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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On February 27, 2010 at 03:34 am local time, a powerful earthquake of magnitude 
8.8 struck central Chile. The epicenter of the earthquake was approximately 8 km off the 
central region of the Chilean coast. With an inclined rupture area of more than 80,000 
square km that extends onshore, the region of Maule was subjected to a direct hit, with 
intense shaking of duration of at least 100 seconds, and peak horizontal and vertical 
ground acceleration of over 0.6 g. According to the Ministry of Interior of Chile, the 
earthquake caused the death of 521 persons, with almost half of the fatalities caused by 
the consequential tsunami. Over 800,000 individuals were directly affected through 
death, injury and displacement. More than a third of a million buildings were damaged to 
varying degrees, including several cases of total collapse of major structures. The 
transportation system was dealt a crippling blow, with 830 failures registered with the 
Ministry of Public Works on roads in both the public and private transportation networks. 
Severe disruption of commerce as well as the rescue and response effort resulted from 
the damage to roads, embankments and bridges. 
Only a few acceleration records were released to the engineering community as of 
December 2010; this withholding of such information of great importance to detailed 
studies that benefits society at-large is regrettable. The available records confirm the 
severe shaking that resulted from the earthquake and the long duration of the strong-
motion part of the records. The dearth of available records led the MAE Center group to 
generate spectrum compatible signals, as described in the report, for back-analysis. 
Geotechnical effects were widespread and comprised massive landslides, buried tank 
heave, uplift of up to 3 m, and liquefaction. Buildings and bridges suffered damage 
because of both structural and foundation failure. The major harbor facilities at Coronel 
and Talcahuano suffered excessive damage and were closed for several weeks after 
the earthquake. 
Failure to engineered buildings was due to the common causes of irregularity and 
limited ductility, with a few cases of damage due to a special provision in the Chilean 
code that allows structural walls with thin webs. On the whole, the performance of 
engineered structures was reasonable, taking into account the magnitude and proximity 
of the earthquake. The latter conclusion is supported by the observations from several 
back-analyses presented in this report. Damage to non-engineered construction is as 
expected in major earthquakes. Most reinforced concrete bridges behaved well; 
displacements were in general larger than the design displacements, as evidenced by 
the severe yielding of seismic restrainers and the demolition of shear keys in 
abutments. Fragility relationships for common types of overpasses in Chile have been 
derived in this report and are offered for use in assessment of the impact from future 
earthquakes. 
The role of social networking tools in enabling the affected population to 
communicate was a most interesting feature in the response to this earthquake. Due to 
iv 
the failure of the power grid, and the congestion of the cellphone network, the 
population resorted to short message service and web social media. Ham radio 
networks were activated to fill gaps due to the failure of the radio network in places. 
The MAE Center field reconnaissance team members consider that Chilean 
engineering was proven to be robust and that seismic design provisions and 
construction practices are of high standard. The extensive damage from this Mw = 8.8 
earthquake is expected and within the ‘life safety’ performance target of seismic design 
codes. 
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1 OVERVIEW 
1.1. MACRO-SEISMIC DATA 
On February 27, 2010 at 03:34 am local time, the fifth largest worldwide recorded 
earthquake with a magnitude of 8.8 struck central Chile. The earthquake nucleated in 
the subduction region between the oceanic Nazca plate and the continental South 
American plate. The epicenter of the earthquake was approximately 8 km off the 
Chilean coast (35.909° S, 72.733° W) and the hypocenter was located at a depth of 35 
km. The epicenter of the earthquake was relatively far away from major cities (the 
closest city Chillán was 95 km from the epicenter), and the fault associated rupture 
covered a region of approximately 80,000 square kilometers, causing major disruption 
and losses. Taking into account the inclined fault rupture and the earthquake 
magnitude, most cities in the coastal region of central Chile were subjected to a direct 
hit with almost zero distance from the causative fault. 
 
Figure 1.1 Left: epicenter of the February 27, 2010 Maule, Chile earthquake and 
closest major cities; Right: geographical location and bordering countries 
of Chile (note: epicentral distances mean very little in the case of great 
earthquakes of fault rupture regions of thousands of square kilometers) 
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Chile borders the South Pacific Ocean between Argentina and Peru (Figure 1.1). 
From north to south, Chile extends 4,270 km (with a coastline of 6,435 km) while the 
average east to west distance is only 177 km. The northern two-thirds of Chile is located 
on the Nazca Plate which moves towards the South American Plate and forms the 
Peru-Chile Trench. The strip shape of Chile that runs parallel to the Peru-Chile Trench 
makes the country prone to earthquakes. Chile has experienced several large 
earthquakes including the strongest ever recorded earthquake (1960 Valdivia 
earthquake) within the last century. The history of earthquakes forced Chile to develop 
strict regulations on seismic design of infrastructure. 
1.2. STATISTICS ON DAMAGE, CASUALTIES, AND ECONOMIC LOSSES1 
Over 12 million people were estimated to have experienced intensity VII or larger 
(on the Modified Mercalli scale), over 2 million people were affected to some level and 
there were 800,000 victims (injured, lost housing, died or missing) as a consequence of 
the earthquake. The impacts of the earthquake were observed in the following regions: 
Valparaíso, Metropolitan, O’Higgins, Maule, Bíobío and Araucania. Five large and 45 
small cities in these regions with populations over 100,000 and 5,000, respectively, 
were impacted. The death toll as reported by the Ministry of Interior of Chile was 521. 
Fifty six people were reported to be missing. The fatalities were mainly in coastal areas, 
and where caused by the tsunami (more than 200 out of 521). Tsunami heights were 
calculated or observed to be as high as 12 m at some locations. 
A total of 370,051 houses were damaged from earthquake and the consequential 
tsunami. The damage distribution is given in Table 1.1. The cost of damage to private 
houses is estimated as $3.7 billion. The adobe construction in Maule region suffered the 
most damage. In Curicó, 90 percent of adobe construction was destroyed. According to 
the Ministry of Health, 130 hospitals have experienced some damage accounting for the 
71 percent of all public hospitals in Chile. The distribution of these hospitals in affected 
regions is provided in Table 1.2. Out of 130 hospitals, four became uninhabitable, 12 
had greater than 75 percent loss of function, only eight were partially operational after 
the main shock, and 80 hospitals needed repairs. The estimated damage to hospitals is 
$3.6 billion. A total of 4,013 schools (representing nearly half of the schools in the 
affected areas) suffered significant damage. Repair and reconstruction needs are 
estimated as $3 billion. Four hundred and forty four churches, which account for the 47 
percent of all churches in the country, were heavily damaged. The engineered buildings 
in general performed very well. According to the reconnaissance report prepared by Los 
                                                 
1  The information in this section is compiled from reports issued by the government of Chile, Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and United 
Nations (UN) Country Team in Chile. Statistics from reconnaissance efforts of other agencies including: 
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE), Earthquake Engineering Research 
Institute (EERI), Los Angeles Tall Buildings Structural Design Council (LATBSDC), and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
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Angeles Tall Buildings Structural Design Council, a study by Rene Lagos using the 
building permit statistics from National Institute of Statistics Chile indicated that out of 
9,974 buildings constructed between 1985 to 2009, only four buildings collapsed and 50 
buildings need to be demolished. Less than 2.5 percent of engineered structures in 
Chile suffered damage and out of all casualties, less than 20 died in engineered 
buildings. 
Table 1.1 Housing damage distribution 
 
Table 1.2 Number of hospitals effected from the earthquake by region 
 
According to the Ministry of Treasury, the economic losses are estimated to be $30 
billion (loss of infrastructure: $20.9 billion, loss of production: $7.6 billion, other costs 
such as nutrition and debris removal: $1.1 billion) which is equivalent to 17 percent of 
the GDP of Chile. The Ministry of Agriculture estimated the agriculture sector losses to 
be $252 million from Valparaíso to Araucania. Seventy percent of the country’s 
vineyards were located in the areas that were affected by the earthquake. According to 
Chilean Wine Corporation, an estimated 20 percent of the production was lost which 
amounts to $250 million. The Ministry of Public Works announced that the rehabilitation 
of damaged roads, airports, dams, canals, bridges and water towers will cost at least 
$1.2 billion. A major portion of the losses was to the transportation networks. According 
to the Ministry of Public Works, as of July 2010, the cost of the transportation 
infrastructure emergency repair is about $317 million while the reconstruction cost is 
estimated at $378 million for the public (non-private concessions) network only. 
According to the Ministry of Labor, a total of 8,417 people were made redundant from 
their jobs. The International Labour Organization reported this figure as 93,928. 
Destroyed Major damage Minor damage TOTAL
Coastal 7,931 8,607 15,384 31,922
Urban Adobe 26,038 28,153 14,869 69,060
Rural Adobe 24,538 19,783 22,052 66,373
Government Housing Developments 5,489 15,015 50,955 71,459
Private Housing Developments 17,448 37,356 76,433 131,237
TOTAL 81,444 108,914 179,693 370,051
Region # of hospitals
Valparaiso 21
Metropolitan 31
O'Higgins 15
Maule 13
Bio-Bio 28
Araucania 22
TOTAL 130
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The earthquake also caused a blackout that affected the 93 percent of the entire 
population and lasted for several days in some locations. Severe problems occurred in 
telecommunication systems due to power outage. Breaks or leaks to water and waste 
water pipes were observed and several elevated tanks collapsed, while buried tanks 
heaved out of the ground. Water canals also experienced some damage. The oil 
refinery in Santiago suffered minor damage and resumed operation 10 days after the 
earthquake. The other major refinery of the country located in Concepción (Bíobío 
region) experienced significant damage due to refractory in the heaters falling to the 
heater floor. Earthquake and the resulting tsunami damaged several ports (including the 
most important ports of the country: Valparaíso, Constitución, San Antonio, Talcahuano 
and Coronel), fish processing plants and wharfs. The damage to ports severely affected 
transnational trade. More than 26,000 small-scale fishermen lost their sustenance and 
the fishing capacity was reduced by 75 to 90 percent after the event. Out of the 59 ports 
considered by the National Confederation of Small-Scale Fisherman of Chile, 38 were 
found to have suffered significant damage. Santiago International Airport was out-of-
operation for a week due to extensive nonstructural damage. This caused significant 
economic losses to airline companies and disruption to air traffic. Minor damage to 
Concepción Airport occurred. No commercial flights were allowed from and to 
Concepción airport for 10 days after the earthquake. Out of 12,000 highway bridges 
approximately 200 were damaged and about 20 of these bridges had collapsed spans. 
1.3. FIELD MISSION ITINERARY AND GPS TRACKS 
The MAE Center team traveled from Santiago (North) to Concepción (South) and 
back using ground transportation in three groups with focus on structural, transportation 
and geotechnical aspects of the reconnaissance mission. The team spent 6 days in 
Chile and visited several damage sites in Santiago, Talca, Concepción, Talcahuano and 
Coronel. The team also attended meetings with researchers from the Catholic 
University of Chile, University of Concepción, and University of Chile, the mayor of 
Talca, and officials from roadways concessions of Itata and Talca. Extensive follow-up 
work continued for several months, mainly undertaken by a member of the MAE Center 
who was on sabbatical at the Catholic University, Santiago. The field mission details, 
composition of the team and areas of expertise are provided in Table A.1. Figure 1.2 
shows the travel route of the team as recorded by the GPS travel log. Detailed GPS 
travel logs in each city are provided in Appendix A.4. The subsequent chapters of this 
report provide more detailed information on the seismology and strong ground motion, 
performance of the built infrastructure, geotechnical observations, and social impacts of 
the earthquake. 
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Figure 1.2 GPS travel log for the entire field mission (blue line: structures group, 
green line: geotechnical group) 
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2 ENGINEERING SEISMOLOGY 
2.1. TECTONIC SETTING 
The Maule Earthquake of 27 February 2010 nucleated on the subduction zone that 
runs along the entire ~5000 km length of the western coastline of South America, known 
as the Peru-Chile trench (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/). Earthquakes in this region are 
due to stress buildup resulting from the movement of the oceanic Nazca plate eastward 
and downward towards the South American plate, as shown in Figure 2.1, at a rate of 
approximately 70 mm per year (Schellart et al., 2007). This value can be compared to 
other subduction zones with slip rates of: ~70 mm/year for Java trench where the Indo-
Australian plate subducts beneath the Sunda plate (Bilham et al., 2005), ~40 mm/year 
for the Cascadia subduction zone where Juan de Fuca plate subducts beneath the 
North American plate (DeMets et al., 1990), and ~20 mm/year for the Himalayan arc 
region where the Indian plate subducts beneath the Eurasian plate (Rao et al. 2003). As 
shown in Figure 2.2, the dense and heavy oceanic crust (Nazca plate) subducts 
beneath the lighter continental crust (South American plate). The formation of the Andes 
Mountain range is related to plate tectonics. It is believed that the thickening of the 
Andean crust is mostly due to tectonic shortening of the South American plate (Kley and 
Monaldi, 1998, Schellart et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 2.1 Subduction zone between the Nazca and South American plates 
(Schellart et al., 2007) 
The Pacific rim that runs along the coast of Chile includes the following features: (1) 
an oceanic trench (as a topographic deep from latitude 4° N to 40° S, and a negative 
gravity belt from 40° S to 56° S), (2) a sub-parallel discontinuous chain of active and 
dormant volcanoes, (3) a zone of active seismicity (where the lower limit of earthquake 
8 
hypocenters deepening from beneath the trench to beneath the volcanic chain and the 
continent), and (4) progressive thickening of the crust away from the ocean basin from 
11 km up to 55-70 km (Plafker and Savage, 1970). According to Barazangi and Isacks 
(1976) the Peru-Chile trench can be separated into five segments where each of the 
segments has a relatively uniform dip. The two segments along the shoreline of 
northern and central Peru (2° S to 15° S) and along central Chile (27° S to 33° S) have 
a dip angle of about 10° to the east. In contrast, the three segments near southern 
Ecuador (0° to 2° S), southern Peru and northern Chile (15° to 27° S), and southern 
Chile (33° S to 45° S) have steeper dip angles from 25° to 30°. It is interpreted that the 
individual segments are bounded by tears in the subducting slab. However, later studies 
(Bevis, 1986; Bevis and Isacks, 1984) interpreted the segment boundaries as a smooth 
contortion rather than a tear (Cahill and Isacks, 1992). An earlier study by Swift and 
Carr (1974) divides the northern and central Chilean seismic zone into seven segments. 
The northern Chile (from 19.5° S to 29° S) is characterized by four segments where the 
dip angle varies from 30° at the north to 15° at the south, while the central Chile is 
divided into three segments. It is observed that the earthquakes of magnitude greater 
than 8.2 occur within individual segments while the earthquakes with magnitude less 
than 8 occur on or near the segment boundaries. 
 
Figure 2.2 Cross-section of the subduction zone (Gerbault et al., 2009) 
2.2. HISTORICAL SEISMICITY IN THE REGION 
Due to the close proximity to the Nazca-South America subduction zone, Chile has 
long been subjected to earthquakes of large magnitude. On average, a magnitude 8.0 
earthquake occurs every decade and a magnitude 8.7 earthquake or greater is 
observed within a century. Table 2.1 lists the earthquakes of magnitude 8.0 or greater 
that affected Chile since the records started in this region. Amongst these earthquakes, 
the most notable ones are the 1868 Valdivia and 1939 Chillán earthquakes that claimed 
more than 50,000 lives; the 1960 Valdivia earthquake which is the largest earthquake 
ever recorded by seismological instruments; and the 1730 Valparaíso and 1751 
Concepción earthquakes which occurred in the vicinity of the 2010 earthquake and 
produced tsunamis of considerable size in the Pacific Ocean. 
Before the 2010 Maule Earthquake, Ruegg et al. (2009) studied the seismic gap 
between Constitución and Concepción using GPS measurements and concluded that 
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more than 10 m of displacement accumulated since the last large interplate event (1835 
earthquake) and the region has the potential to produce an earthquake of magnitude 8-
8.5. 
Table 2.1 Historical earthquakes in Chile with magnitude 8.0 or greater, from 1570 
to 1953 from Lomnitz (1970), 1953 to present from U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS) 
 (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical_country.php#ch
ile) 
Year Epicentral Region Magnitude
1570 Concepción 8.5 
1575 Valdivia 8.5 
1604 Arica 8.5 
1647 Santiago 8.5 
1657 Concepción 8 
1730 Valparaíso 8.75 
1737 Valdivia 8 
1751 Concepción 8.5 
1796 Copiapó 8 
1819 Copiapó 8.5 
1822 Valparaíso 8.5 
1835 Concepción 8.25 
1837 Valdivia 8 
1868 Arica 8.5 
1877 Pisagua 8.5 
1880 Illapel 8 
1906 Valparaíso 8.6 
1922 Huasco 8.4 
1928 Talca 8.4 
1939 Chillán 8.3 
1943 Illapel 8.3 
1960 Valdivia 9.5 
1985 Santiago 8.0 
1995 Antofagasta 8.0 
2010 Maule 8.8 
The map in Figure 2.3 shows recent major earthquakes in Chile alongside seismic 
gaps. The white circles indicate the rupture for individual events, the red circles show 
the epicenters and the yellow dots are the aftershocks. From north to south, the Peru-
Chile trench has ruptured in several incidents except for three locations that are shown 
with red lines. The segment of the subduction zone, Concepción gap in Figure 2.3, 
between the 1985 Valparaíso and the 1960 Valdivia earthquakes, which last produced 
an earthquake in 1835, is the zone that ruptured during the 2010 earthquake. Another 
segment, the Arica gap has been relatively inactive since 1877 and has the potential to 
produce an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 to 8.5. There has been energy release with the 
10 
Valparaíso (1906 and 1985), La Serena (1943) and Vallenar (1922) earthquakes in the 
La Serena seismic gap but it is uncertain if all of the energy accumulated in this region 
has been released with these events. 
 
Figure 2.3 Recent major earthquakes in Chile and seismic gaps (Laboratoire de 
Géologie, Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS), CNRS, Paris, 
France, http://www.geologie.ens.fr/~vigny/chili-f.html) 
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2.3. THE 27 FEBRUARY 2010 EARTHQUAKE 
The Maule earthquake struck Chile on 27 February 2010 at 03:34 a.m. local time. 
The magnitude of the earthquake is estimated as Mw 8.8. The epicenter was located 
offshore at 35.909° S, 72.733° W with the following distances to major cities: Chillán 95 
km, Concepción 105 km, Talca 115 km, and Santiago 335 km. The hypocenter was 35 
km deep (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/). The 
average slip over the approximately 81,500 km2 rupture area was 5 m, with slip 
concentrations down-dip, up-dip and southwest, and up-dip and north of the hypocenter. 
Relatively little slip was observed up-dip/offshore of the hypocenter. The average 
rupture velocity was estimated to be in the range of 2.0-2.5 km/sec. The Global Centroid 
Moment Tensor (GCMT) solution yielded a seismic moment of 1.84 x 1022 Nm, a 
centroid location of 35.95° S, 73.15° W, and a best double couple fault plane geometry 
with strike and dip angles of 18°, and a rake angle of 112° (Lay, et al., 2010). 
The simulation of the fault rupture based on the study by Lay et al. (2010) is 
provided in Figure 2.4. It is seen from the inset in Figure 2.4 that shows the normalized 
power as a function of time that the duration of the earthquake exceeded 3 min. 
However, the significant energy was released within the first the 2 min. It is also 
concluded by studying the propagation of rupture that the fault was bilateral, spreading 
away from the epicenter in both the north and south directions. 
 
Figure 2.4 Frames from the simulation of the fault rupture (Lay et al., 2010) 
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The size of the fault zone varies depending on the calculation method. According to 
method proposed by the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC), the size of the 
fault zone is 189 x 530 km. This method is also used for the strong ground motion 
derivations given in Section 2.4 of this report. The fault zone by NEIC is shown in Figure 
2.5. The prediction from California Institute of Technology yields a fault size of 170 x 
560 km, as shown in Figure 2.6. The colors on the fault zone indicate the amplitude of 
slip, relative movement of one fault plane with respect to the other. The slip amplitude 
reached 9 m at peak location. As a comparison, the maximum value of slip during the 
Chile event is only about 2 times that of the recent Haiti earthquake (maximum slip is 
about 5 m). However, the amount of energy release is approximately 500 times larger. 
This is due to much larger rupture zone in the Chile earthquake as compared to the 
case of Haiti. The slip distribution on the fault cross-section is shown in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.5 Fault zone and surface prediction of the slip distribution, NEIC, USGS 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/fi
nite_fault.php) 
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Figure 2.6 Fault zone and surface prediction of the slip distribution, California 
Institute of Technology 
 (http://www.tectonics.caltech.edu/slip_history/2010_chile/) 
 
Figure 2.7 Slip distribution on fault cross-section according, California Institute of 
Technology (http://www.tectonics.caltech.edu/slip_history/2010_chile/) 
The vertical movement of the ground is shown in Figure 2.8. The uplift reached as 
high as 2 m and settlements of 0.4 m were observed. The coast of Chile moved west, 
into the ocean as much as 6 m at some locations. 
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Figure 2.8 Predicted surface deformation. The vertical component is shown with 
color scale and the horizontal component is indicated with arrows 
(http://www.tectonics.caltech.edu/slip_history/2010_chile/) 
The instrumental intensity map for the main event is shown in Figure 2.9. As seen in 
the figure, the earthquake was strongly felt in a large area, and the instrumental 
intensity reached as high as IX at some locations. Several aftershocks followed the 
main event. According to U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), by 6 March 2010 more than 
130 aftershock were recorded, thirteen with magnitudes greater than 6.0, by 26 April 
2010, 304 aftershocks of magnitude 5.0 or greater were registered. Out of these 
earthquakes 21 had magnitudes greater than or equal to 6.0. The distribution of 
aftershocks within the period from the main event until 24 March 2010 scaled by 
magnitude is shown in Figure 2.10. The aftershock distribution color-coded by depth is 
shown in Figure 2.11. 
The earthquake was the 5th strongest earthquake recorded worldwide (after the 
1960 Chile, 1964 Alaska, 2004 Sumatra and 1952 Kamchatka earthquakes). It was felt 
as far as Southern Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil. The initial event was strong 
enough to even cause seiches in Lake Pontchartrain near New Orleans, Louisiana (The 
Weather Channel, www.weather.com). According to a joint study between several 
institutions including the Ohio State University and University of Memphis, GPS 
measurements indicated that the South American plate moved westward: Concepción 
and Santiago moved 3 m and 27.7 cm to the west, respectively and even Buenos Aires 
15 
(Argentina) moved 4 cm (http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/chilequakemap.htm). The 
displacements of the South American plate based on the GPS measurements are 
shown in Figure 2.12. 
When compared to other events that occurred on the same trench, the 2010 
earthquake created relatively small tsunami. It is hypothesized that the earthquake had 
its largest stress release in shallower waters compared to previous events. Hence, the 
height of the displaced water column is much less. The earthquake generated large 
waves and caused more dramatic effects locally but did not have enough energy to 
travel the Pacific Ocean and cause significant damage in other parts of the world 
(Faculty of Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, University of 
Twente, http://www.itc.nl/27February2010-Earthquake-in-Chile). 
 
Figure 2.9 Instrumental intensity map for the main shock 
 (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/global/shake/2010tfa
n/) 
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Figure 2.10 Aftershocks by magnitude, 2/27/10 to 3/24/10, the superimposed 
rectangle has dimensions 200 km x 600 km 
 (http://www.iris.edu/hq/chile/maps) 
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Figure 2.11 Aftershocks by depth, 2/27/10 to 3/27/10, the superimposed rectangle 
has dimensions 200 km x 600 km 
 (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010tfan/) 
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Figure 2.12 Displacement of the South American Plate as a result of the 2010 Maule 
earthquake (http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/ chilequakemap.htm) 
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2.4. STRONG GROUND MOTION 
2.4.1. Available Measurements 
Ground motions were recorded by two departments at the University of Chile. At the 
time of writing this report, recordings at 10 stations were available from the 
Seismological Service at the department of Geophysics and recordings at 9 stations 
were available from Red National de Acelerografos Departamento de Ingenieria Civil 
(RENADIC). These stations are listed in Table 2.2, along with peak ground acceleration 
of each component and distances to fault based on different measures. RENADIC did 
not provide digital records. However, plots of acceleration time-histories and response 
spectra were made available. No information is available regarding the site 
classifications for any of the strong motion stations. The finite fault model by Hayes 
(2010) shown in Figure 2.5 is used to calculate the closest distance to the rupture 
plane. Figure 2.13 shows the surface projection of fault and location of the stations 
along with seismic zones defined by the Chilean seismic code, NCh 433 (1996). 
Table 2.2 Information on stations and the recorded strong ground motions 
Station PGA (g) Distance (km)* 
ID Name NS EW Vert de dh dsp drup 
Seismological Service 
CCSP Colegio San Pedro, Concepción 0.65 0.61 0.58 109.1 114.6 0.0 36.4 
CSCH Casablanca 0.29 0.33 0.23 311.7 313.6 20.9 48.5 
MELP Melipilla 0.57 0.78 0.39 283.0 285.1 0.0 52.5 
ANTU Campus Antumapu, Santiago 0.23 0.27 0.17 323.0 324.9 25.3 66.1 
STL Cerro Santa Lucia 0.24 0.34 0.24 334.2 336.0 32.5 69.2 
LACH Colegio Las Americas 0.31 0.23 0.16 339.1 340.9 39.8 72.9 
CLCH Cerro Calán, Satiago 0.21 0.23 0.11 343.8 345.6 43.1 74.8 
OLMU Olimue 0.35 0.25 0.15 353.7 355.4 62.2 78.6 
SJCH San José de Maipo 0.47 0.48 0.24 332.5 334.4 49.8 78.8 
ROC1 Cerro El Roble 0.19 0.13 0.11 361.6 363.3 67.9 85.4 
RENADIC 
MMVM Viña del Mar (Marga Marga) 0.35 0.34 0.26 336.7 338.5 47.0 60.8 
CEVM Viña del Mar (Centro) 0.22 0.33 0.19 337.8 339.6 48.5 61.0 
MAIP CRS MAIPU RM 0.56 0.48 0.24 321.3 323.2 19.1 64.0 
CURI Hosp. Curicó 0.47 0.41 0.20 170.4 174.0 13.0 65.1 
SRSA Hosp. Sotero de Río RM 0.27 0.26 0.13 325.2 327.1 29.7 68.0 
UCSA Universidad de Chile Depto Ing. Civil (Interior Edificio) Satiago 0.17 0.16 0.14 331.6 333.5 30.0 68.0 
MMSA Estación Metro Mirador Satiago 0.24 0.17 0.13 329.5 331.3 30.3 68.2 
LTSA Hosp. Luis Tisne RM 0.30 0.29 0.28 332.3 334.2 33.4 69.6 
VALD Hosp. Valdivia 0.09 0.14 0.05 437.8 439.2 182.8 192.7 
*de: epicentral distance, dh: Hypocentral distance, dsp: distance to surface projection of the fault, and drup: 
distance to rupture plane. 
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Figure 2.13 Rupture zone, seismic zone from the Chilean seismic code and locations 
of stations; green circle – RENADIC, yellow circle – Seismological 
Service 
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Figure 2.14 Accelerations and Arias Intensity, Left: station CCSP; Right: station 
MELP 
Figure 2.14 shows the two records, provided by the Seismological Service, that 
have the highest peak ground acceleration (PGA), alongside their Arias Intensity. PGA 
of horizontal component from CCSP and MELP are 0.65 g and 0.78 g, respectively. The 
5 percent damped elastic spectra for the recorded ground motions are shown in Figure 
2.15. Figure 2.16 shows the spectra separated based on the seismic zone specified in 
the Chilean seismic code along with the recommended design spectra for soil types I to 
IV (from rock to saturated cohesive soil). In general the design spectra from Chilean 
seismic code match relatively well with the spectra from recorded ground motions. 
However, for soil I and II, the spectra of records exceed the design spectra for the 
intermediate period range. Additionally, as shown in Figure 2.16 (c and d), the spectra 
of the records at stations MAIP, CURI, CCSP and MELP, exceed significantly the 
design spectra for periods shorter than 1 sec. Moreover, the amplifications for these 
records are 4.26, 4.06, 3.39, and 3.67, respectively, which is an indication of the 
severity of these records, particularly when compared with the value of 2.70, which is 
the 84 percentile amplification factor given by Newmark and Hall (1982), and used 
widely. The amplifications of these records are also noteworthy when compared with the 
amplification factors from the Chilean seismic code, which vary from 2.76 to 3.09 
depending on the soil class. Such a feature could result in relatively high demand 
imposed on short period structures that are designed to conform to code requirements. 
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Figure 2.15 Left: horizontal spectra; Right: vertical spectra 
 
Figure 2.16 Comparison of measured spectra (5 percent damping) with design 
spectra from the Chilean seismic code 
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Table 2.3 shows the durations of the records based on the bracketed (with a 
threshold = 0.05 g) and significant duration definitions. The duration of shaking is 
directly related to the inelastic deformation and energy dissipation demands on the 
structure. If a structure is deformed beyond its elastic limit, the amount of permanent 
deformation will depend on how long the shaking is sustained. Therefore, the duration 
of earthquake shaking is a very important measure of the damage potential of the 
ground motion. The duration of strong ground motion can vary depending on the 
magnitude, source distance, and local site conditions. The duration of strong ground 
motion increases with increasing earthquake magnitude (Chang and Krinitszky, 1977). 
The existing attenuation relationships for strong motion duration (Kamiyama, 1984, 
Papazachos et al., 1992) show that the bracketed duration decreases with increasing 
distance from the source, while the significant duration increases. This is because the 
bracketed duration uses the absolute threshold of the amplitude, which decreases with 
increasing distance from the fault. On the other hand, the significant duration utilizes the 
relative threshold and thus, is related to the geometry of the accelerogram, regardless 
of its absolute amplitude. The existing attenuation relationships for a large earthquake 
like the Chile earthquake are sparse. Therefore, to compare the severity of the 
durations from the Chile earthquake records, horizontal components of large 
earthquake records are selected from the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research 
(PEER), Next Generation Attenuation (NGA) project database 
(http://peer.berkeley.edu/nga). The selected records are from relatively large 
earthquakes (Mw ≥ 6.9) with a peak ground acceleration of 0.1 g or more and source 
distances of less than 100 km. Figure 2.17 shows the comparison of the bracketed 
durations (with a 0.05 g threshold value). This figure indicates that the records from the 
Chile earthquake exhibit longer duration when compared with records from other 
earthquakes. Therefore, this feature of the records from the Chile earthquake could 
have increased the amount of damage. 
Table 2.3 Bracketed and significant durations of ground motions (in seconds) 
 
* Db: bracketed duration with a threshold of 0.05g 
** Ds: significant duration (5 – 95 % of Arias Intensity) 
Station ID 
NS EW Vert 
Db* Ds** Db Ds Db Ds 
CCSP 113.14 64.23 110.91 67.62 98.87 61.80 
CSCH 45.17 32.18 50.26 30.07 41.49 32.08 
MELP 60.23 31.94 58.83 31.78 49.59 33.79 
ANTU 44.50 37.52 45.88 37.68 45.02 47.56 
STL 58.93 41.20 50.96 37.37 59.80 40.86 
LACH 49.33 36.73 54.87 37.54 52.04 46.95 
CLCH 47.06 42.42 49.30 38.32 44.00 50.38 
OLMU 47.06 27.56 48.86 32.08 28.76 34.02 
SJCH 71.21 37.93 68.36 38.56 70.71 53.98 
ROC1 34.89 31.88 34.20 35.48 22.95 36.63 
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Figure 2.17 Comparison with the durations of horizontal components of earthquake 
records selected from the NGA database 
2.4.2. Attenuation of Ground Acceleration 
The available data from the 19 stations in Chile are used to select appropriate 
attenuation relationships for horizontal ground motions. Attenuation relationships that 
are developed for subduction zones with thrust mechanisms and large magnitude 
events, and that utilize a large and uniformly processed data base are selected here. 
The five candidate attenuation relationships are 
• Zhao et al. (2006) 
• Atkinson and Boore (2003) 
• Campbell and Bozorgnia (2003) 
• Gregor et al. (2002) 
• Youngs et al. (1997) 
Note that most of the existing attenuation relationships are not developed to 
account for large magnitude earthquakes such as the 2010 Chile earthquake. Due to 
lack of soil type information for the ground motion records, comparison of the selected 
attenuation relationships is made for rock site as shown in Figure 2.18. The predictions 
of the candidate attenuation relationships for the various soil classifications are provided 
in Appendix B. As shown in Figure 2.18, the PGA and spectral acceleration values 
predicted by the attenuation relationship by Zhao et al. (2006) and Campbell and 
Bozorgnia (2003) are in good agreement with the measured data. Therefore, these 
attenuation relationships are selected to generate hazard maps and the ground motions 
required for back-analysis. 
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Figure 2.18 PGA and response spectra attenuation relationships for rock 
2.4.3. Selection of Records for Back-Analysis of the Case Studies 
The records for back-analysis of the case studies reported in Chapter 4 are selected 
amongst the digital recordings available through the Seismological Service at the 
University of Chile. Most of the stations provided by RENADIC are located north of the 
rupture plane and none of the stations are within 100 km from case study structures. 
Additionally, no digital records from RENADIC are available. Therefore, records from 
the Seismological Service are considered as seed signals to generate records for back-
analysis. Figure 2.19 shows locations of structures for case studies and the locations of 
the stations. 
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Figure 2.19 Yellow dots: location of stations (that are maintained by the 
Seismological Service) and red dots: structures considered as case 
studies 
To generate a suite of records representative of the hazard at the location of the 
structures where no recordings exist, distance from the fault, attenuation relationship for 
PGA, and acceleration response spectra are considered. Particularly, the selected 
attenuation relationships are combined accounting for their standard deviation as 
follows: 
1 2( ) ( )z z z c c cRSA RSA m W RSA m Wασ ασ= ± ⋅ + ± ⋅  (2.1) 
where ܴܵܣ௭ is the attenuation relationship by Zhao et al. (2006), ܴܵܣ௖ is the attenuation 
relationship by Campbell and Bozorgnia et al. (2003), ݉ is the mean value, ߙ is the 
weight on standard deviation, here selected as 0 , േ0.5 , േ1.0  and േ 1.5 , ߪ  is the 
standard deviation, and ܹ  is the weight on the spectral acceleration attenuation 
relationship. 
Figure 2.20 shows the comparison between the combined attenuation relationship 
and PGA or spectral values of the recorded ground motions. The attenuation 
relationship is plotted along with its standard deviation of േ0.5ߪ, േ1.0ߪ and േ1.5ߪ. The 
combined attenuation relationship is used to generate the target spectra. The target 
spectra for each site are shown in Figure 2.21. The mean spectra and spectra 
generated with േ0.5ߪ are selected to be used in spectrum matching of the case study 
records as this range is considered to capture the variation in the strong ground motions 
from the Chile earthquake. 
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Figure 2.20 Combined attenuation relationship for rock site for PGA and spectral 
acceleration at different periods 
 
Figure 2.21 Target spectra for back-analysis of the case studies 
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The spectrum-matched records are generated by using WavGen (Mukherjee and 
Gupta, 2002) program. WavGen modifies a given seed record to render it compatible 
with a given spectrum. The seed records are selected from the ground motions 
recorded by the Seismology Service at the University of Chile. Table 2.4 lists the 
synthetic records for each site and Figure 2.22 shows example acceleration time 
histories for the generated records and the ensuing response spectra. 
Table 2.4 Generated synthetic records for back-analysis of the case studies 
Site Fault Distance (km) Seed Records 
Odontology Building 37.9 CCSP-NS, MELP-NS 
ITATA Bridge 53.4 MELP-NS, STL-EW 
Bridge on Route (Ruta) 5 68.9 LACH-NS, STL-EW 
 
Figure 2.22 Spectrum matched records for back-analysis of the case studies 
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3 GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING 
Chapter 3 provides the observations of the geotechnical group of the MAE Center 
team. The MAE Center geotechnical team was also the GEER 
(http://www.geerassociation.org/) Team D, the reconnaissance was a joint activity and 
the observations are also reported in GEER (2010). For a detailed and extensive set of 
observations of geotechnical damage during this earthquake the reader is referred to 
the GEER report. 
The visited sites are categorized under (i) landslides, (ii) ports, (iii) roadway 
embankments, (iv) bridges, (v) bridge embankments, (vi) underground structures, (vii) 
retaining structures, and (viii) building foundations. Further observations related to 
bridge structures that have geotechnical implications are given in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3. 
3.1. LANDSLIDES AND POTENTIAL TECTONIC MOVEMENTS 
The team visited a series of landslides along road P22 south of Arauco as illustrated 
in Figure 3.1 through Figure 3.4. The series of landslides formed a linear feature nearly 
parallel to the coastline as illustrated in Figure 3.2. All along the road vertical offsets 
were observed in the pavement as illustrated in Figure 3.4 indicative of deeper 
movement. This was the case even when the road was further away from the landslide. 
It appeared that this was more than a classical “surficial” landslide feature with 
potentially larger tectonic movement. In our discussions with faculty at the University of 
Chile they indicated that this linear feature was related to tectonic movement. Additional 
investigations of this feature would be worthwhile. 
 
Figure 3.1 Arauco landslides/coastal bluff features view 1, (-37.246292°,-
73.324251°) to (-37.242213°,-73.421207°) 
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Figure 3.2 Arauco landslides/coastal bluff features view 2, (-37.246292°,-
73.324251°) to (-37.242213°,-73.421207°) 
 
Figure 3.3 Arauco landslides/coastal bluff features, April 14, 2010 
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Figure 3.4 Arauco landslides/coastal bluff features, note linear feature in the road 
showing a vertical offset, April 14, 2010 
3.2. PORTS 
The port structures that were visited by the MAE Center team are listed in Table 
3.1. The locations are marked on maps in Appendix A.4 with the icons that are 
designated in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Locations of the port structures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name Latitude Longitude Figures in the report 
P2 Port of Talcahuano 36°42'52.21"S 73° 6'30.22"W 
Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 
4.8, Figure 4.9, Figure 4.24 
P3 Port of Coronel 37° 1'43.95"S 73° 8'59.16"W 
Figure 3.8, Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, Figure 
3.11, Figure 3.12, Figure 3.13 
P4 Port Lota 37° 5'50.26"S 73° 9'33.59"W Figure 3.14, Figure 3.15, Figure 3.16 
P5 Port St. Vicente 36°43'31.86"S 73° 7'56.60"W 
Figure 3.17, Figure 3.18, Figure 3.19, Figure 
3.20 
3.2.1. Port of Talcahuano 
The port of Talcahuano and the surrounding area were inundated by a tsunami 
caused by the main earthquake shock (Figures 1-3). The tsunami reached about 0.5 km 
inland and caused significant damage to the port facilities. Numerous ships were carried 
inland or were toppled. The sea walls and port dock were also damaged. The damage 
appeared to be a result of lateral spreading and liquefaction. However, it was difficult to 
determine whether this liquefaction was a result of ground shaking or due to the sudden 
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rise in pore water pressure due to dynamic loading resulting from the tsunami induced 
waves. Most likely, this was a result of a combination of both factors. 
 
Figure 3.5 Port of Talcahuano, arerial view (-36.71109°, -73.113898°) 
 
Figure 3.6 Tsunami displaced ship, Port of Talcahuano, April 15, 2010 
 (-36.71109°, -73.113898°) 
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Figure 3.7 Damaged sea wall and dock, Port of Talcahuano, April 15, 2010 
 (-36.71109°, -73.113898°) 
3.2.2. Port of Coronel 
The port of Coronel is a major commercial port parts of which experienced 
damaged due to liquefaction and lateral spreading. A laydown area for container 
storage, consisted of fill supported by a shallow sheet pile experienced extensive 
damage. Figure 3.8 through Figure 3.13 show the corresponding photos of the visited 
areas. The sheet pile wall is embedded about 4-6 m below the ground surface and 
protrudes about 15-20 m above the ground surface. At waypoint 11 (see Figure 3.8) an 
outward movement of about 110 cm was measured, while the port officials reported 
their survey gives about 150 cm. The measurements extended all the way back to the 
warehouses. At waypoint 12 lateral displacements of about 40 cm was measured, and 
at waypoint 13, an outward movement of 10 cm was measured. It did not appear that 
the underlying sands were treated during construction to minimize liquefaction potential. 
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Figure 3.8 Port of Coronel, area marked by GPS tracks along the coast experienced 
lateral spreading (-37.028874°,-73.149768°) 
 
Figure 3.9 Lateral spreading looking north view 1, Port of Coronel, April 14, 2010 
 (-37.028874°, -73.149768°) 
Way point 11
Way point 12
Way point 13
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Figure 3.10 Lateral spreading looking north view 2, Port of Coronel, April 14, 2010 
 (-37.028874°, -73.149768°) 
 
Figure 3.11 Lateral spreading looking south, Port of Coronel, April 14, 2010 
 (-37.028874°,-73.149768°) 
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Figure 3.12 Sand eject, lateral spreading, Port of Coronel, April 14, 2010 
 (-37.028874°,-73.149768°) 
 
Figure 3.13 Seaside view of the sheet pile wall that experienced lateral spreading, 
Port of Coronel, April 14, 2010 (-37.028874°, -73.149768°) 
3.2.3. Port Lota 
The team visited a pier used by fishing boats at Port Lota. The pier appeared 
undulating likely due to pile settlements. Numerous battered piles with broken 
connections were observed. 
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Figure 3.14 Port Lota (-37.097295°,-73.159331°) 
 
Figure 3.15 View of undulating fishing pier, Port Lota, April 14, 2010 
 (-37.097295°,-73.159331°) 
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Figure 3.16 Typical broken pile connections, Port Lota, April 14, 2010 
 (-37.097295°,-73.159331°) 
3.2.4. Port St. Vicente 
The team also visited a wharf at Port St. Vicente (Figure 3.17) that experienced 
lateral spreading and failure of a gravity wall resulting in complete loss of section of the 
wharf or significant lateral movement as shown in Figure 3.18 through Figure 3.20. The 
lateral displacement of the wall was measured to be about 167 cm close to the section 
of the wall that failed and about 63 cm further away. Nearby there were fish processing 
plants that experienced significant damage due to lateral spreading of the foundations. 
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Figure 3.17 Port St. Vicente, observation along fishing wharf 
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Figure 3.18 Lateral spreading and damage to quay wall, blue fish processing plants 
in the background damaged by lateral spreading, Port St. Vicente, April 
15, 2010 (-36.725517°, -73.132390°) 
 
Figure 3.19 Failed section of the quay wall, Port St. Vicente, April 15, 2010 
 (-36.725517°, -73.132390°) 
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Figure 3.20 Measurement of displacement of the wall due to lateral spreading, Port 
St. Vicente, April 15, 2010 (-36.725517°,-73.132390°) 
3.3. ROADWAY EMBANKMENTS 
More detailed information regarding the performance of roadway embankments 
during the earthquake is given in Chapter 5. The observations in the sections below 
have apparent geotechnical features, therefore included here. 
3.3.1. Roadway Embankment ~5km south of Parral 
Numerous roadway embankments failed throughout the earthquake-affected zone. 
This includes a number of embankments along the main north-south highway, Route 
(Ruta) 5. The failures were due to either failure of the underlying soils or the 
embankments themselves. Figure 3.21 and Figure 3.22 show a repaired embankment 
along Route 5. The failed section was bounded by two streams (Figure 3.21) and it is 
likely that the failure of the embankment was due to loss of strength in the underlying 
soils (liquefaction) during shaking.  
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Figure 3.21 Roadway embankment ~5km south of Parral, north is up, Route 5 South 
 (-36.185671°,-71.825415°) 
 
Figure 3.22 Northbound lane looking south, Repaired Roadway Embankment ~5km 
south of Parral, Route 5 South, April 15, 2010 
 (-36.185671°, -71.825415°) 
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3.3.2. Route 5 South Overpass Embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill Overpass 
The team visited a damaged overpass embankment on the right side of the 
northbound lane of Route 5 South. The damage of the embankment appeared to be due 
to shaking of the embankment material. The underlying soil appears to be intact with no 
evidence of loss of strength. The embankment bulged laterally and settled. The 
overpass embankment to the left of the northbound lane did not show signs of damage. 
 
Figure 3.23 Route 5 South overpass embankment, looking north, to Retiro at Tucapel 
Mill (-36.051209°,-71.768005°) 
 
Figure 3.24 Damage to overpass embankment, Route 5 South overpass 
embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill, April 15, 2010 (-36.051209°,-
71.768005°) 
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Figure 3.25 Route 5 South overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill, April 15, 
2010 (-36.051209°,-71.768005°) 
3.4. BRIDGES 
The observations provided in Section 3.4 are specifically on the geotechnical 
failures at the Mataquito Bridge. The overall behavior of bridges during the Mw 8.8 
Maule earthquake is described in detail in Section 4.3. 
3.4.1. Puente Mataquito 
This bridge crosses the Mataquito River close to the Pacific Ocean. Extensive 
liquefaction and lateral spreading occurred at the north and south abutments and in the 
adjacent fields. Figure 3.26 though Figure 3.34 show photos of the bridge and the 
damage. 
The lateral spreading at the south abutment appeared to be more confined due to 
the topography of the area. However, at the north side, due to existence of large fields 
around the bridge, extensive lateral spreading was observed (extending ~270 m from 
the river edge). The lateral spreading from the edge of the abutment wall to the first row 
of piers was ~54 cm and the total lateral spreading from the edge of the abutment wall 
to the river’s edge was ~180 cm (over a distance of ~65 m). The approach embankment 
was ~7.6 m high, and settled ~70 cm relative to the bridge deck. The approach 
embankment experienced outward transverse movement of ~60 cm from the centerline 
as manifested by cracking of the asphalt along a distance of ~200 m. This appeared 
due to liquefaction and failure of the underlying soil and was evidenced by compression 
ridged in the field at the toe of the embankments. 
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Figure 3.26 Puente Mataquito, looking north, April 16, 2010 
 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
 
Figure 3.27 Lateral spreading on the south end of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, April 
16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
48 
 
Figure 3.28  Lateral spreading on the north end of the bridge, Puente Mataquito, April 
16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
 
Figure 3.29 Settlement of the north abutment of the bridge, 70 cm offset at the bridge 
deck, Puente Mataquito, April 16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
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Figure 3.30 Cracking and transverse movement (60 cm on each side) of 
embankment due to liquefaction of underlying soil, north abutment of the 
bridge, Puente Mataquito, April 16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
 
Figure 3.31 Compression ridges at toe of embankment, due to liquefaction of 
underlying soil and settlement of embankment, north abutment of the 
bridge, Puente Mataquito, April 16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
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Figure 3.32 Lateral Spreading towards the river, north abutment of the bridge, 
Puente Mataquito, April 16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
 
Figure 3.33 North abutment shoved into bridge deck due to lateral spreading, Puente 
Mataquito, April 16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
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Figure 3.34 Shearing of bridge girder, north abutment of bridge, Puente Mataquito, 
April 16, 2010 (-35.050712°,-72.162258°) 
3.5. BRIDGE EMBANKMENTS 
Not many embankment failures were observed at the bridge sites that the structures 
team investigated in the field (Sections 4.3 of Chapter 4). A few bridge embankments 
suffered minor damage due to strong shaking as shown in Figure 3.35 and Figure 3.36. 
The approach road that the embankment supports did not show cracks that may have 
caused by the minor damage. It is expected that the cracking of the embankment may 
have affected the dynamic properties of the embankment during the strong shaking, but 
it is not clear how this would have affected the seismic response of the bridge. 
 
Figure 3.35 Surface cracks at the embankment of Las Mercedes Bridge 
Cracked embankment
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Figure 3.36 Cracks at the embankment of Perquilauquén Bridge 
3.6. UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES 
All underground structures encountered by the team appeared to be undamaged by 
the earthquake shaking. The following types of underground structures were 
encountered: 
a. Wide highway box structures (Figure 3.37): these were cut and cover high way 
box structures with 3 lanes of traffic in one direction. These are constructed in the 
relatively stiff gravels. The portal of these structures consisting of U-shaped wall 
sections appeared undamaged. These structures were encountered at two 
locations and each of them was more than 1 km long. 
b. Santiago Metro underground structures (Figure 3.38): no damage was observed 
in the tunnels and underground stations of the Santiago Metro. 
c. Highway Tunnels (Figure 3.39): highway tunnels encountered by the team 
appeared to be intact. A highway tunnel failure (not observed by the team) was 
reported on the northbound lane of Route 5, north of Santiago. It is known as “La 
Calavera” tunnel near Calera. The tunnel is old and had problems before the 
earthquake. It was in rock with rock bolts providing support. After the earthquake, 
rock block was dislodged. 
It appeared that well engineered underground structures performed very well even 
under strong shaking. This is consistent with observations during other earthquakes 
elsewhere. 
Cracked embankment
Location at the bridge site
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Figure 3.37 Highway box structures in Santiago, Top: inside highway box structures, 
April 12, 2010 (-33.424750°,-70.622422°); Bottom: approach to box 
tunnels, April 16, 2010 (-33.541472°,-33.541472°) 
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Figure 3.38 Santiago Metro, Baquedano Station, April 12, 2010 
 
Figure 3.39 Highway tunnel, Route 5 South, April 12, 2010 
 (-33.912867°,-70.725533°) 
3.7. RETAINING STRUCTURES 
The team did not observe damage to modern retaining wall structures. The 
mechanically stabilized earth walls forming the approach embankment for the two ring 
road bridges, which have failed, have remained intact as illustrated in Figure 3.40 
and Figure 3.41. 
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Figure 3.40 Mechanically stabilized earth wall, bridge ring 3, Lo Echevers Bridge, 
Santiago, April 13, 2010 (-33.376159°,-70.747742°) 
 
Figure 3.41 Mechanically stabilized earth, bridge ring 2, Miraflores Bridge, Santiago, 
April 13, 2010 (-33.394269°,-70.769402°) 
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3.8. BUILDING FOUNDATION 
A building in Talcahuano, that was tilted, which appeared to be due to failure in the 
foundation soil, was encountered. This was in an area very close to Port of Talcahuano 
that was hit by a tsunami. Unfortunately the team was unable to further verify this as the 
building was demolished shortly afterwards. 
 
Figure 3.42 Green Building, Talcahuano (-36.714268°,-73.116368°) 
 
Figure 3.43 Tilting of the Green Building due to bearing soil failure, Talcahuano, April 
15, 2010 (-36.714268°,-73.116368°) 
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4 STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING 
The MAE Center field reconnaissance team visited several cities affected by the 
earthquake. The visited cities are Santiago, Concepción, Talcahuano, and Talca. 
Several meetings were held with researchers and city officials in Chile to gain a better 
and more wide-ranging understanding of structural response in the earthquake. In the 
following, an overview of the regional damage where the MAE Center team visited is 
presented followed by detailed discussion on damage of specific buildings and bridges 
from the affected region. In addition, inelastic response history analyses of one building 
and two bridges are presented to clearly understand the damage observed from the 
field investigation and the interaction between the strong shaking and structural 
response. Fragility curves for a common bridge type are also derived. 
4.1. REGIONAL DAMAGE DESCRIPTION AND STATISTICS 
4.1.1. Santiago Region 
Santiago Region is one of the Chile’s 15 administrative divisions. Santiago in the 
Santiago Region is the capital of Chile with a population of around 5.2 million. Although 
the epicentral distance to Santiago is 335 km, the city is close to the rupture area due to 
the large size of the fault as shown in Figure 4.1. There were six seismic stations 
operating in the city during the earthquake event. The PGAs of the recorded 
accelerations were in the range of 0.17 g to 0.56 g for horizontal components and 0.11 
g to 0.28 g for vertical components. Figure 4.2 compares the response spectra of the 
recorded ground motions with the design response spectrum for Santiago. The figure 
clearly shows that the recorded acceleration is significantly higher than the design 
spectrum for the station CRS MAIPU RM. The seismic intensity (MMI) of the city was VII 
based on 922 responses in “Did You Feel It?” community survey system in USGS 
(accessed on Nov. 1, 2010). The intensity of VII corresponds to very strong shaking and 
moderate structural damage. 
 
Figure 4.1 Location of Santiago Region and recorded PGAs in Santiago 
Epicenter
Santiago
PGAs of (NS,EW, UD) components
(0.21, 0.23, 0.11)
(0.30,0.29,0.28)
(0.24,0.17,0.13)
(0.27,0.26,0.13)(0.23,0.27,0.17)
(0.56,0.48,0.24)
8 km
Rupture area
50 km
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Figure 4.2 Location of Santiago Region and recorded PGAs in Santiago, compared 
to the code design spectrum (black line) 
The majority of the RC building structures performed well, suffering only minor 
damage or even no damage at all. A limited number of RC buildings suffered significant 
damage due to structural deficiencies such as soft stories, horizontal and vertical 
irregularities, and short-column effects. Several other buildings were damaged due to 
the failure of RC walls since proper confinement in walls were not required until recently 
in the Chilean Building Code. The followings are some of the observed damage in 
Santiago. 
The building shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 was used as a hotel. It consists of 
a tall tower and a low-rise commercial building. The damage shown in the figures are at 
the juncture of the two structures. As it can be observed in Figure 4.3, the beams 
connecting the tall tower and the low-rise building were fractured at different locations. It 
is speculated that the beams were damaged as the tall building vibrated out-of-phase 
from the low-rise building, which could develop large force demand at the connection 
between the two buildings. The beams connecting the two buildings may not have been 
designed to resist the force demand from the vertical irregularity. Figure 4.4 shows that 
the longitudinal reinforcement bars of the beam in the in-plane direction have relatively 
smaller diameter than the longitudinal bars of the beam connected in the transverse 
direction. It is speculated that the beam running in transverse direction was designed to 
support gravity loads from above while the in-plane beam shown in the figure was 
designed only to support its self-weight.  
The building in Figure 4.5 was constructed with load bearing walls covered with 
masonry cladding. The surface of the bearing walls was chipped such that the cement 
mortar can develop bond strength between the walls and masonry cladding. During the 
earthquake, a large portion of the cladding collapsed possibly causing injuries or even 
death should people have been around the building at the time of the earthquake. The 
building also incurred damage on a beam between two vertically slender windows, 
which separate the two large walls. The beam apparently acted as a link (or coupling) 
CRS MAIPU RMMetro Mirador Santiago 
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beam between the two large walls, and did not have enough shear strength to resist the 
force demand imposed on it. Figure 4.6 presents the failure of a beam-column 
connection where heavy longitudinal reinforcement bars were used without sufficient 
shear stirrups within the beam-column connection.  
 
Figure 4.3 Failure due to vertical irregularity 
 
Figure 4.4 Close-up view of the damaged structure 
The observed damage summarized above is limited to the buildings that the MAE 
Center team visited. Other teams from around the world reported damage to several 
different structures (e.g. EERI, 2010). For instance, several buildings with reinforced 
concrete walls were damaged due to insufficient confinement in the bearing walls. Until 
recently, the Chilean design code did not require confinement in the wall due to the 
satisfactory performance of buildings during the past earthquakes. Latest design code, 
however, requires walls to be designed as special structural walls. In conclusion, overall 
Longitudinal bars of transversely 
connected beam
Longitudinal bars of the beam
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the building structures in Santiago performed very well except only a few heavily 
damaged buildings. 
 
Figure 4.5 Collapsed masonry cladding wall and a damaged beam 
 
Figure 4.6 Failure of beam-column connection 
4.1.2. Bíobío Region 
The Bíobío region is located at the south half of the rupture area as shown in Figure 
4.7. The coseismic slip displacement of Talcahuano and Concepción areas was 
approximately 300 cm as shown in Figure 2.12. Main damage to the region was in the 
coastal towns of Arauco Province, Talcahuano city, and Dichato town. These coastal 
towns were severely damaged due to the tsunami that followed the earthquake. The 
area in Talcahuano Bay that was inundated with the tsunami is approximately 11 km2 as 
shown in Figure 4.8, and more than 30,000 people were directly affected by the tsunami 
(INE, 2010).  
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In Concepción, several buildings collapsed and several 15 to 20 story buildings 
were severely damaged and will have to be demolished. Due to the damage in multi-
story buildings, streets in downtown Concepción were closed. 
In terms of transportation networks, most of the highways and streets suffered only 
minor damage but a few bridges were damaged or suffered collapse. In the Bíobío 
region, two bridges with 2 km length collapsed and one bridge of 2 km length was 
severely damaged. While the number of failed bridges is small, they constituted critical 
links in the regional transportation network. The failed bridges connect the industrial 
areas to the ports. In addition, many people living in San Pedro City used to commute to 
Concepción through these bridges. After the failure of the bridges, there was one to two 
hours of delay in crossing the Bíobío River. In addition, some people who used to live in 
San Pedro and commute to Concepción had to relocate to Concepción due to the delay 
in commuting. Even though the number of bridge failures was small, the failure of the 
critical bridges led to significant impact on the area. At the time of the field investigation 
around one and half months after the earthquake, only 30 percent of industries were 
operating in the region due to the damage to structures, lack of power, or difficulty in 
accessing the facility. There were failures in critical lifeline networks, such as gas, 
electricity, water, and wastewater. Based on information obtained from researchers in 
the University of Concepción, the electricity network was restored before other utility 
networks. The gas network was not restored to many areas in the region even after 
several weeks. As some parts of the network were very old, the vulnerability was high 
leading to irreparable damage in some instances. 
In general, the central valley area of the Bíobío region, shown in Figure 4.7, was not 
largely affected by the earthquake except for damage to a few highway bridges and 
slopes. The area, however, suffered failures in water irrigation systems. 
 
Figure 4.7 Damage to Bíobío Region 
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Talcahuano
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Dichato
Tsunami damage
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Biobio River
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Tsunami damage
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Figure 4.8 Talcahuano Bay area affected by tsunami 
Figure 4.9 shows the effects of tsunami on structures in Talcahuano Bay. In Figure 
4.9 (Left), the roof of the building nearly collapsed and tanks were toppled due to the 
tsunami. Many ships were found inland and some of the ships hit to building structures 
damaging the buildings as shown in Figure 4.9 (Right). 
 
Figure 4.9 Effects of the tsunami on Talcahuano Bay. Top: toppled tank and 
collapsed building due to tsunami; Bottom: a dislocated ship, which 
damaged a storage building 
1 mile
1 mile
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4.1.3. Maule Region 
The epicenter of the earthquake was located offshore Maule Region as shown 
in Figure 4.10. Talca is the capital of the Maule region with a population of 230,000 and 
a building stock of 75,000 houses. The city suffered the heaviest damage from the 
earthquake due to its proximity to the rupture area. In addition, there was a large 
number of adobe houses in Talca built without seismic provisions, thus compounding 
the damage. Out of 75,000 houses in Talca, around 15,000 houses were damaged 
among which around 4,000 either collapsed or need to be demolished. Many of these 
buildings were built 100 to 200 years ago. Especially in the old downtown area, where 
the majority of buildings were made of adobe, approximately 80 percent of buildings 
were damaged and half of the damaged buildings are intended for demolition. 
 
Figure 4.10 Location of the Maule Region and the rupture plane 
In addition to the adobe construction, there are many new reinforced concrete or 
masonry structures built according to the modern design code. The newly constructed 
buildings rarely suffered damage except for a couple of buildings which suffered 
architectural damage rather than major structural damage. Structures constructed in 
timber with adobe infill performed relatively well. When interviewed by the field 
reconnaissance team, the mayor of the city expressed concern that people in the city 
may rebuild their houses with adobe due to its low construction cost. At the time of the 
visit, the city did not have modern design guidelines for adobe construction.  
The failure of adobe buildings is expected to cause a secondary problem. The area 
has a rainy winter season between May and August. The debris from adobe buildings 
Epicenter
Talca
Rupture area
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can easily turn to mud and may block the sewer system causing flooding hazard. After 
the earthquake, the city suffered damage of critical lifeline network including gas, water, 
and electricity. All lifeline networks were recovered in seven-to-ten days. Downtown 
areas took longer to recover from damage as networks were relatively dense and 
therefore difficult to repair. While the networks were recovered in a relatively short time, 
the city suffered from interdependency of networks operation. For instance, the water 
system was repaired earlier than electricity. Due to the lack of electricity, however, 
water could not be pumped to higher grounds. 
Figure 4.11 shows modern RC buildings in Talca. The building on the left did not 
suffer noticeable damage. The building on the right suffered damage to an architectural 
feature. Though this is not a structural failure, it is life threatening. The buildings on the 
left in Figure 4.12 are typical adobe structure and the one on the right is a masonry 
historic structure in downtown Talca. The majority of the damaged buildings in Talca 
were similar to those shown in Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.11 Modern RC buildings in Talca 
 
Figure 4.12 Adobe buildings and historic structures 
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4.2. EFFECTS ON BUILDINGS 
Section 4.2 focuses on the effect of the earthquake on building structures. Damage 
observed in specific structures that were visited by the MAE Center team is described 
qualitatively. The information regarding the visited buildings is provided in Table 4.1. 
The location of each building and the related figure(s) in the report are also provided in 
the table. The column “icon” indicates the label of the buildings as shown in the figures 
in Appendix A.4. Additionally, a case study building is modeled and numerical analysis 
is performed. The analytical results are compared with the field observations. 
Table 4.1 List of buildings visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude Figure 
B1 Ciudad Empresarial Hotel 33°23'23.20"S 70°37'8.93"W Figure 4.5 Figure 4.6 
B2 University of Concepción - Chemistry Building 36°49'46.25"S 73° 2'13.42"W Figure 4.13 
B3 University of Concepción - Gymnasium 36°49'35.47"S 73° 2'12.10"W Figure 4.14 
B4 Case Study 1: University of Concepción - Odontology Building 36°49'32.78"S 73° 2'11.35"W 
Figure 4.15 
Figure 4.16 
B5 Damaged Highrise in Concepción 36°49'45.02"S 73° 2'43.00"W Figure 4.17 
B6 O'Higgins Tower in Concepción 36°49'44.35"S 73° 3'16.70"W Figure 4.18 
B7 Alto Río Condominium in Concepción 36°49'41.82"S 73° 3'42.07"W Figure 4.19 
B8 Building close to Talcahuano Port 36°43'9.76"S 73° 6'29.63"W Figure 4.22 
B9 Building at the Talcahuano shorefront 36°43'6.13"S 73° 6'29.94"W Figure 4.23 
B10 Building at the Talcahuano Port 36°42'58.19"S 73° 6'28.06"W Figure 4.24 
B11 Typical adobe failures in Talca 35°25'32.82"S 71°39'2.74"W Figure 4.12 
B12 Edificio Aranjuez 35°25'40.75"S 71°39'57.46"W Figure 4.25 
B13 Tribunales de Justicia de Talca 35°25'16.65"S 71°40'3.83"W Figure 4.11 (Right) 
B14 Building at the Ciudad Empresarial Business Complex 33°23'16.99"S 70°37'2.57"W 
Figure 4.3 
Figure 4.4 
4.2.1. Observed Building Damage 
A number of buildings of the University of Concepción experienced damage to 
different extents. Fire started immediately after the earthquake in the Chemistry 
Building, Figure 4.13. It is postulated that no significant structural damage occurred. 
However, the steel framed structure was completely burned and had to be demolished. 
The columns carrying the steel roof of the University Gymnasium suffered cover 
spalling, most probably, due to slight buckling of longitudinal reinforcement (Figure 4.14). 
It was observed that no transverse reinforcement existed and smooth bars were used 
as longitudinal reinforcement, typical of pre-1960 construction in Chile. Deep cracks, 
which are expected to result from the out-of-plane movement of the walls, were also 
observed on the sidewalls at the discontinuity region (where the tiered seats end). 
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Figure 4.13 Fire in the Chemistry Building after the earthquake and the demolishing 
process 
 
Figure 4.14 Gymnasium, University of Concepción, buckling of longitudinal 
reinforcement and cover spalling, out-of-plane failure of sidewalls at the 
wall discontinuity 
The most severe structural damage to University of Concepción buildings was 
observed in the Odontology building, Figure 4.15. The damage was concentrated at the 
first story due to high demands and relatively small dimensions of the columns. 
Combined axial and shear failures were observed at the top portions of the first story 
columns. Non-uniform spacing of stirrups, as seen in Figure 4.15, due to construction 
errors is expected to have caused the decrease in shear capacity. Shear failure of 
columns due to short column effect was also observed in addition to diagonal cracks 
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around openings in masonry infill walls. As shown in Figure 4.16, the Odontology 
building was being retrofitted at the time of the MAE Center team’s visit. The retrofitting 
efforts included the jacketing of first and service story (a half height story used for 
accessing the building utility lines) columns. 
 
Figure 4.15 Odontology Building, University of Concepción, combined shear-
compression failure at the top of first story columns, short column effect, 
and diagonal cracks in masonry infill walls around openings 
 
Figure 4.16 Retrofitting of the Odontology Building, University of Concepción 
Several engineered buildings in Concepción have suffered significant damage. It is 
speculated that this is mainly attributed to soil conditions in the city, which is 
sedimentary valley with sand deposits having depths of approximately 80 m. The soft 
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soil conditions might have resulted in relatively high accelerations at long periods. Other 
high-rise RC buildings in the city (some of them are mentioned below) also suffered 
significant damage supporting the effect of soil conditions. The reinforced concrete 
condominium high-rise building shown in Figure 4.17 suffered severe damage to 
bearing walls and was left uninhabitable.  
 
Figure 4.17 Severely damaged condominium high-rise building in Concepción 
The O’Higgins tower in Concepción attracted considerable attention of structural 
engineers due to its mode of failure. The building was constructed in 2008 with 21 
stories above ground level and 2 stories underground. The building experienced 
collapse of a story at the framing setbacks, Figure 4.18. The severe damage to coupling 
beams was also clearly visible at the façade of the building. 
The 15-story Alto Río condominium in Concepción, Figure 4.19, collapsed in a 
spectacular manner. It is postulated that the walls on one side of the building, as-
designed, were not continued to the ground level which caused the building to overturn, 
leading to tensile failure of RC walls and toppling of the entire structure. The 
discontinued walls that caused the irregularity in plan and elevation, hence twisting of 
the structure, are shown in plan and elevation view sketches of the building in Figure 
4.20 and Figure 4.21, respectively. At the time of the earthquake 87 people were inside 
the building among whom eight people died and 79 survived (52 escaped on their own 
efforts, 27 were rescued). 
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Figure 4.18 O’Higgins tower in Concepción suffered partial story collapses 
  
Figure 4.19 Alto Río condominium in Concepción, structure toppled on one side, and 
failure of bearing walls 
Complete 
story failure
Damage to 
coupling beams
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Figure 4.20. Sketch of plan view for Alto Río condominium (the sketch is based on the 
information provided in the reconnaissance report by the Los Angeles 
Tall Building Structural Design Council) 
 
Figure 4.21. Sketch of elevation view for Alto Río condominium 
Talcahuano region near Concepción was also seriously affected from the combined 
effects of strong ground motion and tsunami. The RC building, Figure 4.22, beside the 
shoreline near the port of Talcahuano was damaged beyond repair. Figure 4.23 shows 
a number of several buildings at the shorefront damaged due to hydrodynamic loading 
of the waves carrying debris. The buildings of the Talcahuano port, which were mostly 
steel frame, were also damaged and rendered nonfunctional, as shown in Figure 4.24. 
The MAE Center team also visited Talca. The 6-story RC office building shown 
in Figure 4.25 suffered from non-structural damage. The decorative features 
constructed from lightweight concrete on the façade of the building fell down during the 
earthquake. This building exemplified several cases where the non-structural damage 
rendered buildings nonfunctional and caused interruption of various extents after the 
earthquake. 
Discontinued 
structural wall
Discontinued 
structural wall
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Figure 4.22 RC building near the port of Talcahuano damaged beyond repair 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.23 Buildings at the shorefront in Talcahuano damaged due to hydrodynamic 
loading 
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Figure 4.24 Damaged buildings of the Talcahuano port 
 
Figure 4.25 Edificio Aranjuez (6-story office building) was rendered nonfunctional due 
to nonstructural damage after the earthquake 
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In addition to adobe buildings, unreinforced masonry construction was also 
abundant in Talca. The team visited the three story unreinforced masonry government 
building in Talca (Edificio Intendencia Maule, Figure 4.26) which was heavily damaged 
during the earthquake and was nonfunctional at the time of visit. Another unreinforced 
masonry building that was severely damaged in Talca is the Liceo de Niñas Marta 
Donoso, Figure 4.27. Failure of masonry walls due to diagonal shear cracks is shown in 
the figure. 
 
Figure 4.26 Edificio Intendencia Maule in Talca 
  
Figure 4.27 Liceo de Niñas Marta Donoso in Talca 
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4.2.2. Case Study: Odontology Building of the University of Concepción 
4.2.2.a. Introduction and building configuration 
This case study aims to explain the observed damage in the Odontology building of 
the University of Concepción. A brief description of the damage observed by the MAE 
Center team is provided in Section 4.2.1. The Odontology building is located at the 
southern east part of Concepción as shown in Figure 4.28. The structure was used as 
the school of dentistry, which also included rooms for examination and medical 
treatment of patients. Due to the requirements of the building occupancy, the reinforced 
concrete structure has a particular configuration. As shown in Figure 4.29, the structure 
has three regular stories and three, approximately half height, service stories that serve 
to utility lines. 
A typical floor plan of the structure is shown in Figure 4.30. The building has a 
rectangular shape with seven bays in x-direction and five bays in y-direction. Structural 
core-walls are provided at center of the building to resist the majority of the lateral loads. 
Except for minor differences in column dimensions of the exterior frames with five bays, 
the structure is symmetrical with respect to both x- and y-axes. 
 
Figure 4.28 Location of the Odontology building of the University of Concepción and 
the ground motion recording station labeled CCSP 
Station CCSP
Odontology 
Building
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Figure 4.29 The Odontology building of the University of Concepción 
 
Figure 4.30 Typical plan view sketch of the Odontology building 
Service floors
Regular 
floors
7@6.3 m = 44.1 m
5@
7.
0 
m
 =
 3
5 
m
P6
P5
P3 P2
P4 P1 P10
Wall B
Wall C
W
al
l A
W
al
l A
P6 P6
P6
P3
P3P3
P4
P4
P4
P2
P2
P2
P1 P1
P1
P5
P5
P5
P5 P5 P5 P5 P5 P5
P5 P5 P5 P5 P5 P5
P5
P5
Wall B
Wall CW
al
l A
W
al
l A
P10
Modeled FrameX
Y
N
77 
As shown in Figure 4.31, three floors of the building are designed as flat slabs. Flat 
slab floors have shallow (slab-depth) beams between the columns and the slab spans 
the entire floor in both directions. Flat slab design, without the column capitals (or drop 
panels) is commonly used around the world for light loads. Flat slab construction is 
preferred in that it provides more clear space, easier formwork (hence shorter 
construction time), less building height, and architectural flexibility. For the Odontology 
building of the University of Concepción the flat slab design is used for the service floors 
which carry considerably lighter loads compared to the regular floors. 
As seen in Figure 4.29 (also shown in the elevation sketch, Figure 4.31), another 
feature of the building is that masonry infill walls are used at the first floors of the 
exterior frames. Based on the information that the MAE Center team has, it is not 
certain whether the lateral resistance provided by these infill walls were included in 
design calculations. It is postulated that these walls were considered to be non-
structural. The height of the first story is 3.1 m and the height of the masonry infill walls 
was measured to be approximately 2.1 m. 
4.2.2.b. Observed damage 
The earthquake caused interesting damage patterns to the Odontology building of 
the University of Concepción. The structural damage was confined to columns of 
exterior frames. The rest of the observed damage was non-structural; cracking of the 
partition walls (inside the building) and the diagonal cracks of the masonry infill walls at 
the exterior frames. 
As previously discussed in Section 4.2.1, field observations indicated that the 
combined axial-shear failure at the top portions of the columns were due to commonly 
observed short-column effect that results from increased shear demands on a specific 
portion of the vertical members due to a decrease in the effective length. Proper seismic 
design of vertical members targets at formation of plastic hinges at the member ends 
(under the extreme seismic demand). This type of failure can dissipate large amounts of 
energy without a significant reduction in the load carrying capacity. However, the 
unexpected decrease in the member lengths (which resulted from the existence of 
masonry infill walls in the case of the Odontology building) leads to shear failure in the 
members that were designed for flexure. Several of the first-story columns of the 
Odontology building that failed due to short-column are shown in Figure 4.44. 
In the light of the above described observations, it was decided to model the 7-bay 
exterior frame of the building, as indicated in Figure 4.30. The modeling approach, 
earthquake input and the results are described in the following sections. 
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Figure 4.32 Short-column effect observed at the Odontology building 
4.2.2.c. Modeling approach 
The fiber-based finite element analysis software ZEUS NL (Elnashai et al., 2010) is 
used to model the frame shown in Figure 4.30. Modeling approaches for four different 
types of members of the frame: columns, T-beams, flat slabs, and masonry infill walls 
are described below. 
Typical column, beam and slab sections of the frame are shown in Figure 4.33. All 
members except for the masonry infill walls are represented with 3-D elasto-plastic 
beam-column elements described by a cubic shape function (Izzuddin and Elnashai, 
1993). The columns and slabs are modeled using rectangular sections. The fiber-based 
finite element modeling approach allows for modeling of the cross-section and 
placement of the reinforcing bars at their exact locations. The effective flange width (for 
regular floors where a T-beam exists) is calculated according to ACI 318-08 (ACI, 2008). 
For the flat-slab floors, the portion of the slab that contributes to the frame analysis is 
determined by using the following formulation proposed by Luo and Durani (1995a, 
1995b). 
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Parameter ߯  is the reduction factor accounting for gravity loads. ܿଵ  and ܿଶ  are the 
column dimensions in the bending directions and normal to bending direction, 
respectively. ݈ଵ  and ݈ଶ  are the span length in bending direction and in transverse 
direction, respectively, both measured from center to center of the columns. In Eqn. 
(4.3), ௚ܸ is the direct shear force due to gravity load only, ܣ௖ is the area of slab critical 
section, and ௖݂ Ԣ  is the concrete compressive strength. These formulations were 
developed based on the results of several tests conducted on slab-column connections 
and reported in literature. 
 
Figure 4.33 Typical column, beam and slab sections 
The concrete material is modeled using the constant confinement constitutive 
relationship developed by Martinez-Rueda and Elnashai (1997) based on the 
formulations by Mander et al. (1988). Steel is modeled with a bilinear elasto-plastic 
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model with kinematic strain hardening. Based on the information on the design 
drawings, the following material properties are used: a concrete compressive strength of 
29.4 MPa, steel yield and ultimate strengths of 411.6 MPa and 617.5 MPa, respectively. 
In modeling the masonry infill walls the following assumptions are made: infill walls 
do not carry any vertical loads and they can be represented with diagonal struts that 
have horizontal resistance only. The first assumption is justified due to the fact that the 
infill walls have openings for windows which do not transfer the gravity loads. The 
second assumption is related to the modeling approach as described below. 
Masonry walls are modeled with two diagonal compressions struts. The strengths of 
the struts are determined based the following possible failure modes: compression 
failure of diagonal strut, sliding shear failure of masonry along horizontal mortar, and 
diagonal tensile cracking (Paulay and Priestley, 2002). Amongst these failure modes, 
the first and the second one are the most commonly observed for infill walls. Here, the 
shear strengths of each infill wall corresponding to the compression failure of diagonal 
strut and sliding shear failure are calculated and the minimum of the two is used as the 
ultimate strength. 
The modeling of masonry infill walls follow the approach proposed by Mostafaei and 
Kabeyasawa (2004) as adopted by Kwon and Kim (2010). The procedure is described 
in the following. The compressive strength of the masonry prism is an important 
parameter in the modeling approach. According the Paulay and Priestley (2002), the 
compressive strength of the masonry prism, ௠݂Ԣ is estimated as 
( )
( )
cb tb j
m y
u tb cb
f f f
f f
U f f
α
α
′ ′ ′+′ = = ′ ′+  (4.4) 
where ݄ is the height of the masonry unit, ߙ ൌ ݆ 4.1݄⁄ , ݆ is the thickness of mortar, ܷ௨ is 
the stress nonuniformity coefficient and equal to 1.5, ௖݂௕Ԣ is the compressive strength of 
brick, ௧݂௕Ԣ  is the tensile strength of brick and equal to 0.1 ௖݂௕Ԣ , and ௝݂ Ԣ  is the mortar 
compressive strength. 
The use of Eqn. (4.4) requires mechanical properties of the brick and the mortar. 
This information is not available, however, NCh 2123 (2003) specifies the minimum 
compressive strength for clay brick units in the range from 4 MPa (hand-made bricks) to 
11 MPa (machine-made bricks). Additionally, Moroni et al. (2004) provides that the 
typical strength of masonry bricks in Chile is 6-12 MPa. Based on this information, 11 
MPa is selected as the masonry strength ( ௖݂௕Ԣ) in this study. The minimum compressive 
strength for masonry cement mortar (fjԢ) is specified as 10 MPa in NCh 2123 (2003) 
which is also adopted here. 
Compression failure of infill walls occurs as a result of the compression failure of the 
equivalent diagonal strut. The horizontal component of the diagonal strut capacity is 
calculated as 
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cosc w mV zt f θ′=  (4.5) 
where ݖ is the equivalent strut width calculated based on FEMA 306 (1999), ݐ௪ is the 
thickness of the infill panel, and ߠ is the angle defined by the infill height and length. ݖ 
and ߠ  are illustrated in Figure 4.34. The following information is obtained from field 
investigation of the building: mortar thickness is 30 mm, height of masonry units is 75 
mm, and the wall thickness including mortar is 200 mm. 
 
Figure 4.34 Masonry infill walls and the equivalent diagonal strut (Kwon and Kim, 
2010) 
The sliding shear strength of masonry infill walls is calculated based on the Mohr-
Coulomb criteria as follows 
0f Nτ τ μσ= +  (4.6) 
where ߬଴ is the cohesive capacity of the mortar beds, ߤ is the sliding friction coefficient 
along the bed joint, and ߪே is the vertical compression stress in the infill wall. The shear 
strength in terms of force can be written as 
0f w mV t l Nτ μ= +  (4.7) 
where ݈௠ is the length of infill panel (as shown in Figure 4.34) and ܰ is the vertical load 
on the infill wall. The infill walls of the Odontology building do not carry vertical loads, 
therefore, ܰ is approximated as the vertical component of the diagonal compression 
force, i.e. ܴ௖ݏ݅݊ߠ, where ܴ௖ is the diagonal compression force (shown in Figure 4.34) 
which is given as 
0
1 tan
w m
c f
t lR V τμ θ= = −  (4.8) 
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As per Kwon and Kim (2010), the typical ranges for ߬଴ and ߤ are 0.1 ൑ ߬଴ ൑ 1.5 ܯܲܽ 
and 0.3 ൑ ߤ ൑ 1.2 . It is assumed here that ߬଴ ൌ 0.04 ௠݂Ԣ . The friction coefficient ߤ  is 
calculated based on the work by Chen (2003) as 
0.654 0.00525 jfμ ′= +  (4.9) 
The shear strength calculated based on the diagonal compression failure and the 
sliding shear failure cannot exceed 0.83 MPa according to ACI 530-05/ASCE 5-05 
(2005) which imposes the following condition 
max 0.83
w m
V MPa
t l
=  (4.10) 
The two diagonal struts of infill walls provide resistance against lateral load. Here, it 
is assumed that the force-displacement relationship of each diagonal strut follows a tri-
linear curve in terms of compression and the strut has zero tensile strength as shown 
in Figure 4.35. The hysteretic behavior of diagonal struts is modeled with lumped 
springs at the end of the strut and the strut is modeled with rigid truss element. The tri-
linear displacement-force relationship consists of yield shear force (Vy), maximum shear 
force ( ௠ܸ), yield displacement (Uy) and maximum displacement at peak force (ܷ௠). The 
maximum displacement at maximum lateral force is calculated based on the following 
equation by Madan et al. (1997) 
cos
m m
m
dU ε θ
′=  (4.11) 
where ߝ௠Ԣ  is the masonry compressive strain at maximum compressive stress and 
assumed to be 0.0018 and ݀௠ is the diagonal strut length. The maximum drift limitation 
of 0.8 percent is applied as suggested by Kwon and Kim (2010). The initial stiffness ܭ଴ 
is determined as (Madan et al., 1997) 
0
2 m
m
VK
U
=  (4.12) 
where ௠ܸ is the maximum strength taken as the lower of those obtained based on the 
above defined two failure criteria, the stiffness ratio (ߙ) is assumed to be 0.2, and ܷ௬ 
and ௬ܸ are estimated based on ௠ܸ, ܭ଴ and ߙ. 
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Figure 4.35 Hysteretic behavior of diagonal strut elements (Kwon and Kim, 2010)  
The analytical model for the considered frame of the Odontology building is shown 
in Figure 4.36. 
 
Figure 4.36 Analytical model for the exterior frame of the Odontology building 
4.2.2.d. Analysis results 
Since the objective of the analysis conducted here is to investigate the effect of 
masonry infill walls on the response of the structure and observed damage, two building 
configurations are considered: with and without infill walls. An eigenvalue analysis of the 
structure is conducted. The mode shapes for the first three modes (for the configuration 
with infill walls) are shown in Figure 4.37 and the periods for both configurations are 
summarized in Table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.37 Mode shapes for the first three modes (frame with infill walls) 
Table 4.2 Periods of the building with and without infill walls 
 
1st mode, 0.798 sec
2nd mode, 0.262 sec
3rd mode, 0.121 sec
w/ infills w/o infills
1st mode 0.798 0.829
2nd mode 0.262 0.273
3rd mode 0.121 0.164
Periods (sec)
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A total of eight ground motion records are used for inelastic dynamic time history 
analysis of the building. As it is described in detail in Section 2.4.3, for the sites of case 
study buildings a mean acceleration spectrum is developed using the source 
characteristics and a set of suitable attenuation relationships. Two additional spectra 
(+0.5σ and -0.5σ) are also developed. Two seed records are selected (stations CCSP 
and MELP for the case of Odontology building) and spectrum matching is used to obtain 
the spectrum compatible records. For the back-analysis conducted here, the original 
(without spectrum matching) record from the CCSP station (both horizontal 
components) is also used due to close proximity of the station to the building site (6.7 
km as illustrated in Figure 4.28). 
The interstory drift ratio profiles for all eight records and the two configurations (with 
and without infill walls are provided in Figure 4.38. 
 
Figure 4.38 Maximum interstory drift ratio: dotted lines show frame without infill wall, 
solid lines show frame with infill wall 
The interstory drift ratio for all ground motions are compared for the two 
configurations (with and without infill walls) in Table 4.3. Based on the information that is 
provided in Figure 4.38 and Table 4.3, it is concluded that there is a significant reduction 
in the interstory drift ratio of the first floor, reaching as high as 51 percent, when the 
effect of maonry infill walls are considered. 
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Table 4.3 The effect of infill walls on the interstory drift ratio, ID (ID values are in %) 
Ground motion Structure type 
Story 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
Raw Record at station, CCSP 
NS F* 0.64 0.70 1.24 1.39 1.38 1.18
FW** 0.32 0.67 1.15 1.36 1.40 1.19
EIW*** -50.42 -3.38 -7.06 -1.92 1.15 0.88
EW F 0.65 0.99 1.88 2.00 1.90 1.43
FW 0.33 1.03 1.98 2.00 1.90 1.44
EIW -49.73 4.61 5.39 -0.24 0.36 0.99
Synthetic record 
CCSP Mean + 0.5σ F 0.84 1.22 2.45 2.28 2.07 1.42
FW 0.41 1.26 2.59 2.24 2.09 1.43
EIW -51.26 3.02 5.50 -1.81 1.18 1.02
Mean F 0.69 1.02 1.94 1.88 1.68 1.26
FW 0.35 1.08 2.09 1.83 1.69 1.26
EIW -49.31 5.95 7.78 -2.51 0.54 -0.13
Mean - 0.5σ F 0.59 0.88 1.58 1.56 1.39 1.15
FW 0.31 0.93 1.72 1.51 1.37 1.14
EIW -46.58 6.51 8.84 -3.26 -0.93 -0.81
MELP Mean + 0.5σ F 0.83 1.22 2.35 2.14 2.07 1.51
FW 0.42 1.23 2.38 2.16 2.08 1.52
EIW -49.66 0.81 1.02 0.68 0.61 0.85
Mean F 0.68 1.03 1.89 1.74 1.71 1.31
FW 0.36 1.04 1.91 1.74 1.71 1.32
EIW -47.34 1.46 1.32 0.32 0.40 0.56
Mean - 0.5σ F 0.57 0.88 1.56 1.40 1.41 1.14
FW 0.31 0.89 1.58 1.40 1.41 1.15
EIW -44.43 1.24 1.30 -0.04 0.42 0.75
* ID for frame without infill wall, IDF 
** ID for frame with infill wall, IDFW 
*** Effect of infill wall on ID (in %), ܧܫܹሺ%ሻ ൌ ሺܫܦிௐ െ ܫܦிሻ ܫܦி ൈ 100⁄  
In order to explore causes of the shear failure of columns due to the previously 
described short-column effect, it is required to compute the shear capacity of the 
columns and compare it against the shear demand imposed during the earthquake. The 
shear strength of the RC column is calculated according to ACI 318-08 (2008). The 
nominal shear strength ( ௡ܸ) is the summation of the contribution of concrete ( ௖ܸ) and the 
contribution of steel ( ௦ܸ) 
n c sV V V= +  (4.13) 
where 
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 (4.16) 
and ܣ௩ is the area of shear reinforcement within a spacing distance of ݏ, fy is the yield 
strength of steel, ݀ is the effective depth of the section. The contribution of the concrete 
in shear resistance is calculated using Eqn. (4.15) if the member is subjected to a 
compressive force, on the other hand if the member is subjected to axial tension the 
modified equation given in Eqn. (4.16) is used. In Eqns. (4.15) and (4.16): Ag is the 
gross sectional area in ݉݉ଶ, ௨ܰ is the axial force in ܰ with compression being positive, 
௖݂ Ԣ is the compressive strength of concrete in MPa, ܾ௪ is the width of the section web in 
݉݉. The variable ߣ is taken as 1.0 and 0.75 for normal and light weight concrete, 
respectively. 
Since the shear capacity of the member is a function of the axial force acting on it, 
the capacity is evaluated for each time step of the dynamic analysis. The shear demand 
is directly obtained from the finite element simulation. As an example, the shear 
capacity and the shear demand on column 8 (the column numbering is shown in Figure 
4.36) are compared in Figure 4.39. It is observed that the presence of masonry infill 
walls significantly increase the shear demand on the columns and the shear capacity is 
exceeded at certain times throughout the analysis. The shear demand to shear capacity 
ratio for the first story columns are provided for both frames (with and without the infill 
walls) and all ground motion records in Table 4.4. For illustration purposes, these ratios 
are shown using bar plots in Figure 4.40 through Figure 4.42 for different ground motion 
records. It is concluded that the shear demand exceeds the shear capacity of the 
columns for various considered cases. The existence of masonry infill walls significantly 
increases the likelihood of exceeding the shear capacity. For the building without the 
infill walls, the shear demand is exceeded for none of the considered cases under the 
original CCSP record, which can be thought as a more realistic description of the 
earthquake demand. It is known that spectrum compatible records contain a range of 
frequencies that usually do not exist in natural records. 
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Figure 4.39 Comparison of shear capacity and demand for column 8, spectrum 
compatible mean record with seed CCSP 
 
Table 4.4 Shear demand-to-capacity ratio of columns for the first story 
Ground motion 
Max. Shear Demand/Capacity 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
Raw Record at station, CCSP 
NS F 0.57 0.89 0.77 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.54 
FW 1.01 1.03 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.96 0.93 
EW F 0.55 0.84 0.74 0.66 0.72 0.82 0.97 0.62 
FW 1.06 1.07 0.88 0.81 0.91 1.01 1.19 1.18 
Synthetic record 
CCSP Mean + 0.5σ F 0.64 1.05 0.93 0.85 0.88 0.99 1.16 0.68 
FW 1.19 1.17 0.98 0.87 0.88 1.01 1.23 1.26 
Mean F 0.56 0.86 0.77 0.69 0.74 0.84 0.99 0.63 
FW 1.03 0.96 0.81 0.72 0.73 0.85 1.04 1.09 
Mean - 0.5σ F 0.49 0.71 0.63 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.83 0.56 
FW 0.89 0.80 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.70 0.87 0.95 
MELP Mean + 0.5σ F 0.69 1.16 1.01 0.92 0.85 0.88 1.04 0.64 
FW 1.22 1.22 1.02 0.89 0.81 0.89 1.09 1.15 
Mean F 0.59 0.92 0.80 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.85 0.56 
FW 1.06 1.03 0.83 0.74 0.67 0.73 0.93 1.02 
Mean - 0.5σ F 0.51 0.75 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.69 0.48 
FW 0.91 0.87 0.69 0.61 0.54 0.60 0.79 0.90 
* Bold italic font indicates that the shear demand exceeds the shear capacity 
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Figure 4.40 Maximum shear demand to capacity ratio, CCSP record (unmodified): 
empty bars indicate frame without infill walls, solid bars indicate frame 
with infill walls 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.41 Maximum shear demand to capacity ratio, spectrum compatible record 
CCSP: empty bars indicate frame without infill walls, solid bars indicates 
frame with infill walls 
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Figure 4.42 Maximum shear demand to capacity ratio, spectrum compatible record 
MELP: empty bars indicate frame without infill walls, solid bars indicate 
frame with infill walls 
4.2.2.e. Conclusions 
In Section 4.2.2, back-analysis of the Odontology building of the University of 
Concepción is conducted. Field inspection of the building indicated that shear failure of 
the columns on the exterior frames may be due to short-column effect. Rigorous 
modeling of the building is conducted using fiber-based finite element analysis software. 
Two models are constructed, with and without masonry infill walls, in order to study the 
effect of masonry walls on the observed damage. It is concluded that the interstory drift 
ratio at the first story is significantly reduced when the infill walls are present. 
Furthermore, many columns of the first story are expected to fail due to increased shear 
demand as a result of the masonry infill walls. Particularly, for the exterior columns of 
the considered frame the shear demand exceeded the shear capacity considerably 
which indicated severe damage. The analytical results are in agreement with the 
observed damage in the field. 
4.3. EFFECTS ON BRIDGES 
4.3.1. Observed Bridge Damage 
Considering the large earthquake magnitude and rupture area, the damage to 
bridge structures was less than could have been expected. The major highways in Chile 
are constructed and maintained by private companies. The highway network is 
approximately 2,200 km in length and has around 2,000 bridges with span length longer 
than 10 m. Among these structures, only one percent (8 highway and 12 pedestrian 
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bridges) collapsed due to the earthquake. Approximately 100 bridges (50 highway and 
50 pedestrian bridges) were damaged to a level requiring repair. 
The MAE Center field investigation team visited several damaged bridges to study 
failure modes. There had been several teams from other organizations, such as 
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) and Japan Society of Civil Engineers 
(JSCE), which focused on bridge performance. Table 4.5 presents a compiled list of 
damaged bridges, their locations, and failure modes based on the data collected from 
the field investigation and reports available in the public domain (Kawashima et al. 
2010; Yashinsky et al., 2010). 
The most commonly observed bridge damage was due to unseating or 
displacement of superstructure, especially for skewed bridges. Even if the centers of 
mass and stiffness coincide, skewed bridges tend to develop rotation, which results in 
unseating of the bridge girder or failure of shear keys. Bridges designed according to 
relatively recent design practice apparently suffered more damage than bridges 
constructed in the past. In the old construction practice, the integrity of bridge 
superstructure was high due to diaphragms connecting the girders. On the other hand, 
bridges constructed in recent years often did not have diaphragms. As a result of the 
lack of in-plane stiffness and connectivity, bridge girders were damaged due to the 
pounding of the superstructure onto the shear keys. In the report from another field 
investigation team (Yashinsky et al. 2010), it is stated that the seat-width on bridge bent 
was not large enough to prevent unseating. In addition, in many bridges, shear keys 
were not strong enough to resist the lateral forces from the pounding superstructure.  
Only a few bridges reportedly had damage of their substructure. It is speculated that 
as there are not many bridges with integral superstructure-substructure connection, the 
large inertial force from superstructure was not transferred to the substructure. The 
inertial force caused the unseating or large movement of the superstructure, or the 
failure of shear keys. 
In the following, detailed description of bridge failure modes are presented, which is 
followed by numerical case studies in Section 4.3.2. 
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Table 4.5 List of damaged and/or collapsed bridges 
Bridge name | Roadway carried by the bridge | Location  Damage / failure modes and other remarks 
Miraflores Bridge | Vespucio Norte Express | Independencia, 
Santiago 
North bridge had diaphragm between girders and concrete 
shear keys preventing the movement of the superstructure. 
Damage on concrete shear keys.  
South bridge had steel shear keys for each girder. Most of 
shear keys were damaged.  
Lo Echevers Bridge | Vespucio Norte Express | Lo Echevers, 
Santiago 
Skewed bridge. Unseating of superstructure due to large 
transverse displacement.  
Quilicura Bridge | n/a | n/a Skewed steel girder bridge. Unseating of deck. Failure of shear 
keys. Shear keys at only one side was damaged. The bridge 
was maintained by ministry of public work.  
Las Mercedes Bridge* | Route 5 South | 34°4.3235′S 
70°45.753′W 
Skewed pre-stressed girder bridge. Unseating of deck. No 
diaphragms joining pre-stressed girders.  
Costanera Norte | n/a | n/a Skewed bridge. Shear key failure. Large displacement of 
superstructure at abutment.  
Pasarela Peatonal | Route 5, Norte | n/a Pedestrian bridge. Bridge deck was bolted to the bent of the 
bridge. The bolts were sheared and the superstructure 
unseated. The bridge bent was undamaged.  
Perquilauquén Bridge* | Route 5 | 36°15.208’S 
71°48.8257’W 
Consists of two bridges, one built in mid-1990s and the other 
one recently built. The older bridges suffered less damage than 
the new one. The damage on the new bridge was large 
transverse displacement of superstructure. The shear key of the 
new bridge was very weak and failed.  
Juan Pablo II Bridge | n/a | Concepción, 36°49.401’S 
73°5.477’W 
Shear failure on bridge column due to lateral spreading of soil 
toward river.  
Llacolén Bridge | n/a | Concepción, 36°50.039′S 
73°4.623’W 
Indication of lateral spreading toward river. Unseating of several 
ramps.  
Bíobío Bridge | n/a | Concepción, 36° 50.442' S  73° 4.115' W Built in 1930s. Closed before the earthquake for maintenance. 
Steel stringer bridge. Unseating of bridge decks. Total collapse.  
Las Ballenas Bridge | n/a | Suburb of Concepción  Rupture of elastomeric bearings.  
Río Claro Bridge | n/a | n/a Unreinforced masonry bridge built in 1870. Collapsed during the 
earthquake.  
Tubul Bridge | n/a | Arauco South most location of complete bridge collapse. Steel girder 
bridge. All eight steel girders were unseated. In JSCE slide, it 
was reported that performance of foundation was insufficient.  
Paso Cladio Arrau* | n/a | 36° 39.536' S  72° 19.545' W Minor transverse translation of the superstructure. The bridge 
was serviceable after the earthquake. 
Route 5 overpass near Chillán* | Route 5 (overpass) | Chillán 
36° 35.083' S  72° 6.534' W 
Skewed bridge. Large translation and close to unseating of 
superstructure. Shear key at the abutment was not long enough 
to provide resistance to superstructure.  
Notes: Detailed discussion on bridge damage are presented in the following for the bridges with asterisks (*). 
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4.3.1.a. Las Mercedes Bridge 
The bridge shown in Figure 4.43 is an overpass on Route 5 located at 34°4'19.44"S, 
70°45'45.18"W based on GPS coordinate. The bridge is a two-lane two-span bridge 
with three pre-stressed concrete girders and reinforced concrete deck. The structure 
has a skew angle of approximately 10 degree. The superstructure is supported on 
elastomeric bearings and restrained to the substructure with seismic restrainers with a 
diameter of 23.6 mm, which corresponds to #7 or #8 bars in the U.S. 
Major damage to the bridge was caused by the rotation of the superstructure, which 
resulted in the failure of shear keys and unseating of a girder. Ideally, if a bridge’s 
centers of mass and center of stiffness coincide, the superstructure should not develop 
rotational seismic demands even if there is a skew angle. Due to the nonlinearity of 
bridge components, such as gaps between superstructure and abutment, the skewed 
bridges can relatively easily be subjected to large rotational demand. For 
instance, Figure 4.44 (a) shows an illustration of an intact skewed bridge. When there is 
seismic demand in longitudinal or transverse direction that is large enough to close the 
gap between the superstructure and the abutment, the center of stiffness is shifted 
toward the abutment where the gap is closed. Once the centers of stiffness and mass 
become different, the translational seismic demand develops rotational seismic demand 
as shown in Figure 4.44 (b), which eventually causes rotation of the superstructure. The 
rotational seismic demand can cause torsional failure of bridge bents in the monolithic 
bent-deck construction. As superstructure was supported on elastomeric bearings for 
the investigated bridge, the superstructure rotated, which resulted in the failure of shear 
keys and unseating of a girder. 
Figure 4.45 shows deformation of bridge superstructure. The west end of the 
superstructure was shifted toward the south by approximately 1.5 m as shown in Figure 
4.45 (a). The gap between the superstructure and east abutment was closed and the 
gap between west abutment and superstructure was about 0.5 m. Bent remained nearly 
intact except for the cracks on the shear keys. Figure 4.46 shows the seismic 
restrainers connecting the superstructure and substructure. The seismic restrainers 
seemed to have been installed to prevent uplift of the superstructure. The effectiveness 
of the restrainers on actual seismic performance of the bridge superstructure could not 
be clearly explained based on the information obtained during the field investigation. It 
appeared, however, that the restrainers did not provide lateral resistance. The shear 
keys in the abutments and the bent were damaged as shown in Figure 4.47. Shear keys 
appeared to be flexible and did not have enough strength to resist the force from the 
superstructure. 
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Figure 4.43 Rancagua Bypass 
 
 
 
Figure 4.44 Effect of skew angle on seismic demand 
South bound
West abutment
East abutment
Inertial force
Gap closing
Centers of stiffness and mass
Mass center
Stiffness center
Rotation
(a)
(b)
(c)
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Figure 4.45 Translation of bridge superstructure 
 
1.5 m 50 cm
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Figure 4.46 Seismic restrainers connecting superstructure to abutment 
 
Figure 4.47 Failure of bridge shear keys 
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4.3.1.b. Perquilauquén Bridge 
The Perquilauquén Bridge is also located on Route 5. The bridge carrying the 
northbound traffic was built recently and the bridge carrying the southbound traffic was 
built in the mid-1990s. The recently constructed bridge adopted pre-stressed girders for 
superstructure and circular piers for substructure. The bridge constructed in 1990s 
consisted of box girder for superstructure and wall pier as shown in Figure 4.48. As the 
two bridges were constructed with different structural systems, the comparison of 
damage in both bridges provided an insight into how different structural systems 
perform differently when subjected to similar earthquake demand. 
Both bridges did not collapse due to the earthquake event. The bridge carrying the 
northbound traffic, which was constructed recently, however, showed much more 
damage than the older bridge. The major damage to the bridge was due to 
approximately 0.4 m displacement of bridge superstructure in the transverse direction. 
The shear keys of the bridge failed. The shear keys did not have enough strength to 
resist the force from the pounding superstructure. Due to the slenderness of the shear 
key, it is speculated that the shear key on the east side of the bridge was damaged from 
the inertial forces of the superstructure as shown in Figure 4.50. The superstructure was 
very close to unseating as shown in Figure 4.51. The other bridge, however, did not 
show clear evidence of translation. The shear keys of the bridge appeared to have 
higher strength and stiffness than those of the bridge carrying the northbound traffic. 
 
Figure 4.48 Perquilauquén Bridge 
99 
 
Figure 4.49 Displaced bridge superstructure and damage on shear keys 
 
Figure 4.50 Damage at the bottom of a slender shear key 
Cracks at the bottom of 
shear key, seemingly due to 
the inertial force of the 
shear key itself.
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Figure 4.51 Bridge girder close to unseating 
4.3.1.c. Paso Cladio Arrau 
This bridge is located at 65 km (36°39'32.16" S, 72°19'32.7" W) from Concepción. 
The roadway was constructed and had been maintained by Autopista Del Itata. Based 
on discussions with representatives from the company, the roadway did not suffer 
significant damage from the earthquake. The bridge, Paso Cladio Arrau, consists of four 
spans as shown in Figure 4.52 and each span consists of ten pre-stressed concrete 
girders, which are integrated with diaphragms at the both ends and in the middle of 
each span. Each bent consists of ten reinforced concrete piers. The bridge suffered 
minor damage due to movement of the superstructure in the transverse direction. As a 
result of the movement of the superstructure, shear keys at the abutment were cracked 
(Figure 4.53) and seismic restrainers connecting the superstructure to the abutment 
yielded (Figure 4.54). The seismic restrainers were protected from corrosion with steel 
pipes. The end of the steel pipes yielded in both direction indicating that the 
superstructure developed large translation in both directions and moved back to original 
configuration, possibly due to the elasticity of the elastomeric bearings.  
While the damage to the bridge structure is minimal, the bridge maintenance 
company was concerned that moving the superstructure to its original position and pre-
stressing the seismic restrainers would require significant time and effort. 
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Figure 4.52 Paso Cladio Arrau 
 
Figure 4.53 Damaged shear key at abutment 
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Figure 4.54 Yielded seismic restrainer and steel tube protecting the restrainer from 
the weather 
4.3.1.d. Route 5 overpass near Chillán 
The bridge shown in Figure 4.55 was a two-span bridge, which consisted of pre-
stressed concrete girders. The bridge was very typical highway overpass commonly 
found along Route 5. The superstructure of the bridge was highly skewed. 
The major damage to the bridge was due to a displacement of more than 0.3 m of 
the superstructure in transverse direction as shown in Figure 4.56. Large gaps were 
formed between the superstructure and both abutments as shown in Figure 4.57. The 
total gap at both ends was about 0.65 m, which is much larger than gaps normally 
planned for thermal expansion. In addition, the east embankment showed cracks on the 
embankment soil, possibly from the passive pressure of the abutment toward the 
embankment Figure 4.57 (a). Based on these observations, it is speculated that the 
inertial force from the superstructure applied large passive pressure on both abutment 
developing permanent deformation of the embankment. 
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Figure 4.55 Route 5 overpass near Chillán 
 
Figure 4.56 Displacement of the superstructure 
0.3 m
104 
 
Figure 4.57 Gap between superstructure and abutments 
4.3.2. Case Study 1: Paso Cladio Arrau 
4.3.2.a. Configuration of the reference bridge 
The reference bridge for this case study is a 4-span 77.5-m long bridge (Paso 
Cladio Arrau) which was introduced in Section 4.3.1.c. The bridge has three bents each 
of which consists of 10 piers as shown in Figure 4.58. As observed in most other 
bridges in Chile, the bridge was installed with seismic restrainers, which connect bridge 
deck to bent caps. Girders are supported on elastomeric bearings made of neoprene. 
The bridge has a skew angle of approximately 50 degrees. 
The bridge suffered minor damage from the earthquake. The superstructure 
displaced in the transverse direction, seismic restrainers yielded and elongated, and the 
shear keys were damaged. The superstructure was not unseated. While the damage to 
the bridge was minor, it is chosen for this case study to investigate the effect of skew 
angle and seismic restrainers on the response of a bridge system. 
The schematic drawing of the bridge and configuration of bents and piers is shown 
in Figure 4.58. For modeling the bridge, ZEUS NL (Elnashai et al., 2010) is used. Each 
structural member is assembled using cubic elements capable of representing the 
spread of inelasticity within the member cross section and along the member length by 
using fiber sections (Izzuddin and Elnashai, 1933). To model the bearings and gaps, 
lumped spring elements are used. The observed damage and numerical modeling of 
elements are introduced in the following sections. 
(c)
(b)
(a) (a) Cracks on bridge embankment
(b) 41 cm gap at east abutment (c) 25 cm gap at west abutment
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Figure 4.58 Configuration of bridge bents and abutments 
4.3.2.b. Observed damage 
Figure 4.59 shows a cracked shear key of the reference bridge due to the 
translation of the bridge superstructure. Even though the shear key was damaged, it 
may have prevented the unseating of the bridge superstructure. In addition to the shear 
key, it is speculated that the seismic restrainers may have played a role in reducing 
damage to the bridge structure. The seismic restrainer shown in Figure 4.60 yielded due 
to large displacement of the superstructure. Considering the large mass of the 
superstructure, the seismic restrainers themselves do not have enough strength to 
prevent the superstructure from lateral displacement. The post-tensioning force in the 
restrainers, however, could have increased the friction force in elastomeric bearings, 
which increases the energy dissipation capacity of the bearings. 
 
Figure 4.59 Failure of the shear keys 
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Figure 4.60 Yielded seismic restrainers 
4.3.2.c. Numerical modeling of the bridge elements 
The 3D model of this bridge is created in ZEUS NL using the simplified model 
shown in Figure 4.61. This model consists of different elements, which represent an 
idealized characteristic of each component of the actual bridge. The stiffness of 
abutments and hysteretic behavior of bearings are modeled using the joint elements in 
ZEUS NL. Piers, seismic restrainers, and rigid elements are modeled using cubic beam-
column elements. The deck is considered as a single rectangular beam with the similar 
section properties as the section of the girders and bridge deck. The configuration of 
numerical model is shown in Figure 4.62. 
 
Figure 4.61 Simplified stick model of bridge used for modeling 
In the reference bridge, there are gaps between the end span and the abutment, 
which allows for the thermal expansion of the bridge. In the drawing details, spacing 
between the abutment and deck, and deck and the shear keys are 6 cm. The abutment 
is modeled in ZEUS NL using joint elements. The stiffness of the abutment is calculated 
by the simplified procedure in CALTRANS Bridge Design Aids (1989), which only 
depends on the width of the bridge. 
Modeling details  of typical connections are available in the next figure.
Equivalent girder Rigid beam connected to the equivalent girder
Node A
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Elastomeric bearings were modeled with joint elements considering the weight of 
the deck and the initial tension force developed by the post-tensioned seismic 
restrainers. Seismic restrainers are modeled by cubic beam-column elements. Bilinear 
steel model and a hysteretic concrete model are used to idealize the pier 
reinforcements and concrete material. Strain hardening of the steel material is ignored 
in the analysis. According to the drawing details of the bridge, bearings are made of 
neoprene material whose hysteretic behavior is simplified as bilinear. Figure 4.62 
illustrates how the connections between the superstructure, abutment, and the 
substructure are modeled using rigid and joint elements. 
 
Figure 4.62 Configuration of lumped springs for bearings and gaps 
4.3.2.d. Input ground motions and analysis cases 
The spectrum compatible ground motions introduced in Section 2.4 are used for 
nonlinear response history analyses. A total of 18 horizontal components of ground 
motions records are applied in transverse direction. Maximum deformation of the 
superstructure from each analysis is monitored. To understand the relative effect of 
skewness and seismic restrainers on the response of the bridge, the following analysis 
cases are considered. 
Table 4.6 Analysis cases for bridge analysis  
 
Superstructure
Lumped mass
Rigid link
Bilinear elastomeric 
bearing
Seismic bar
Pier D = 850 mm
18φ25 bars
Lumped mass
Seismic bar
Gap element oriented normal to the abutment
Abutment spring
Rigid 
link
 Skew angle:  
as built condition 
Skew angle:  
0 deg 
With seismic bar Case 1-# Case 2-# 
Without seismic bar Case 3-# Case 4-# 
Note: ‘#’ indicates ground motion number  
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4.3.2.e. Sample analysis results 
To verify the response of structural components of the bridge, the hysteretic 
responses of the representative components are presented hereafter. Figure 4.63 
compares the force-displacement relationship of a connection between superstructure 
and substructure assemblage for the cases without skew angle (Cases 2 and 4). It is 
noticed that when the seismic restrainers are included in the model (Case 2), the 
yielding force of elastomeric bearing is higher than the case without seismic restrainers 
(Case 4) as the post-tensioning of the seismic restrainer increases the normal force on 
the elastomeric bearings. The overall lateral displacement is smaller than the case 
without seismic restrainers due to higher energy dissipation capacity. 
 
Figure 4.63 Effect of seismic restrainer on hysteretic response of bearings  
Figure 4.64 shows the trajectory of the movement of node A in Figure 4.61. The 
bridge has a gap of 6 cm normal to the abutment. As the superstructure can move ±6 
cm, it has a total 12 cm displacement range. The figure shows that the implemented 
gap model and its orientation properly limit the movement of the node. 
Figure 4.65 illustrates the maximum displacement of the superstructure for Cases 1 
and 2. As the shear keys of the bridge are not modeled, the superstructure can move in 
the transverse direction without restriction. The movement of the superstructure of Case 
1 in transverse direction is limited by the closing of gaps between superstructure and 
Case 2
u1
u2
Case 4
u1
u2
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abutments. Due to the change in center of stiffness when the gap closes, the 
superstructure rotates, thus increasing torsional demand on the bridge bent. 
 
Figure 4.64 Trajectory of end of bridge span for Case 3-01 
 
Figure 4.65 Trajectory of end of bridge span for Case 1-18 and Case 2-18 
4.3.2.f. Comparison of results from four analysis cases 
The results from the four analysis cases are compared in terms of maximum 
translational displacement of node A in Figure 4.61. The maximum displacements are 
compared in three plots to study the effect of skew angle and seismic restrainers. Figure 
4.66 (Top) compares Cases 1 and 3. The difference between the two cases is seismic 
restrainers, which connect the superstructure and the substructure. Bridges in both 
cases have skewed superstructure. As observed from the figure, the Case 1 (with 
seismic restrainers) has relatively smaller seismic demand than the Case 3 (without 
seismic restrainers). The difference becomes larger as the shaking intensity increases. 
As the bearings in Case 1 have higher frictional force due to post-tensioning of seismic 
restrainers, it can dissipate more energy than Case 3. The resistance of seismic 
restrainer due to bending and/or pulling action is not significant. A similar trend is 
observed in Figure 4.66 (Middle) in which Case 2 and 4 are compared.  
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6 cm gap
Contact at left abutment
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Figure 4.66 Maximum displacement of node A, Top: comparison of Cases 1 and 3, 
Middle: comparison of Cases 2 and 4; and Bottom: comparison of Case 
1 and 2 
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Figure 4.66 (Bottom) compares Cases 1 and 2 to evaluate the effect of skew angle 
on superstructure response. The figure shows that at low intensity level (the first three 
ground motions), the two bridges’ responses are very close. As the ground motion 
intensity increases, the Case 2 (without skew angle) tends to have larger displacement 
demand on node A. Before the analysis, it was expected that increase in rotational 
demand due to skew angle would increase the displacement demand. Based on the 
analysis results, however, it is found that at least for this reference bridge, the skew 
angle does not necessarily increase the displacement demand on the superstructure. It 
is probably due to the increase in transverse stiffness due to closing of the gap, which 
might have larger influence than the development of rotational demand. To generalize 
this conclusion, though, further study on the effect of skew angle (considering wide 
range of skew angles, span length/width ratios, and number of spans) is necessary. 
4.3.3. Case Study 2: Las Mercedes Bridge 
4.3.3.a. Configuration of the reference bridge 
The bridge has a two-span continuous deck with a span length of 28.5 m. The 
superstructure of the bridge is a reinforced concrete slab-girder deck and each span 
has three pre-stressed concrete girders and a cast-in-place concrete slab. The bridge is 
supported by a two-column bent at the center and retaining walls at both ends as shown 
in Figure 4.67. The longitudinal direction of the bridge is skewed by an angle of 11 
degrees from the perpendicular direction to Route 5, which it passes over. The axes of 
the column bent and retaining walls are parallel to the highway under the bridge. 
Superstructure is supported on elastomeric bearings and restrained to the substructure 
with seismic restrainers having a diameter of 22 mm. Overview of the reference bridge 
is given in Figure 4.68. 
    
Figure 4.67 Configuration of Las Mercedes bridge, Left: Satellite photo of the bridge 
and Route 5, Right: Skew angle 
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Figure 4.68 Overview of the bridge 
4.3.3.b. Numerical model 
A three-dimensional numerical model is generated to investigate the seismic 
response of the bridge. The analytical model is idealized to have a symmetric elevation 
along its longitudinal direction as shown in Figure 4.69 (Middle). The finite element 
analysis program ZEUS NL (Elnashai et al., 2010) is utilized to perform the necessary 
analyses for the assessment of the bridge such as nonlinear static pushover analyses, 
eigenvalue analyses, and nonlinear dynamic response history analyses. The 
superstructure, which consists of pre-stressed girders and cast-in-place reinforced 
concrete slabs, is assumed to be a rigid diaphragm in the analytical model. Based on 
the design drawings of a typical bridge on Route5 and Schmidt hammer tests at the 
field, compressive strength of concrete is assumed to be 50 MPa for girders and 35 
MPa for other parts of the bridge including columns. Yield stress of reinforcement is 
assumed as 400 MPa. Overview of the numerical model is provided in Figure 4.69. 
 
Figure 4.69 Numerical model of Las Mercedes Bridge, Top: overview, Middle: 
elevation, and Bottom: plan 
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A total of twelve bearings are used at both ends of each girder and their locations 
are given in Figure 4.70. The elastomeric bearing is assumed to be made of plain 
neoprene pad with hardness of 50 durometer. Details on the material properties of 
bearings and test methods are given elsewhere (AASHTO, 2006). The friction 
coefficient between the surfaces of the bearing and the girder is assumed to be 0.21 
which is the friction coefficient between neoprene rubber and concrete. The thickness of 
elastomeric bearing pads on the column bent is 37 mm, while the thickness of those on 
retaining walls is 60 mm. Shear modulus (G) of the neoprene bearing (50 durometer) is 
0.69 MPa and shear area (A) is 140000 mm2 (400mm x 350mm). The lateral stiffness of 
an elastomeric bearing can be calculated as K = GA/h, where h is bearing height. 
Lateral force (Fb=63000N) at friction slip is obtained by multiplying the vertical force at 
each bearing (Fv=300000N) by friction coefficient (0.21). For the tall (60mm) bearing, 
the maximum displacement (Δb) at which the friction slip begin can be calculated as 
follows: Δb = Fb/K = 63000/(0.69¯140000/60) ≈ 40mm. Similarly, the maximum friction 
displacement of the short (37mm) bearing is assumed to be 25 mm. The force-
displacement relationship of the bearing used in the analytical model is shown in Figure 
4.71. 
 
Figure 4.70 Locations of joint and gap elements in the numerical model (plan view) 
 
Figure 4.71 Locations and force-displacement relationship of a joint element for the 
elastomeric bearing 
There are a total of 16 seismic restrainers located between bearing supports as 
shown in Figure 4.72. The diameter of restrainers is 22 mm and their yield stress is 
assumed to be 400 MPa. The details of the seismic restrainers in the design drawing 
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(Figure 4.73) shows that the top anchor of a seismic restrainer is not sufficiently strong 
to carry pre-stressing forces. The role of seismic restrainers is to stabilize the 
superstructure by preventing it from bouncing under earthquake excitations rather than 
giving extra friction resistance by pre-stressing loads. Therefore, pre-stressing force at 
seismic restrainers is not assumed in the analytical modeling. 
 
Figure 4.72 Analytical model and locations of seismic restrainers, Left: numerical 
modeling of substructure with seismic restrainers at the left end of the 
deck, Right: locations of the seismic restrainers (plan view) 
 
Figure 4.73 Details of the top anchorage of a seismic restrainer 
Movements of the superstructure in the longitudinal direction are restrained by the 
abutments at both ends of the deck and governed by properties of elastomeric bearings. 
The construction joint at the latter abutment has unidirectional resistance. Gap elements 
are used to represent the delayed contact at the construction joints between the bridge 
deck and approach slabs on the abutments. Based on the design drawings, the 
clearance of the construction joint is assumed to be 60 mm. A unidirectional spring 
element is used to represent the conditional force transfer at the construction joint; only 
compressive forces are transferred when the gap is closed. The locations of the gap 
elements and the force-displacement relationships are represented in Figure 4.74. 
Location of a seismic bar
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Figure 4.74 Numerical model of bent cap, elastomeric bearing, and seismic restrainer 
4.3.3.c. Analysis cases and results 
Under earthquake excitations, the simple bridge behaves like a rigid diaphragm on 
a relatively stiff substructure. Therefore, it is assumed that the seismic response of the 
superstructure is mainly affected by slip at the girder-bearing interface and the mode 
shape is determined by lateral stiffness and location of elastomeric bearings and spring 
properties representing construction joints. The fundamental period of the bridge is 
evaluated as 0.80 seconds and the latter mode is induced by the deformation of the 
elastomeric bearing before the friction slip. The first mode shape is determined by the 
movement of the superstructure in the transverse direction without torsional responses 
because the bridge is symmetric along the ݔ direction (see Figure 4.69). Torsion is in 
the second mode as shown in Figure 4.75 (b and d) and the corresponding period is 
0.77 seconds. 
 
Figure 4.75 Mode shapes of the bridge 
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In the static pushover analysis, lateral forces are applied in the direction of the 
highway, which is parallel to the axes of the column bent and retaining walls (z direction 
in Figure 4.69). The locations of shear keys and direction of lateral forces are shown 
in Figure 4.69. . From the analysis results, it was observed that Shear key #1 reaches 
its ultimate shear capacity earlier than others, followed by severe damage on Shear key 
# 2. Uneven lateral force distribution on shear keys and unbalanced force redistribution 
can magnify torsion in highly inelastic response range of the bridge. The capacity curve 
of the reference bridge is shown in Figure 4.77. The status of the bridge on the capacity 
curve is explained as follows. 
1. The superstructure is displaced due to deformation of elastomeric bearings, 
2. The lower part of a girder hits a shear key, 
3. Shear key #1 has reached its ultimate shear strength, 
4. Force redistribution among shear keys, 
5. Shear key #3 has reached its ultimate shear strength. 
Figure 4.78 (a) shows an outer girder on a deformed elastomeric bearing. The 
maximum allowable deformation of the bearing pad is 40 mm, which is larger than the 
gap of 30 mm between the girder and the shear key. Therefore, the superstructure can 
safely move on the bearing pad without friction slip as long as the shear key is 
sufficiently strong. The shear key plays an important role in preventing the 
superstructure from experiencing excessive displacement. The stiffness and strength 
increase between response points 2 and 3 in Figure 4.77 is the contribution of shear 
keys. In the analytical study, it is observed that the lateral force on shear key # 1 is 
transferred to shear key #2 and #3 after shear key #1 has reached its ultimate capacity. 
However, the latter force redistribution is not possible in the real structure. After the 
peak response point 3 in Figure 4.77, the loss of lateral strength of shear key #1 is 
abrupt and complete as shown in Figure 4.78 (b). Therefore, there is no possibility for 
force redistribution among shear keys. Additionally, as soon as the shear key has failed 
the girder and elastomeric bearing will slip off from the bearing support as shown 
in Figure 4.78 (c). Once the latter slip-off has occurred, the girder cannot move back to 
the opposite direction and thus its displacement will be accumulated unidirectionally. At 
the same time, the other end of the superstructure moves to the opposite direction, 
which causes cumulative torsion of the superstructure. 
 
Figure 4.76 Direction of equivalent lateral forces and location of shear keys 
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Figure 4.77 Results of a static pushover analysis 
 
Figure 4.78 Girder slip on elastomeric bearing and bearing support 
A sample plot of dynamic response history analysis, under the spectrum compatible 
record that is matched to +0.5σ spectrum using the original ground motion from the 
station STL (EW component) as the seed record (presented in Section 2.4), is shown 
in Figure 4.79. The earthquake loading is applied in the transverse direction of the 
bridge deck. Shear keys are omitted in the analytical model for dynamic response 
history analyses in order to investigate causes of torsion other than the uneven 
resistance of shear keys. While the maximum displacement is 90 mm, which is larger 
than the allowable deformation of the elastomeric bearing, the torsion is only about 
0.0012 degree. This negligible amount of torsion implies that the large amount of torsion 
observed at the field (Figure 4.45) is not caused by dynamic characteristics of the 
structure. 
It has been reported that torsion of skewed bridges is generally caused by pounding 
of a superstructure with embankments. However, the skew angle of this reference 
bridge is too small for the torsion observed at the field to be caused by the pounding 
response. Eccentricity between the centers of mass of the deck and the resultant 
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pounding forces at the embankment is too small to make sufficient couple forces. While 
substructures such as piers and embankment walls had negligible effects on the 
movements of the deck, properties of bearings and shear keys significantly affect 
responses of the superstructure. Premature failure of a shear key causes uneven and 
excessive displacement at the end of the superstructure. Then the girder ends slip off 
from the bearing support and this would initiate the torsion accumulated unidirectionally 
(Figure 4.78). This explains the large amount of torsion observed at the field (Figure 
4.45 and Figure 4.47). 
 
Figure 4.79 Selected dynamic response history results (response history by record: 
STL, EW component, mean ൅0.5σ) 
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4.3.4. Seismic Fragility of the Las Mercedes Bridge in Case Study 2 
4.3.4.a. Fragility framework 
Bridge seismic fragility curves are statistical functions that give probabilities of 
reaching or exceeding a certain damage level or state as a function of a ground motion 
intensity measure. The function can be written as ܲሾܦ ௜ܵ|ܲܩܣ ൌ ݕሿ, where PGA is an 
example of a ground motion intensity measure, and ܦ ௜ܵ is the damage state in question. 
Applications of fragility curves include aiding in emergency response optimization, 
design support for performance-based engineering, planning support for seismic events, 
and policy support. The current damage states used in most fragility curves refer to the 
state or condition of a bridge following an earthquake event. States such as “Moderate” 
or “Complete” damage are an indication of the capacity that may be left in the bridge or 
bridge component. 
A fragility framework is described in this section for the deterministic bridge model 
subjected to several ground motions taken from or simulated for the region in question. 
The responses of several bridge components were recorded: the elastomeric bearings 
in the longitudinal and transverse directions, the abutment movement, and the column 
response. 
The limit states chosen for this analysis are based on the HAZUS limit states 
developed by FEMA (2003). Table 4.7 shows qualitative descriptions for the limit states 
that inspection engineers can identify. For fragility analysis, these qualitative states 
need to be expressed quantitatively, in order to fit the response of the system to 
appropriate limit states. There are two ways of developing values, prescriptive and 
descriptive (Nielson, 2005). In this example, a prescriptive approach will be used, in 
which the values that are shown to be relevant to the physics of the structure and that 
can be confirmed in the field, are used. 
Table 4.7 Qualitative description of bridge damage limit states 
 
Damage States Description 
(N) – No Damage No damage to a Bridge 
(S) – Slight Damage Minor cracking/spalling to abutment, cracks at hinges, minor spalling at column, or minor cracking to the deck 
(M) – Moderate Damage 
Moderate cracking and spalling at column, moderate 
settlement of approach, cracked shear keys or bent bolts at 
connection 
(E) – Extensive Damage Degraded column without collapse, some lost bearing support in connection, major settlement of approach 
(C) - Complete Damage Collapsed column, all bearing support lost in a connection, imminent deck collapse 
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4.3.4.b. Method of fragility curve development 
Based on the origins of the damage data used in the generation of the curve, there 
are four main types of fragility curves in use. The methods include empirical, 
judgmental, analytical, and hybrid fragility curves, which combine data from different 
sources to create damage states. For this case study, a typical overpass bridge is 
modeled deterministically and analyzed to develop fragility curves using the analytical 
method. The ground motions used for this study are actual recordings from the 
earthquake (taken from different locations, 10 stations, 20 horizontal components), 
spectrum matched records developed using attenuation relationships (18 components, 
see details in Section 2.4), and scaled records to have data points at high PGA values 
(five records). In total 43 ground motion records are used to develop the fragility curves. 
The distribution of the PGA of the records used in fragility analysis is provided in Figure 
4.80. 
 
Figure 4.80 Distribution of the PGA of all records used in fragility analysis 
4.3.4.c. Component demand 
Many fragility curves focus on the response of one component, such as the drift of a 
column, to indicate the state of a bridge after an earthquake event. However, the 
responses of other major bridge components are emerging as significant elements in 
determining the fragility of the entire bridge (Nielson and DesRoches, 2007; Padgett 
and DesRoches, 2007). For this study, the responses of the column, abutment, and 
bearings in multiple directions are recorded. The responses that are monitored are the 
column curvature ductility and maximum drift ratio, fixed and expansion bearings 
longitudinal and transverse movements, and the abutment displacement in the 
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longitudinal and transverse direction. From these, responses, component fragilities are 
created. The aim is to find the fragility of the entire bridge system, so a joint probabilistic 
seismic demand model (PSDM) is developed from individual components’ PSDMs. 
To find the yield displacement and yield curvature of the columns, an approximate 
relationship given in Priestley et al. (1996) is used. To calculate the curvature of the 
columns, the maximum moment at the column base is used to determine the maximum 
curvature if the member is elastic, the plastic curvature is added to the elastic curvature 
if yielding has occurred. The plastic curvature is based on the failure mechanism of the 
column (Buckle et. al, 2006). It is assumed that low cycle fatigue failure of the 
longitudinal bars is likely (Buckle et. al, 2006). The drift ratio is the ratio of the maximum 
displacement at the top of the column to the column height. The curvature ductility is the 
ratio between the maximum and the yield curvature. 
4.3.4.d. Limit states (capacity) 
The capacities of the bridge components and subsequent limit states were adopted 
from the work of Nielson and DesRoches (2007), and Ramanathan, et al (2010). The 
capacities presented in their work were determined through experimental studies and 
results presented in previous publications. The capacities are converted into limit states 
by interpreting the data to represent some physical meaning. For example, for slight 
damage to a column, one might consider some small cracks. In an experiment, small 
cracks could be observed around some particular curvature ductility. Thus, this value 
would represent the slight damage state for a column. In those previous studies, 
multiple tests for each component were performed to determine a median value for 
each limit state and the dispersion parameter of the data. These values are used in the 
probabilistic seismic demand models of the components. Below is a table of the 
monitored bridge components and the median and dispersion values for each of the 
four limit states considered, as given in the work of Nielson and DesRoches (2007), and 
Ramanathan et al. (2010). The columns for this bridge were assumed to be seismically 
designed because of the close spacing of the transverse reinforcement. The column 
drift ratio limit states were adopted from the work of Mackie et al (2007). 
Table 4.8 Bridge damage limit states 
 
Component Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Med Disp Med Disp Med Disp Med Disp 
Column Ductility (Seismic) 4.90 0.70 9.14 0.53 12.46 0.59 13.1 0.60 
Column Residual Drift Ratio 0.50 0.30 1.25 0.40 2.00 0.40 6.72 0.35 
Elasto Brg – Fixed – Longitud (mm) 28.9 0.60 104 0.55 136.1 0.59 187 0.65 
Elasto Brg – Fixed – Transv (mm) 28.8 0.79 90.9 0.68 142.2 0.73 195 0.66 
Elasto Brg – Expan – Transv (mm) 28.9 0.60 104 0.55 136.1 0.59 187 0.65 
Elasto Brg – Expan – Longitud (mm) 28.8 0.79 90.9 0.68 142.2 0.73 195 0.66 
Abutment – Longitudinal (mm) 37 0.46 146 0.46 1000 0 1000 0 
Abutment – Transverse (mm) 9.75 0.70 37.9 0.90 77.2 0.85 1000 0 
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4.3.4.e. Probabilistic seismic demand models 
If the fragility of the bridge were based on the response of one component, then the 
resulting fragility function could be given in a closed form solution, like the one shown 
below (Nielson 2007). 
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Figure 4.81 Illustration of combining component fragility to obtain system fragility 
However, since the responses of several components are incorporated here, a joint 
probabilistic seismic demand model is needed. Following the procedure proposed by 
Nielson (2005), each bridge component and the responses are assembled into 
individual probabilistic seismic demand models using lognormal linear regression to find 
the model parameters.  
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From these models, the correlation between all of the components is calculated, 
and a joint PSDM (JPSDM) is found for the system. From this joint model, the system 
fragility is evaluated by performing a Monte Carlo simulation of the JPSDM and 
comparing the resulting demand values with the component capacities to determine the 
system failure at each damage level (Nielson and DesRoches, 2007). This procedure is 
illustrated in Figure 4.81, showing that the individual component fragilities are combined 
to give an overall system fragility curve through the use of the JPSDMs. 
4.3.4.f. Uncertainties in modeling and resistance 
The risk due to uncertainty must be mitigated and kept within acceptable levels, 
since it is impossible to eliminate all uncertainties. For a structural system analyzed 
under earthquake loads, uncertainty arises from the demand and capacity (Ji et al., 
2007b). The uncertainties from the demand on a system derives from the ground 
excitation, which includes the soil conditions, load path of the motions, and the random 
motions generated from the source of the quake. The uncertainty from the capacity of 
the system is due to the material and geometric uncertainties, where the properties of 
the designed structure and materials are considered random. 
Researchers have found ways to account for these uncertainties and mitigate the 
effects in their results (Wen et al, 2003). For the uncertainty in ground motions, it has 
been found that it is best to include many records of ground motions to cover as many 
frequencies and seismic energy levels as possible (Ji et al., 2007b). To account for this 
uncertainty, the bridge structure is analyzed with a suite of 43 ground motions that 
characterizes the specified region, and also provides a range of intensities. Some of the 
ground motions are actual records taken in Chile during the Mw 8.8 earthquake. Other 
records are those developed and described in Section 2.4 of this report using carefully 
selected attenuation relationships. Finally, the rest of the records are scaled from the 
actual time histories to give a broader range of frequencies for the analysis. Only 5 out 
of 43 records are derived using scaling and the records are chosen such that the 
scaling factors are between 1 and 1.5 in order not to distort the characteristics of the 
ground motions. These ground motions are unidirectional and applied only in one 
horizontal direction during the analysis. 
From the capacity of the system, uncertainty can stem from the material 
properties used and the geometry of the structure. However, the variability of the 
response of the system is much more susceptible to the ground motion variability than 
the material uncertainties (Kwon and Elnashai, 2006). Therefore, for this analysis, the 
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bridge geometry and material properties are modeled deterministically, and only the 
ground motions chosen contribute to the variability in the response. 
4.3.4.g. Bridge analysis and fragility 
The case study bridge used for this analysis is a typical highway bridge crossing 
over Route 5, as described in Section 4.3.3. These 2-span concrete girder bridges were 
commonly observed along the north-south route in Chile. Another feature that is typical 
of these bridges is the vertical seismic restrainers connecting the deck to the bent cap 
or abutment. Several of the bridges had similar damage modes, which was transverse 
displacement of the bearings at the abutments. A picture of the bridge under 
consideration is shown in Figure 4.82, which had the most severe damage that was 
observed during the MAE Center reconnaissance mission. 
 
Figure 4.82 Case study overpass bridge crossing Route 5 
Fragility analysis was performed on this case study using the results of the 
preceding steps. The products of this analysis are fragility curves that describe the 
probability of meeting or exceeding a certain damage level at a particular intensity 
measure. The graphs in Figure 4.83 show two fragility curves for the case study bridge 
based on the PGA, one curve using column curvature ductility as the engineering 
demand parameter for columns, and the other using the maximum column drift ratio. 
Both of these parameters have been used in past research for predicting bridge fragility. 
As shown, these two parameters give different estimates of the fragility of this bridge, 
especially in the higher damage states. For example, for a PGA level of 0.5 g, the 
fragility curve based on curvature ductility predicts around 50 percent chance of slight 
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damage, while the drift ratio based curve predicts approximately 20 percent probability 
of slight damage. This difference could be due to the fact that the limit states come from 
different sources. These curves show that the bridge has a low vulnerability to damage 
for the more severe limit states. 
 
Figure 4.83 Seismic fragility curves in terms of different demand parameters (DP), 
Left: DP is curvature ductility; Right: DP is max drift ratio. 
In addition to system fragility curves, the component fragility curves may be 
investigated to determine the most vulnerable component at each limit state. As shown 
in Figure 4.84, for the slight limit state from the drift-ratio based fragility curves, the 
response of the expansion bearings in the longitudinal direction contributes the most to 
the fragility of the system, followed by the response of the abutment in the transverse 
direction. For the moderate damage state, the response of the abutment in the 
transverse direction controls the fragility. As demonstrated in this case study, if the 
response of components of the bridge other than the columns were ignored, the fragility 
of the system would be miscalculated. 
As a comparison, fragility curves of similar bridge types modeled for moderate 
seismic zones, such as the central and southeastern United States, are presented 
in Figure 4.85 to compare the relative vulnerability of the case study bridge to high 
seismic demand with a similar bridge subjected to moderate seismic demand. The 
fragility curves for the U.S. (Nielson, 2005) included separate curves for several bridge 
classes, including multi-span simply supported (MSSS) concrete girder bridges, like the 
bridge in this case study. One difference between the case study bridge and the bridge 
class in the quoted study is that U.S. bridges were not assumed to be seismically 
designed. The implication is that the limit state values for the column demand parameter 
are lower than the ones used in this study. Comparing the fragility curve below with that 
developed for the current case study based on curvature ductility, it is observed that the 
case study bridge is more robust and more likely to withstand greater ground motion 
shaking than the bridge modeled in a moderate seismic zone in the U.S. 
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Figure 4.84 Seismic fragility curves of different structural components, Top-Left: 
Slight damage; Top-Right: Moderate damage; Bottom-Left: Extensive 
damage; Bottom-Right: Complete damage 
 
Figure 4.85 MSSS concrete girder bridge fragility curve for moderate seismic zones 
(Nielson, 2005) 
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4.4. EFFECTS ON HISTORICAL STRUCTURES 
The 27 February earthquake damaged several historical structures in Chile. 
According to the preliminary report by the EERI team 444 churches were heavily 
damaged which accounts for 47 percent of all churches in the country (EERI, 2010). 
The AONBenfield event recap report indicates that over 90 percent of the historical 
center was destroyed in Curicó and dozens of homes in the historical center of 
Concepción collapsed (AONBENFIELD, 2010). Several historical structures were 
damaged in Talca (those that were visited by the team are shown in the next section) 
including the government building of Intendance (see Section 4.2.1). The damaged 
historical structures visited by the MAE Center team were limited to those in Talca as 
summarized in the next section. 
4.4.1. Observed Damage 
The MAE Center team visited the following historical structures in Talca; Iglesia Los 
Salesianos, which suffered severe damage, Figure 4.86; Cathedral of Talca, studied in 
more detail in Section 4.4.2, Figure 4.87; Edificio Intendencia Maule, Figure 4.88; and 
Liceo de Niñas Marta Donoso, Figure 4.89. All these structures were unreinforced 
masonry construction except for the Cathedral of Talca, which is an RC structure with 
masonry infills. The severe damage observed emphasized the vulnerability of historical 
structures in Chile to earthquakes. The list of visited historical structures is provided 
in Table 4.1. The location of each structure and the related figure(s) in the report are 
also provided in the table. The column “icon” indicates the label of the buildings as 
shown in the figures in 0. 
Table 4.9 List of historical structures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude Figure in report 
H1 Edificio Intendencia Maule in Talca 35°25'34.79"S 71°39'55.43"W 
Figure 
4.26 Figure 4.88 
H2 Liceo de Niñas Marta Donoso 35°25'22.76"S 71°39'28.55"W 
Figure 
4.27 Figure 4.89 
H3 Iglesia Los Salesianos 35°25'43.68"S 71°39'36.64"W Figure 4.86 
H4 Cathedral of Talca 35°25'33.25"S 71°40'0.93"W Figure 4.87 
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Figure 4.86 Iglesia Los Salesianos 
   
Figure 4.87 Cathedral of Talca 
   
Figure 4.88 Edificio Intendencia Maule 
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Figure 4.89 Liceo de Niñas Marta Donoso 
4.4.2. Case Study: The Cathedral of Talca 
4.4.2.a. Preamble 
The City of Talca is about 240 km south of Santiago. It has a population of about 
200,000. Talca is located on the projection of the fault plane from the Maule earthquake 
fault. It is a significant economic, agricultural and educational city, with two universities. 
Because of the national significance of Talca to Chilean history and the importance 
of the Talca diocese within the archdiocese of Santiago, the Cathedral of Talca holds a 
revered place in Chilean Roman Catholicism. The Talca Cathedral has had a number of 
noted Bishops, as below: 
• Miguel León Prado (apostolic administrator) - 12 June 1913 - 18 October 1925 
appointed, auxiliary bishop of Santiago de Chile 
• Carlos Silva Cotapos - 14 December 1925 - 21 January 1939 resigned 
• Manuel Larraín Errázuriz - 21 January 1939 succeeded - 22 June 1966 died 
• Carlos González Cruchaga - 4 January 1967 - 12 December 1996 retired 
• Horacio del Carmen Valenzuela Abarca - appointed 12 December 1996 – current 
Bishop 
The current Cathedral is at least the second (probably the third, since it is likely that 
the 1742 earthquake would have destroyed a place of worship on the same site) to be 
built in this location. The previous Cathedral of Talca was demolished in the 1928 
earthquake (magnitude 8.4). The images in Figure 4.90 are possibly pictures of the 
Cathedral before (left) and after (right) the 1928 earthquake. 
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Figure 4.90 Cathedral of Talca before and after the earthquake in 1928 
4.4.2.b. The New Cathedral 
The Cathedral was started with a cornerstone ceremony in 1939, and construction 
started in 1941. It was opened to the public in 1951, and dedicated on Thursday 30 
September 1954. The project architect was Ramon Venegas, and the engineer was 
Jose Mascayano (the design documents mention engineers Alberto Covarrubbias and 
Carlos Infante). The interior decorations were by Alejandro Rubio. The sitting Bishop of 
the time was Monsignor Manuel Larraín Errázuriz (1900-1966), who was Bishop from 
1941 to 1966. Bishop Errázuriz was the driving force behind the new Cathedral during 
his term at Bishop-curate which was from 1938 to 1941. 
The structure was designed for a seismic coefficient of 1/10 g, presumably meaning 
10 percent of the weight, not a peak ground acceleration of 0.1 g, but this is not certain. 
A translation of the overview design sheet is given in Appendix C. The design live load 
on both floors and stairs was taken as 500 kg/sq. m, and the foundation design bearing 
pressure was 1.5 kg/sq. m. The Cathedral was raft foundation. All design aspects 
conformed to the Chilean code of 1933. The structural system of the Cathedral is 
reinforced concrete frame with massive brick masonry walls of considerable thickness. 
The plan of the Cathedral is quite simple, with a main hall and one tower, as seen 
in Figure 4.91. It has a central nave and two isles, one on either side. The isles are 
lower than the nave, as indicated in Figure 4.91 and Figure 4.93, which is one of the 
causes of damage to the columns supporting the arches of the nave. The overall plan 
dimensions of the Cathedral are 56.75 m by 40.85 m. The isles are approximately 4 m 
wide and 9.85 m high, as compared to the total height of the nave, which is 19.65 m. 
131 
 
Figure 4.91 External view (side elevation) of the Cathedral before the earthquake 
 
Figure 4.92 Plan view (recreated from design drawings) 
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Figure 4.93 Front Elevation (recreated from design drawings) 
4.4.2.c. Description of Observed Damage 
Figure 4.94 shows one of the few exterior shear cracks at the corner of a window 
opening. The RC column is intact. It was also observed that damage was concentrated 
at corners of openings but all other structural elements are intact. There is no shedding 
of brick masonry walls due to their thickness, unlike the case of infills in buildings; this is 
shown in Figure 4.95. 
Whereas there was no apparent damage to RC structural members, compression 
failure on the exterior of a heavily loaded corner column was observed (Figure 4.96). 
The smooth bars are very nearly buckled. The cover must have had considerable 
cracks leading to rusting of the longitudinal reinforcement. 
With regard to the damage indicated in Figure 4.97, the masonry did not fail but 
rather the plaster peeled off. Some minor shear cracking was seen at the corner of the 
opening where stress concentrations occur. 
Figure 4.98 confirmed that the concrete quality is high-to-very high. Smooth steel 
bars are used throughout. Reasonable spacing of ties but not all longitudinal bars are 
tied. Only spalling damage to RC was observed. 
With reference to Figure 4.99, the masonry panel above the RC arch and cross 
beam is large and hence cracked in shear, with some horizontal cracking due to sliding 
that causes change in the direction of principle stresses. Spalling damage to the RC 
arch is observed. The arches in the background were not damaged possibly because 
5.75 m
4.10 m
6.70 m
3.10 m
CL
CL
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they were less loaded (there is a slab connecting them and thus distributing the load 
from above).  
Finally, the side frames (or outriggers) have provided the circular columns with a 
degree of protection, which the slender arches that extend above the side frames did 
not have. This resulted in hinging at the end of the arch as shown in Figure 4.100. The 
arch in the background is much stiffer than those in the foreground. It has not suffered 
any damage. This pattern of damage, shown in Figure 4.100, was repeated in several 
locations. 
 
Figure 4.94 Exterior damage to masonry walls 
Intact RC Column
Masonry Arch Failure
Shear Crack at 
Corner
134 
 
Figure 4.95 Exterior damage to masonry at corners of windows 
 
Figure 4.96 Compression-induced damage to exterior RC column 
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Figure 4.97 Left: Interior damage to masonry walls 
 
Figure 4.98 Interior spalling of RC cover – showing construction details 
RC Beam
Thick Brick 
Masonry 
Wall
Unreinforced 
Window 
Opening
Steel Ties
RC Arch
Main 
Reinforcement
136 
 
Figure 4.99 Side isles damage to RC arch and masonry wall 
 
Figure 4.100 Interior damage to high columns at junction with side isles 
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4.4.2.d. Conclusions 
The Cathedral behaved on the whole very well. Minor structural damage was 
observed constituting no threat of life. It is worth commenting on the design and 
construction. With regard to design versus performance, as indicated above it is not 
clear if the design acceleration was 0.1 g or the design base shear was 10 percent of 
the weight. If it were the former, then the design base shear with no response 
modification factors would be 25 percent of the weight. Taking into account minimum 
response modification based on overstrength, the design base shear (for a peak ground 
acceleration - PGA - of 0.1 g) would be about 9 percent of the weight, assuming a force 
reduction of 3. If the actual design base shear was 10 percent of the weight of the 
structure, then there is an implicit assumption that the ground acceleration used for 
design is about 0.3 g. The USGS hazard map shown in Chapter 2 of this report (Figure 
2.9) gives a value of PGA of about 0.3 g - 0.4 g. Therefore, the Cathedral was subjected 
to at least the design ground acceleration, if not 30 percent higher. This argument 
confirms that the response of the Cathedral is considered as intended in the design. 
Regarding construction, it is the opinion of the MAE Center field mission team that the 
construction quality, both in terms of materials and placement, was of very high quality. 
Admittedly, the Cathedral is not in use. However, taking into account that no one lost 
their lives when the structure was subjected to one of the largest earthquakes ever 
measured, at a distance of about 100 km to the epicenter, with aftershocks that could 
have been right under the City of Talca, the behavior of the Cathedral was actually 
excellent. 
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5 TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS, ROADS AND EMBANKMENTS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Maule earthquake significantly affected a 500 km zone along the Chilean 
coastline from the Araucanía region in the south to Valparaíso in the central region as 
seen in Figure 2.9. The details on the damaging effects of the earthquake are provided 
in Section 1.2. 
 
Figure 5.1 La Madera road and Itata highway networks surveyed 
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Although guidelines on assessing the pavement condition are available for normal 
vehicle loading and climate effects, limited data, research studies, and technical 
guidance is published on the pavement network’s structural and functional condition 
following a major earthquake. The impact of an earthquake on road network and other 
transportation facilities can be detrimental as it affects the supply of emergency and 
medical assistance, food, and water for the people in the damaged areas. In addition, 
the roadway damage may affect the transportation of commercial goods and services, 
which are needed to maintain the local economies during the re-building process. An 
example of the criticality of the transportation infrastructure tragically unfolded after the 
January 2010 Haiti earthquake (Wikipedia, 2010; Rathje et al., 2010). The damage to 
the transportation system affected the supplies for people’s basic needs as well as the 
ability to repair the roads. 
The MAE Center field reconnaissance mission (transportation and structures 
groups) inspected several road networks to assess the extent of damage on pavement 
surfaces, bridge approaches, embankments, and fill areas. The two road networks 
surveyed and discussed in this report were within 100 km of the city of Concepción. The 
data presented in this report includes findings from the site visits to these routes: Itata 
Highway and La Madera road, both shown in Figure 5.1. The damage information 
summarizes the pavement condition in terms of cracking, embankment failures, 
International Roughness Index (IRI), as well as general damage observations. The 
Chilean standards for constructing embankments will also be presented since much of 
the observed pavement damage was related to embankment movements. 
5.2. OVERVIEW OF CHILEAN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
DAMAGE 
The Chilean Ministry of Public Works, MOP (Wikipedia, 2010) has developed a 
transportation infrastructure database that contains a summary of the location and type 
of earthquake damage in the affected regions. This database is being used for 
prioritizing and managing the major emergency repair and rebuilding process, which is 
currently estimated to take four years. The information in this database is being 
collected at the network level. Hence, it does not necessarily include detailed project-
level information on all distress’ extent and severity. 
The Ministry has classified the damage into two main categories: public and private-
operated civil infrastructure. For the public civil infrastructure investment, a total of 1,695 
significant failures were registered, of which 717 are roadway damage (Table 5.1). For 
the private (concession-operated facilities) infrastructure investment, a total of 642 
failures were reported with 113 directly related to the roadway (Table 5.2). 
The MOP information and pavement condition assessment survey of the two 
roadway network both observed that the main damage was caused by embankment 
and bridge approach fill instability. The second major transportation infrastructure 
damage affected road and pedestrian bridges. 
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Table 5.1 Number of major earthquake damage/failures reported on public 
transportation infrastructure by region 
 
Table 5.2 Number of major earthquake damage/failures on private concession-
operated transportation infrastructure by region 
 
*Mainly roads embankments (including small and large embankments) 
** All bridges suffered damage at fill access 
As of July 2010, the cost of the transportation infrastructure emergency repair is 
approximated at $317 million while the reconstruction cost is estimated at $378 million 
(Ministry of Public Works of Chile, 2010b) for the public (non-private concessions) 
Structure Types 
Chilean Region 
Valparaíso 
M
etropolitana de 
Santiago  
Libertador G
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B
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H
iggins  
M
aule 
B
iobío 
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racanía 
Los R
íos 
Total 
Roads* 40 50 84 74 92 51 2 393 
Bridges and Approach Fill** 14 15 27 88 41 24 2 211 
Road Access* 2 2 23 13 29 19 0 88 
Overpass-Crossing 1 0 2 10 3 0 0 16 
Pedastrian Bridges 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 4 
Guardrails 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Others 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 57 67 142 186 167 94 4 717
Structure Types 
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Total 
Roads* 3 2 5 0 18 1 0 29 
Bridges and Approach Fill** 0 3 5 1 6 0 1 16 
Access Roads* 0 1 1 0 3 3 0 8 
Overpass-Crossing 3 12 8 6 1 4 0 34 
Pedastrian Bridges 2 12 1 0 5 5 1 26 
Total 8 30 20 7 33 13 2 113
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network. This is considered a significant investment for Chile given that the 2008 
national gross domestic product (GDP) was $169 billion. The reconstruction costs will 
likely be higher since more projects need to be re-designed and upgraded to meet new 
earthquake standards. 
Chilean performance specifications for public and privately operated roads have 
become more demanding in the past 15 years; however, the construction specifications 
have not evolved accordingly. The following performance criteria are the requirements 
for private concession roadways (Ministry of Public Works of Chile, 2010a) and new 
public construction in Chile: 
• Maximum IRI = 3.5 m/km 
• Maximun rut depth = 15 mm 
• Maximun surface fatigue cracking percentage = 10 percent 
• Potholes and localized distress = Zero 
• Surface friction coefficient = 0.40 to 0.55 
Since many road failures and pavement damages were associated with the 
structural performance of the embankment, the design and construction specification 
were reviewed. The standard for the embankment material and construction is defined 
in the Chilean Road Manual (Ministry of Public Works of Chile, 2000). The current 
standard requires the material to meet the following specifications: 
• California Bearing Ratio (CBR) > 10 
• Minimum density = 90 percent (maximum dry density, modified proctor) 
• Maximum material size = 150 mm 
• Top 300 mm of embankment should be CBR > 20 and the maximum aggregate 
size = 100 mm 
The Chilean standards (Ministry of Public Works of Chile, 2000) also define three 
types of structural fills: structural fill for under drains, permeable structural fill (for bridge 
approaches), and light structural fill for bridges in order to reduce settlement and 
horizontal forces. For permeable structural fill for bridge approaches, the standard 
requires that the material be comprised of inorganic nonplastic soil and 100 percent 
shall pass the 80 mm sieve, 35 to 100 percent pass the 5 mm sieve, and 0 to 4 percent 
pass the 0.075 mm sieve. The fill should also have a 20 percent minimum sand 
equivalency and compaction shall be in 200 mm layers maximum with a minimum of 95 
percent maximum dry density (modified proctor). 
5.3. ROAD NETWORK OBSERVATIONS AND EVALUATION 
The observations and performance after the earthquake of two private-concession 
highway projects, shown in Figure 5.1, will now be reviewed. Both highways (La Madera 
road and Itata highway) are located near the earthquake epicenter. The Concepción 
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area is the southern hemisphere’s most important forestry producer. La Madera road is 
a 108.7 km two lane route from Concepción to Nacimiento. This road primarily connects 
Concepción to Los Angeles as well as many local towns in between. In addition to 
regular traffic, the road is used for wood transport from the forest to local ports as well 
as by wood pulp manufacturers, and timber suppliers. Hence, the pavement supports 
heavy commercial truck traffic. 
The 75km Itata highway from Concepción to Chillán is a four-lane highway facility, 
which connects the main north-south interstate in Chile with the 2nd largest city, 
Concepción, Figure 5.1. This highway also serves the forest industry and enables the 
bi-directional flow of commercial goods transportation from and to the ports and central 
region markets. 
5.3.1. La Madera Road 
La Madera road has three main sections as seen in Table 5.3. Section 1 is hot-mix 
asphalt (HMA) overlay of jointed concrete, section 2 is HMA over foamed asphalt 
recycled layer, and section 3 is conventional flexible pavement with HMA surfacing. 
Post-earthquake data from La Madera concession identified 59 damaged areas. The 
total linear length of the roadway that experienced earthquake damage was 5.08 km or 
approximately 5 percent of the total length. More specifically, the percentage of 
pavement damage was 4.48 km or 4.2 percent. The other 0.6 km (0.8 percent) damage 
was one bridge damage, one bridge collapse, and 0.288 km of shoulder distress. 
Based on the visual inspection of this road network, the most severe pavement 
distresses were associated with embankment and fill locations; further discussion of the 
geotechnical causes of damage is provided in Chapter 3 of this report. Overall, the 
typical pavement damages were a result of bridge approach embankment/fill settlement, 
sag vertical curve embankment failures, under-drain fill settlement, and embankment 
slope stability failures or lateral spreading. 
Table 5.3 La Madera pavement sections 
 
Kilometer Thickness by layer and Type (cm) 
Initial Final Subase RFA* Base Concrete Asphalt 
0.000 12.000 15 - - 18 12.7 
12.000 20.000 15 15 - - 5 
20.000 45.487 10 15 - - 5 
45.487 48.139 26 - 25 - 7.4 
48.139 52.8 26 - 25 - 7.3 
52.800 68.000 26 - 25 - 7.3 
68.00 78.873 26 - 25 - 7.2 
78.873 101.100 20 - 20 - 13 
101.100 107.250 21.5 - 21.7 - 12.7 
107.250 108.104 26 - 25 - 7.1 
* Recycled Foam Asphalt layer 
** Jointed Plain Concrete Pavement
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5.3.2. Itata Highway Pavement Failures 
The Itata highway is a 75 km flexible pavement structure consisting of a 20 cm 
granular subbase, 20 cm granular base layer, and 13 cm of HMA. Visual assessment of 
the Itata highway after the earthquake identified 69 locations of roadway damage 
corresponding to 119 individual distresses. Table 4 summarizes the distress types 
observed on the roadway surface, embankment, and shoulder areas and their 
respective percent occurrence. The most prevalent distress observed was transverse 
cracks. Most cracks (transverse, longitudinal, and surface) resulted from embankment 
lateral displacement or local settlement. In addition, some roadway settlement resulted 
from settlement or collapse of drainage pipes under the road. Of the 69 damage 
locations, 60 percent of them were associated with some sort of embankment failure 
with the remaining, 33 and 7 percent, pavement surface and shoulder damage, 
respectively. 
Table 5.4 Road network distress type and level on the Itata Highway (0 to 75 km) 
 
5.4. ROADWAY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: VISUAL INSPECTION 
Based on the visual inspections of the two roadways, the following typical damages 
and distresses were observed: sag vertical curve embankment failures, fill settlement 
near bridge approaches, under-drain fill settlement, and lateral spreading of 
embankments. Figure 5.2 demonstrates two typical failures of a bridge approach fill 
settlement and subsequent elevation difference between the road and the bridge. This 
type of failure slowed traffic flow across bridges. Most bridges on these two networks 
did not experience severe structural damage and hence, were able to maintain service. 
Another common damage observed on La Madera road was embankment failure at 
the bottom of sag vertical curves as seen in Figure 5.3. Poor soil condition surrounding 
the embankment yielded the worst damage results. However, less damage was 
observed when trees or other confining structures exist near the embankment. In some 
locations, drainage pipes and culverts crossing underneath the roadway settled or 
collapsed resulting in severe surface distress as seen in Figure 5.4. 
Distress Type Number of Observations 
Percent of Occurrence 
(%) 
Transverse crack 24 34.8 
Lateral displacement of 
embankment 21 30.4 
Shoulder-Curb separation 19 27.5 
Roadway settlement 14 20.3 
Longitudinal crack 10 14.5 
Pavement surface crack 9 13.0 
Shoulder settlement 7 10.1 
Road upheaval/bump 3 4.3 
Drainage and shoulder collapse 2 2.9 
Shoulder crack 2 2.9 
Total 119 100% 
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Figure 5.2 Typical bridge approach embankment-fill settlement 
  
Figure 5.3 Sag vertical curve pavement failures 
  
Figure 5.4 Left: under-drain fill settlement at the roadway surface; Right: collapsed 
drainage pipe 
Pavement surface damage was also noticed on roads built on embankments that 
experienced slope stability distress and lateral spreading. The embankment failures 
resulted in longitudinal, transverse and diagonal cracks in the road as shown in Figure 
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5.5. In this case, the resultant pavement distress caused serviceability problems and 
safety hazards. It was observed that when no lateral confinement was present at the toe 
of the slope (e.g., trees, retaining walls, etc.) the pavement damage was more severe. 
This type of failure was also commonly noted by another team that surveyed Chile’s 
infrastructure performance after the earthquake (Vargas, 2010) as well as in Haiti 
earthquake (Rathje et al., 2010). 
  
Figure 5.5 Pavement damage due to embankment slope stability and lateral 
spreading 
5.5. ROADWAY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL 
EVALUATION 
Structural and functional pavement evaluation data were gathered after the 
earthquake. For Highway La Madera, falling weight deflectometer (FWD) data before 
and after the earthquake was obtained while IRI measurements for Itata highway were 
available before and after the earthquake. The purpose of analyzing this data was to 
determine the change in pavement condition after the earthquake so that future 
prediction and planning for the effect of an earthquake on the structural and functional 
condition of a given roadway would be better known. 
5.5.1. Falling Weight Deflectometer – La Madera Road 
FWD testing was conducted on La Madera road in November 2006 and after the 
earthquake in April 2010 (Vargas and Bellolio, 2006; Vargas, 2010). The purpose of the 
FWD analysis was to determine the extent of the pavement structural damage due to 
the earthquake. Only the section that has foamed asphalt/recycled materials that was 
constructed in early 2006, from kilometer 12 to 45.5, was analyzed. Figure 5.6 (Top) 
and Figure 5.7 (Top) are plots of the normalized deflection under a 40 kN plate load (D0) 
at 20°C for 2006 and 2010, respectively, while Figure 5.6 (Bottom) and Figure 5.7 
(Bottom) are the normalized deflections collected at D8 sensor located at 1.524 m from 
the plate load center for the 2006 and 2010 measurements, respectively. The mean 
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normalized deflection in 2010 decreased by 28 percent from that measured values in 
2006 for segment 1 but only 9 percent for segment 2 as seen in Table 5.5. Segment 1 is 
from 12.0 km to 20.0 km, while segment 2 is from 20.0 km to 45.5km.  
It was clear that an increase in total structural capacity of the pavement occurred 
from 2006 to 2010. The 2010 FWD measurements were conducted in the dry season 
while the measurements conducted in 2006 were performed near the end of the wet 
season. However, the decrease in the maximum deflection over time is collectively 
attributed to the aging of the HMA surface, the curing of the foamed asphalt base layer, 
and possibly a change in the granular material stiffness. The deflections at the D8 
sensor in Table 5.5 indicates that the subgrade modulus has been maintained over time 
with less than 10 percent change from 2006 to 2010. In addition, the back-calculated 
subgrade modulus averaged 100 MPa for both 2006 and 2010, which signifies a good 
subgrade soil modulus. 
The location of the pavement failures immediately after the earthquake are noted on 
the deflection plot in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 (vertical lines) to determine if there were 
specific correlations between the deflections in 2006 and failures in 2010. No clear 
correlation exists between the pavement structural capacity (including subgrade 
modulus) and the locations of 2010 failure locations based on the deflection basin or 
maximum surface deflections. During the visual survey after the earthquake, it was 
empirically noted that the La Madera sections that have binder-rich foamed asphalt 
performed relatively better. In general, the FWD test data suggested that the 
earthquake did not cause unforeseen network level damage to the pavement structure 
except for the obvious local damage areas reported during the visual surveys. No 
quantifiable trends were seen in the FWD data as a result of the earthquake. Additional 
FWD data is needed over time to verify if changes in the material or structural capacity 
may show up after the first rainy season. 
Table 5.5 Normalized Maximum (D0) and 1.524 m Offset Deflection (D8) in 
Segment 1 (12 km to 20 km) and Segment 2 (20 km to 45.5 km) 
 
* Standard deviation 
 Year 
Centre Plate Deflections 
(microns) 1.524m offset Deflections (microns)
Segment 1 
12 to 20 km 
Segment 2 
20 to 45.5 km 
Segment 1 
12 to 20 km 
Segment 2 
20 to 45.5 km 
La
ne
 1
 2006 647.2 (120.7*) 493.1 (116.9) 67.4 (19.5) 61.3 (19.8) 
2010 465.1 (105.9) 393.3 (116.8) 61.7 (20.8) 64.7 (24.1) 
Difference 182.1 99.8 5.7 -3.4 
La
ne
 2
 2006 725.4 (136.9) 465 (117.4) 78.9 (28.5) 64.7 (17.2) 
2010 456.2 (92.4) 426.0 (120.3) 62.7 (20.5) 69.5 (20.4) 
Difference 269.2 39.0 16.2 -4.8 
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Figure 5.6 Top: maximum center loading plate deflection; Bottom: deflection at 
sensor offset of 1.524 m on lane 1 of segment 1 (normalized to 40 kN 
and 20 °C). 
 
Figure 5.7 Top: maximum center loading plate deflection; Bottom: deflection at 
sensor offset of 1.524 m on lane 1 of segment 2 (normalized to 40 kN 
and 20 °C). 
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5.5.2. IRI Measurements: Itata Highway 
It was expected that the roughness of the road would increase after this major 
seismic event. IRI data was collected by the Itata highway concession as required by its 
operating contract. The IRI measurements for lane 4 (driving lane) on the Itata highway 
are shown in Figure 5.8 for August 2009 and April 2010 (ASPA, 2009; ASPA, 2010) as 
an example. The IRI in 2010 was measured after some of the earthquake-damaged 
areas were repaired or patched. Mean IRI values for the four lanes are presented 
in Table 5.6. The IRI for this pavement increased 3.6 percent in the passing lanes and 
8.35 percent in the driving lanes over the seven-month period. This increase in IRI is 
significantly higher than a well-maintained roadway and is attributed to the effect of the 
earthquake, especially in the driving lane to local settlement and emergency patching. 
Despite the effects of this earthquake, the IRI of the roadway still meets the maximum 
specification requirements of 3.5 m/km. 
 
Figure 5.8 Longitudinal variations in IRI from 2009 to 2010 for Lane 4 of Itata 
highway 
Table 5.6 Average IRI in 2009 and 2010 for Itata Highway 
 
5.6. DISCUSSION 
In general, a significant number of the pavement damage was related to 
embankment movements. A large number of the embankments that structurally failed 
were constructed with material that just met the minimum specification requirements. It 
appears that the present Chilean specifications for embankments were not adequate to 
withstand an earthquake of the magnitude experienced in 2010. In addition, 
embankment settlement and slope stability analyses may need to be conducted to 
better understand the causes of the catastrophic slope failures and settlements. 
Year 
IRI (m/km) 
Lane 1-Passing Lane 2-Passing Lane 3-Driving Lane 4-Driving 
2009 1.37 1.41 1.70 1.60 
2010 1.42 1.46 1.84 1.73 
Change (%) +3.4 +3.8 +8.4 +8.3 
152 
A large number of earth-stabilized bridge approaches had major failures or 
collapses, while the remaining suffered minor damage. Bridge approaches where 
mechanically stabilized earth was utilized had excellent performance with no visual 
distresses observed. This suggests that the fill construction and/or material selection 
and compaction played an important role in the bridge approach failures and may 
suggest that this construction specification is inadequate to withstand such an 
earthquake. 
The Maule earthquake occurred at the end of the Chilean summer but if the 
earthquake would have occurred during the winter rainy season, the damage could 
have been more severe. The Concepción region usually has more than 1,000 mm of 
rain during winter, which results in saturated soil condition. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that total pavement damage could have been significantly worse if the 
earthquake happened during winter. 
5.7. CONCLUSIONS 
The Maule earthquake caused considerable damage to transportation networks. 
Several pavement networks were surveyed for characteristic damage after the 
earthquake. The main failures on the pavement surface were a result of fill material 
settlement at bridge approaches, under-drain settlement, embankment slope failures, 
and lateral spreading of the embankment. The surveys indicated that mechanically-
stabilized fills used at bridge approaches performed better than earth-stabilized bridge 
approaches during the earthquake. Most of the failed fill areas meet the current 
specification requirements suggesting an evaluation of current fill standards is 
necessary. Traditional pavement visual assessment guidelines were found to be 
unsuitable for evaluating earthquake damage on roadways since the distress 
mechanisms are different. The field surveys concluded the need for developing a 
standardized condition assessment tool with guidelines to evaluate pavement damage 
after an earthquake. 
Falling weight deflectometer data was collected and analyzed to determine the 
effects the earthquake had on the pavement structural capacity from 2006 to 2010. In 
general, surface deflections showed little change in the pavement structure as a result 
of the earthquake and the changing in surface deflections were primarily related to the 
aging of the asphalt layer. This means the pavement network showing no surface 
distress should be expected to perform as originally anticipated. Surface roughness 
data was collected and International Roughness Index (IRI) was calculated to determine 
the effects the earthquake had on the pavement functional performance. The roughness 
measurements were performed five months before the earthquake and immediately 
after the emergency repairs. The average IRI changed 3.6 to 8.4 percent, in the passing 
and driving lanes, respectively. The IRI changes were a combination of both local 
settlement of the roadway and emergency repair construction quality. 
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6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES AND IMPACT ON 
COMMUNICATIONS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chile has a history of frequent and high intensity earthquakes on record (Volk, 
2010). Closely following the Haiti earthquake of January 12 where a 7.0 magnitude 
earthquake caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, estimates range from 230,000 to 
300,000 according to (Vorbe, 2010), to many more homeless (over 1 million people) 
and tremendous material and economic damage, Chile’s earthquake inescapably and 
originally was covered in international news in relation to Haiti. For instance, On March 
1, 2010, the front page headline in the New York Times was "Headline: Chile Mobilizes 
Soldiers to Aid after Quake", with a sub-headline of "Millions Are Displaced as Death 
Toll Climbs". The article displayed both the tendency to overestimate damage as well as 
comparisons to Haiti. Chile’s much stronger earthquake sparked a tsunami that swept 
away entire villages and reconfigured the coastal topography in the affected region. The 
natural disaster resulted in 521 deaths. Damage estimates range from 30 billion dollars 
in damage from national authorities, 18 percent of Chile’s GNP (Volk, 2010) to a much 
lower private estimate of 10 billion dollars, 6 percent of GNP (Navia, 2010). Although 
the location and effects differed drastically from that of Haiti, originally news coverage 
linked the two as do continuing academic debates that compare the two (Latin American 
Studies Association: Forum, XLI: 3, 2010). To understand the relatively minor damage 
incurred in Chile in relation to Haiti, a more detailed study of Chile will illuminate the 
situation. 
The country of Chile is a thriving and dynamic political entity with a successful 
economy by global standards2. Ranked #44 in 2009 in the United Nations (UN) Human 
development Index, it is situated atop the “High Human Development, HHD (developing 
countries)” category. It is the highest ranked Latin American country in this index, ahead 
of Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico, and Costa Rica, other countries in this same 
HHD category. According to Volk (2010) Chile has pursued joining the “developed” 
category for years, and the current President Piñera reassures his people that this will 
be achieved by 2018. According to the latest UN data, Chile’s 17 million people are 
overwhelmingly urban (88+ percent), literate (98.65 percent), with high life expectancy 
(81.6/75.5, women/men), and low fertility rates (1.9 live births per women). Literacy 
rates vary according to reporting agency between 96.5 (UNDP, 2009 – web reference) 
to 98.65 percent (UNICEF, 2010 – web reference). In terms of the Latin American 
region, Chile has a relatively peaceful democratic past, with the notable exception of 
seventeen years of military rule under General Pinochet (1973-1990) who deposed a 
democratically elected President Allende. In sum, these statistical and social indicators 
                                                 
2 While beyond the scope of this chapter, issues of aggregate data such as GDP and GNP do not reveal 
uneven wealth distribution across people and regions. 
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document Chile’s placement high atop the developing countries index, at the border of 
the “developed” category. 
6.2. GEOGRAPHY AND TOPOGRAPHY 
One very influential element in Chile’s development and its social, cultural, political, 
economic, and communications situation is its geography. Chile is a very long country 
(4,270 km of contiguous territory plus a long archipelago terminating in Antarctica), with 
a narrow width (averaging 177 km east to west). This width is deceptively large as the 
presence of the Andes mountains to the east, to the west the Pacific Ocean borders the 
nation with rugged coastal territory. Together with the mountains an oceanside take up 
much of the possible livable or traversable space. Moreover, and perhaps as a result of 
its topography, Chile is a sparsely populated country. Its density index is 192nd in the 
world compared to Haiti’s 31st. This translates into 22.6 as compared to 361.5 
inhabitants per square kilometer (Navia, 2010). 
In particular, the transportation and communications implications of geography and 
topography and population density are great since, as communications scholars have 
documented, communications and transportation are nearly symbiotic until the 
development of electronic and digital media. To wit, communications lines historically 
have been erected alongside transportation lines. In fact, as Guback and Bettig (1987) 
have noted, in the German language of the nineteenth century there was only one word 
for both communications and transportation. The history of communications technology 
documents that transportation routes which often privilege commerce and military 
operations over interpersonal travel, provide the framework for communications. For 
example, telegraph poles run parallel to railroad lines, as the original semaphoric 
system of telegraphy was connected to railway stations. As well, communication lines 
follow imperial paths rather than domestic needs (Smith, 1980). This means that in most 
countries with a colonial history—as is the case with Chile-- transportation, and thus 
communications networks, flow from the internal areas of the country out to a port that 
connects via waterways with the mother colony. In Chile this means that major ports 
such as Iquique in the north, Valparaíso in the central region, and Talcahuano in the 
south served as a departure point for exportation of raw materials and arrival point of 
colonial settlers, expert knowledge, and capitalized goods. Given its long and narrow 
terrain, Chile has traditionally depended and continues to depend on these three major 
ports for international commerce. Until the twentieth century, sea-lanes accounted for 
most of the transportation, especially in regards to commerce, from north to south as 
well as for communications from east to west 3 . Even in contemporary times, 
transportation of goods, especially major agricultural exports such as fruit, seafood, 
lumber, and wine, is still carried out partly through sea lanes. Communication with 
                                                 
3 Most notably the British controlled underwater cables that transported communications. This was a 
major part of the reason that the US invested so heavily in telegraph and radio technology. 
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seafaring modes of transportation remains of essential importance. The most reliable 
form of sea to shore communication is radio. 
Finally, another item of relevance to the study of transportation and communications 
is the reliance on the one north-south road, previously known as the Panamerican 
Highway4 and now as Highway 5 (Route 5). It is imperative that in such a long country, 
this highway serve as the major avenue of material delivery and human transportation 
within the country. Food, people, and newspapers—all of those that travel on land--rely 
on this highway to reach markets and people. In the case of crisis, or political turmoil, 
any disruption of this highway can have disastrous effects in terms of scarcities and 
isolation. For instance, one of the destabilizing tactics used by those seeking to topple 
the Allende government in the early seventies (1970-1973), was to pay off the truck 
drivers to strike and thus create immediate food shortages throughout Chile, especially 
in the highly populated central region that not only relies on food from other regions but 
also is the seat of most of the political power in the country. With that knowledge in 
mind, the north-south transportation corridor is of great strategic importance to the 
country. A disruption caused by a natural disaster, such as a major earthquake, 
inevitably will lead to destabilization and food shortages. 
There is also research on disaster communications drawn primarily from the sub-
fields of disaster medicine and information technology deployment. Scholars in these 
areas note that “during a disaster communications may be congested or misused” 
(Garshnek and Burkle, 1999). Success or failure of a disaster response is often 
determined by timely access to communication and reliable information (Ibid., p. 213). 
Establishing efficient, rapid, and reliable telecommunication pathways to facilitate 
sharing of transportation and information reduces mortality and morbidity. Whereas in 
some cases (such as Haiti) the communications system was “inadequate or 
nonexistent,” in others (such as Chile) the “disaster itself is responsible for immobilizing 
the existing communications infrastructure” (Garshnek, Sinchi, and Burkle, 1998, p. 
223). 
6.3. REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
Another background element of relevance to this report is the regional distribution of 
population, media, and power in Chile. Although a rather recent historical trend, by 2010 
88 percent of the 17 million Chilean population is urban. This nearly reverses the 
distribution of population in just four decades. Furthermore, the bulk of the urban 
population resides in the greater Santiago metropolitan area with 40 percent or 6.8 
million people concentrated in that city and another 2 million in Valparaíso. The uneven 
distribution of population generates an uneven concentration of political and financial 
clout that in turn negatively affects those regions beyond the greater metropolitan area 
of Santiago in terms of distribution of resources. The implications for a natural disaster 
                                                 
4 This highway theoretically runs the length of The Americas south of the US border. However, in some 
parts the Panamerican Highway is more of a metaphor that a real road. 
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is that resources will first be deployed in the central metropolitan area, regardless of 
need or intensity, and will slowly, if ever, trickle down to the area closer to the epicenter 
that falls outside the metropolitan region. This concentration of population, power, and 
resources inevitably includes interpersonal and mass media as a means of 
communications. For example, landline telephony is more widely available in the 
Santiago metropolitan region than anywhere else in the country, and even there landline 
accessibility is not total. This concentration of land lines means that until recently much 
of the population had to rely on public telephony, or even more recently, mobile 
telephony. The same applies to television—with original deployment first limited to 
downtown Santiago. Radio remains a much more widely available medium.  
6.4. POLITICAL TRANSITION 
The earthquake on February 27, 2010 came at a time of political transition for Chile, 
thirteen days ahead of the scheduled transfer of power from Michelle Bachelet, a left of 
center president of the coalition Concertacion that had ruled the country since 1990 
when President/General Augusto Pinochet had stepped down after seventeen years in 
power. The incoming President Sebastian Piñera represents a right of center coalition. 
Thus, part of the contributing factors to the post-earthquake confusion was a power 
vacuum and struggle and difficult communication between the outgoing president 
Bachelet and the incoming president Piñera. The ministerial and bureaucratic 
government staff, many of whom are politically appointed, were also in a state of 
disarray. Bachelet’s staff was moving out, and Piñera’s staff was either moving in or yet 
to be appointed. While the original response to the earthquake was voiced by President 
Bachelet, much of the resources devoted to earthquake recovery were in fact decided 
by the incoming president who, in turn, was forced to abandon, or at least background, 
most of his proposed campaign promises in the wake of the urgent needs following the 
disaster. 
6.5. SEASONAL AND OTHER TIMING ELEMENTS 
The February earthquake occurred at the end of Chile’s summer vacation season. 
In fact, schools were to begin their fall instruction the Monday after the earthquake. As 
well, the earthquake happened on a Friday night, the beginning of a weekend in the last 
weekend of the summer season. All of these elements are relevant in terms of where 
people were at the time of the earthquake. To begin with, many in the middle class were 
either still away on vacation or making their way back to the major metropolitan areas. 
Many young people were still up partying at 3:34 a.m. local time. Not many people were 
on the road or in public places at that time of the night. 
There are positive and negative outcomes of the timing of the earthquake. To be 
sure, the lack of people concentrated in schools, roads, or major shopping centers 
prevented possible chaos and casualties. The vacation time meant both that many 
people were away from the urban areas but also that many of the people who would 
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manage the crisis were not at work or even around the cities at the time. The late night 
hour meant that workers, say in emergency alert posts, were also not at work. 
Reconnecting people, either in person or via forms of communication, was a major 
challenge after the earthquake—a challenge that in the case of coastal communities, 
cost life and material damage. 
Given its rather developed status and high literacy rates, Chile has a thriving media 
system. Prior to the military coup Chile had a vibrant newspaper culture that has begun 
to recover since 1990. As well, Chile’s radio and television development and 
deployment followed traditional lines of expansion, from the major cities first to the 
provinces later. Radio networks traditionally lay in the hands of powerful economic 
sectors—for example, Radio Minería belonged to the powerful copper mines. Like in 
many countries, Chile’s television network was first operated by large universities and 
was not commercial, and only since the eighties has it transitioned into private sector 
ownership and prominence with a minimum presence of public broadcasting. As with 
other highly networked countries, Chile has exhibited, over the past decade, a growth 
and reduction in absolute and proportional numbers of internet connectivity trough dial-
up and then growth through other connectivity forms such as digital subscriber line 
(DSL) and wireless means. Similarly Chileans have adopted mobile telephone 
technology, especially as landlines were difficult (if not impossible) and very expensive 
to get in many locations. 
Whereas scholars find that “land lines provide the links between nodes in 
telecommunications networks and offer point-to-point transmission along a wire or fiber-
optic cable medium … The disadvantages related to disaster management are that land 
lines cannot attach to anything mobile, cannot reach remote locations economically, 
cannot broadcast a signal simultaneously to all parts of a continent, and the system may 
be damaged during a disaster.” (Garshnek, Sinchi, and Burkle, 1998, p. 224). All of 
these factors took place in Chile following the earthquake. Given that most of the 
damage was suffered by remote locations, the limits of reliance on landline telephony 
and integrated digital networks were clearly exposed. 
Transnational flows of population and capital result in external communications 
networks. Communications research shows, much like with internal national networks, 
that international communications networks are developed to facilitate transfer of 
information about capital and military. Nonetheless, there is also a need for people-to-
people communication. While cosmopolitan and upper middle class professionals who 
experience high degrees of mobility make use of these networks, recent development of 
digital technology also facilitates their use by other groups such as seasonal, 
undocumented, or working class migrants. Local telephone centers, cheap telephone 
cards, and now—internet telephony such as Skype—enable those with limited 
resources to stay connected to their homelands. One need not own a personal 
computer with home internet access as internet centers allow low-income people to 
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access social networks such as Facebook as well as to make Skype calls and check e-
mail. 
While Chile does not match the level and magnitude of migration as countries like 
Mexico, it has experienced waves of outward migration due to political changes. Thus, 
there are far flung Chilean communities dating back to 1970 and 1973. Additionally 
waves of German and Italian migrations to Chile result in transnational flows to and from 
those two countries. Moreover, the level of education and development of the country 
means that professionals also have transnational careers and that businesses send 
Chileans abroad as well as non-Chileans to Chile. Thus given its national development 
as a globally integrated economy, news about Chile and its earthquake were likely to be 
covered in countries with whom it shared strong migration flows and economic ties. 
Finally, Chile serves as a regional node of immigration for countries whose 
economies are not as strong. Immigrants from Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina currently 
expand the transnational mix that becomes more noticeable when communications 
traffic increases due to a natural disaster. Therefore, due to regional proximity and 
citizen presence, news coverage of earthquake will increase in neighboring countries as 
a way to inform national population about welfare of citizens. 
6.6. COMMUNICATIONS EFFECTS 
A major earthquake, as this one, inevitably, was bound to cause major disruptions. 
While the disruptions were much smaller than the worst-case scenario due to the 
frequent occurrence of and therefore knowledge about earthquakes in the zone and the 
resulting degree of preparedness enabled by a relatively wealthy economy, the 
disruptions were great nonetheless. Electricity, gas, sewage, and water infrastructures 
were immediately disrupted with different rates of reinstatement. In particular, in terms 
of communications, there were some expected and some unexpected outcomes. 
Government itself suffered from an immediate inability to communicate with its own 
agencies and military. In the case of Concepción the military was deployed by Monday 
29 (two days after the earthquake) in order to gain control of the situation amidst feared 
looting and chaos (Volk, 2010). A curfew from dusk till dawn was instituted and 
enforced. In these affected areas, communication and transportation were so severely 
disrupted that emergency vehicles such as ambulances and fire trucks could not receive 
accurate information nor communicate with each other as to location of people and 
situations. 
The magnitude and duration of the earthquake resulted in short-, middle-, and long-
term disruptions. The short-term effects were felt during and immediately after the 
earthquake. Middle range effects comprise the effort to resume transportation and 
communications flow and services in the aftermath. Long-term effects refer to the 
reconceptualization of networks, some of which may have been damaged and others, 
which remain to be deployed, as the information is gathered post-earthquake. Nearly all 
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communications crashed immediately after the earthquake. Different elements began to 
be restored from within a few hours to nearly two weeks, depending on the mode and 
location. In the long term the entire network needs to be reassessed, especially reliance 
on electric and electronic telecommunications and the relative lack of attention paid to 
radio. 
Following the initial shock of the earthquake people attempted to move to a safe 
place and to contact relatives and friends in the immediate vicinity and farther away. 
While Chilean people are used to mid-level tremors and know where to seek shelter 
(e.g. doorframes, outdoors, etc.), the earthquake was so strong that people could not 
move while it lasted. Many people did not take the beginning of the earthquake 
seriously—after all, they are used to strong tremors (called earthquakes elsewhere). By 
the time people realized that this was one of the “big ones”, it was too strong to move. 
This was repeatedly reported. Although everyone knew what to do and where to go 
during an earthquake, in the middle of this one nobody could move. Additionally, strong 
aftershocks occurred for weeks after the earthquake, and certainly immediately 
following it. The immediate aftermath of the quake resulted in total electrical outage in 
the affected areas. People in Santiago, Valparaíso and Viña del Mar, Concepción and 
Talcahuano, Chillán, Talca, Rancagua, etc. survived the earthquake only to surface in 
total darkness with sirens of all kinds blaring (building, automobile, and emergency 
vehicles and warning systems). In this setting people attempted to move and 
communicate. Needless to say, roads, especially in urban areas such as Santiago, 
Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, and Concepción became immediately congested. Without 
streetlights, it was difficult to see if there were transportation network failures. 
People immediately attempted to make phone calls, as it was evident that there was 
an electrical power outage and therefore internet, television, and electric radio were not 
usable. Those with battery-operated radios originally could not find an operating radio 
station. In the affected area, Radio Bío Bío was able to transmit within an hour through 
its emergency generators. Those with landlines were sometimes able to make a phone 
call, but more often, this network crashed or functioned intermittently. Those with mobile 
telephone—nearly everyone with a mobile telephone—attempted to make phone calls. 
In the short-term, with nearly everyone who had a mobile phone attempting to place 
a phone call immediately after the earthquake, the system crashed. Cell phone users 
tried other strategies such as sending out text and twitter messages with the reasoning 
that these would be somehow kept in the system and sent and received at a time when 
the system came back to work. In fact, this was not an unsuccessful approach as the 
system occasionally functioned and some of these messages were sent and received. 
In the middle term range, cell phones would become discharged and without electricity, 
there was nowhere to charge them. Cell phone companies began to send mobile 
recharging units to certain cities and neighborhoods. These would generate long lines of 
people. Electric companies also began to deploy mobile units for recharging not just 
mobile telephones, but that was certainly one of the uses of this effort. In the long-range 
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cell phone companies and digital communications industry need to expand their 
capacity to account for the possibility that more than 10 percent of users will make 
demands on the system. Given Chile’s propensity for large earthquakes, this is not a 
remote possibility in the near future. 
Nearly all disaster communications research and conventions begin with the 
necessity for and integrated and operable communications system. While some 
research stresses the importance of satellite and internet technology, in a disaster case 
when electricity is out of order, we return to the global mass medium, transistor radio. 
The keystone element of a crisis system is of communications is radio. As Manoj et al. 
(2007, p. 51) note “lack of radio interoperability” severely hampers disaster relief and 
information sharing efforts. Moreover, radio operations have to be integrated at the city, 
regional, and national level, across people, communities, and layers of government and 
other institutions that become relevant in such a situation. 
In Chile, immediately in the aftermath of the earthquake radio communication was 
interrupted. However, radio station emergency generators were activated by some radio 
stations and they became a primary and, in many cases, the sole source of mass media 
information for people and governments in the affected regions, especially those farther 
away from Santiago wherein communications and transportation were more quickly 
restored. 
Ham radio operators had legal agreements with the government with legal clauses 
written specifically for the case of earthquakes (Title VIII, Article 53—which states “In 
exceptional cases such as earthquakes …. This network will be activated as the 
emergency network.”). Immediately following the earthquake, the emergency network 
determined that there was a “dead zone” of transmission between Rancagua to the 
north of the epicenter and Valdivia to the south, a 761 km swath. Within 10 minutes of 
the earthquake the ham radio network was activated and in operation. By 4:10 a.m. 
there was an alert distributed about the tsunami. However despite the thousands of 
messages sent, and the fact that access to this network was free and continuous within 
the network, the lack of organized interaction with authorities rendered its efficacy less 
than useful and in some cases altogether negligible. 
Newspapers as well suffered a break in production. In Concepción two days passed 
before local newspapers, El Sur and El Diario de Concepción, could begin to distribute, 
in much shorter versions dedicated totally to the earthquake aftermath. Since 
distribution channels were also disrupted, newspapers were sold on street corners by 
people yelling out the name of the newspapers, like in the nineteenth century, and 
quickly sold out whenever available. This traditional form of media was in high demand, 
especially against the backdrop of intermittent electric and electronic media availability. 
Interviews with some close to the epicenter revealed that most people suffered at 
least two days of total lack of infrastructure: water, gas, sewage, electricity, and any 
form of communications other than interpersonal. As many said: “nos fuimos a la negra” 
(we lived through a total black out). People tried to reach their families, and for those 
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who managed to, they stayed in an extended family situation for as long as two weeks. 
Others who were in far flung places on vacation took many days in returning due to 
transportation and road issues as well as local restrictions on traveling after dark. 
Everyone agreed that the main form of communication was interpersonal, word of 
mouth. 
Return to a fully networked communications status took up to two weeks. Within 24-
48 hours local newspapers and radio stations were available in most urban and 
suburban settings. By Monday, those connected to larger organizations (government, 
corporations, and the military) in the large cities, but especially in Santiago secured 
access to networked electric and electronic communications. In particular, this 
institutional connection to networked resources proved crucial in sending and receiving 
communication to and from abroad for those with transnational connections. More 
efficient than emailing, those connected to Facebook found that posting a general 
message such as “La familia Nahuel esta bien—todos” (The Nahuel family is well—all 
of us) was much more efficient and economical than trying to individually call or email 
single individuals. Transnational triangulation was also possible. For example, someone 
living in the U.S. with a cousin in Germany could try to find out via that German 
connection if they had heard from common relatives and friends in Chile. This 
networked set of connections were accessed by people of all socioeconomic status, 
from migrant laborers to highly paid professionals, as a way of finding out and 
distributing information about particular individuals and families. 
Whereas those connected manage to get news of their status out to others, those in 
the region without these connections might remain more or less unconnected for a week 
or more; in most households there was a week gap in electric power. Even up to the 
time of the MAE Center trip in April there was still little knowledge about communities to 
the south of Bíobío. Most of the recovery and assessment effort began in Santiago, 
though it was not the most affected region. Efforts flowed, not very evenly nor rapidly, 
through other cities. Remote villages and populations fell beyond the scope and original 
impulse of the communications and recovery effort. 
6.7. COMMUNICATION FAILURE 
Despite the infrastructural disruptions and damage mentioned in the previous 
section, there was relatively little material damage and human loss of life in relation to 
the magnitude and length of the earthquake. However, the total failure in 
communications meant that populations could not be warned about the impending 
tsunamis that hit the coastal areas following the earthquakes. Whatever warning 
systems were in place on paper did not function at the time. Whether this was 
completely due to the failure of telecommunications systems or if there was also an 
interpersonal communications element to it, remains to be further investigated. Some of 
those interviewed suggested that there was a social occasion in which many of the 
emergency warning personnel were participating. The MAE Center team also 
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interviewed a couple of dockworkers in Talcahuano, the port city near Concepción, and 
they claimed that they called the Coast Guard to find out if there was danger of 
tsunamis and they were told “no.” These particular workers nonetheless sent people 
home and took high ground that is why they lived to tell the tale as their workplace was 
thoroughly damaged, if not destroyed, by the waves. In fact, coastal populations headed 
to the hills because of previous earthquake readiness training thus mitigating more 
extensive loss of life. 
Given the character of Chile’s topography, there are clusters of populations 
throughout the length of the coast. Public warning systems in the networked age 
(Botterell and Addams-Morring, 2007) have to be tailored to the local conditions. In the 
case of most coastal communities in Chile, one can assume electrical power in the best 
of times, but in the disruption of communications that occurred immediately after the 
earthquake, semaphoric, sound signal, and radio messages would have been most 
helpful to coastal residents. 
Despite not being in the epicenter zone, Santiago suffered some disruption and 
damage. Beginning with the airport as a zone of entry into the country, minor damage 
and necessary mandatory inspections caused it to close for two days following the 
earthquake and to operate below full capacity for another week. Cities and regions most 
affected took longer, still in process as per the conversation of the MAE Center team 
with the mayor of Talca and according to Volk (2010). The regional tendency to spend 
more resources on the capital city bore itself out in this case. Despite or perhaps due to 
its being less affected, repairs in Santiago were addressed first. 
6.8. CONCLUSIONS 
Major international media are deployed according to geopolitical reasons. Similarly, 
coverage of international news is as much about geopolitical interests of the covering 
country as it is about “objective” facts. Therefore, countries that matter to major global 
powers are more likely to have media coverage and correspondents than those whose 
participation in geopolitics is more marginal. In addition, media coverage centers on 
major cities. This is the case in the U.S. as much as in any other country. For instance, 
the San Francisco earthquake of 1989 (known as the Loma Prieta earthquake) was 
originally covered by local broadcasters and reporters because that city is not 
considered major enough to have major international correspondents. Thus if an 
earthquake occurs in any other city, coverage will be filtered through the location of the 
major city. In the case of the New York Times coverage, the stories by-lined by Mark 
Lacey were filed from Lima, Peru. 
In the case of Chile, due to its status as a node of economic productivity and 
bilateral trade agreements with the U.S. as well as extensive trading with European and 
Asian countries, there were quite a few international correspondents in Santiago. 
Original coverage came from Santiago and foregrounded the damage and disruption in 
Santiago. There was less coverage about Valparaíso and Concepción, and much less 
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coverage about the areas closer to the epicenter and thus most damaged such as Talca 
and Constitución. Somehow the New York Times early reports included photographs 
from Talca and Constitución (Figure 6.1), though CNN reports pictured mostly the 
damage in Santiago (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1 Front page New York Times article and photo on February 28, 2010—the 
day after the earthquake. While the photograph is of Talca, most of the 
article focused on the damage in Santiago and Concepción 
 
Figure 6.2 Photograph from cnn.com on February 27, 2010, Santiago damage 
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In the aftermath of the earthquake, international news covered some of the major 
elements of damage, such as the building Alto Río in Concepción (Figure 4.19, see 
Section 4.2), and some of the more spectacular—especially visually—photographs 
about the destruction after the tsunami, especially in Talcahuano as this city is easily 
accessible from, indeed connected to, Concepción. In accordance with the patterns of 
international coverage, news of the earthquake were quickly replaced with other 
international news as the middle and long range effects became more pronounced and 
the immediate aftermath was no longer news. Middle and long term effects are often not 
considered “news” as these are much more difficult to discuss and difficult to visualize. 
In the United States, little about the earthquake was even mentioned after mid-March, 
except in Latina/o media where it continued to be a news item, even if not in the front 
page. In the popular Univisión show “Sábado Gigante” Don Francisco, its Chilean host, 
occasionally focuses attention on the victims of the quake and raising funds to send to 
Chile. 
While the epicenter of the earthquake was closest to a city called Constitución, the 
closest big city is Concepción. Needless to say, there was little media presence in 
Constitución which is 234 km from Concepción. As well, Constitución cannot be 
reached directly by the Pan-American Highway (Route 5) but by far less traveled 
Highway 126 and a combination of other coastal roads that also suffered much more 
damage from the earthquake than Route 5. Not only were media not able to reach that 
city and other coastal communities easily but neither were warnings and emergency 
help. Had the city not engaged in recent earthquake preparedness, which included 
possible post-earthquake tsunami drills, more citizens might have perished. Scholarship 
on disaster communications shows that “Success or failure of a disaster response is 
often determined by timely access to communication and reliable information… 
Establishing efficient, rapid, and reliable telecommunication pathways to facilitate 
sharing of transportation and information will reduce mortality and morbidity” (Garshnek 
and Burkle, 1999, p. 213). This lack of communication and reliable information had 
disastrous consequences in Constitución. As significant portion of the total casualties 
from the earthquake were from Constitución due to the tsunami. National and 
international media, however, have reported little directly from this most affected city 
and region as it is both difficult to reach via roads and it is also, for the same reasons, 
not a hub of media production or coverage. 
New media, such as digitally delivered internet access for personal and 
business/institutional uses has been singled out in recent research as a key component 
of emergency help delivery post disaster. For example, Garshnek et al. (1998) single 
out satellite communications as a reliable technology. Sun Oh (2003), Meissner, et al. 
(2002), and Botterell and Addams-Morring (2007) also include satellite, digital, and 
electricity intensive telecommunications systems as part of their strategy for managing 
communications during a disaster. However, as Manoj and Hubenko Baker (2007) note: 
“Above all, the emergency communication tools for the general public must be 
affordable, available, and applicable during their day-to-day life in order to ensure that 
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they will be used during a crisis” (p. 52). Affordability and availability in relation to new 
technologies is something that is very much interrelates to socio-economic resources. 
The presence of business and government institutions in the big cities, especially in the 
capital city of Santiago, meant both that not only those institutionally networked systems 
but also that a swath of the population is able to afford to be networked at home. 
Concepción (ca. 900,000 people), though much smaller than Santiago (ca. 6 million 
people), also has some big businesses, government, and educational institutions that 
provided workers with access at the office and with the salaries to afford access at 
home. 
While the earthquake resulted in near total blackout up through the Santiago 
metropolitan area for at least 24 hours, by Monday morning many of those whose jobs 
included digital connectivity could draw on those resources to communicate regionally, 
nationally, and internationally. Some reported that they were able to Skype from work to 
loved ones in the more affected region. Landlines were among the first to work 
sporadically so Skype to landline was an early tactic. Internet social network postings 
such as Facebook were also quite useful as were individual emails. However, these 
options were only open to those with access to institutions whose power supplies were 
privileged over individual households. In turn, the few connected could reach a regional, 
national, and transnational circle of connections with an emphasis on the latter as the 
two former were likely to be disrupted. 
Communications and transportations systems need to be accessible and reliable, 
especially during times of crisis and disaster. The two remain symbiotic, even in the 
contemporary digital era. What this means in the case of Chile or any other country is 
that access to roads and the ability to share information is likely to be disrupted after 
crisis and/or disaster at the precise moment when that access is most urgently 
important. Whereas much of contemporary research on disaster communication and 
crisis warning singles out satellite and digital technology as a crucial component of a 
strategy of recovery, the preliminary accounts from the ground in the Chilean situation 
suggest that we need to reconsider and re-foreground traditional media. Both 
government agencies and individuals were hampered in their efforts by their reliance on 
the new communications technologies. The total electric black out immediately after the 
earthquake and the less than organized alternative communication network response 
meant that the warning of impending tsunamis did not reach its target audience, the 
coastal population near the epicenter. Most of the loss of life was due to this failure in 
communications. While, the material damage, although large in absolute numbers but 
small in relation to the magnitude of the earthquake, was mostly inevitable—that is, the 
country was not prepared for 2 meter waves and earthquake based damage was to be 
expected in many settings because of a complex set of variables (e.g. the mostly adobe 
structures in the historic downtown of Talca dated back to an age where seismic 
construction was not part of the equation), the loss of life in the coastal regions was 
more or less easily preventable. 
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Foremost from the perspective of communications systems, there is a need for 
individuals and institutions to keep a backup system of communications. The most 
reliable and affordable such system is a network of battery powered radio receiver 
and/or ham radio equipment. This network does not rely on electricity and can cover 
large distances, especially in the coastal area5. This means that local and national 
governments, as well as the military, have to create and support such a network. In turn, 
this network needs to be integrated so that inter-agency communication can occur in 
disaster times when access to information is so crucial. National and regional 
governments need to keep information, and possibly support, a network of generator 
powered ham radio operators to provide back up when electric and electronic networks 
fail. Of course digital and satellite supported communications networks are not 
irrelevant, but we cannot rely on these since they are highly susceptible to failure in 
times of natural disaster, especially in world regions where the network may not be as 
strong or as broad as necessary. For instance, many people still are not internet 
connected and thus disconnected from broader network that internet allows. This 
network particularly needs to be strengthened in coastal region. A skeletal emergency 
network needs to be maintained 24/7. 
As a complementary network, digital mobile telephony providers need to expand 
network capacity so it can better sustain the high demands of another potential 
occurrence of earthquake or other natural disasters. While one of the two national 
mobile telephony networks bounced back a bit sooner, the fact remains that neither was 
able to function under maximum demand. 
Another element in the communications outlook is that in times of crisis people 
revert to traditional networks of familial and interpersonal communications. In this 
sense, transportation networks are crucial as in the modern world, including in Chile, 
families do not live in the same household or compound. This meant that the immediate 
reflex of most Chileans was to travel “home.” This caused major congestion in dark 
roads, some of which were damaged. A public service media campaign instructing 
residents on evacuation and also on the feasibility and timing of traveling “home” is in 
order. 
As noted by communications scholars, transportation and communications networks 
are inextricably entwined especially in times of crisis. Much touted de-centralization 
promises of electronic network did not come into effect during time of crisis. Traditional 
media served information needs for the population. A better integrated ham radio 
network would also help government and military needs. This is not a call for great 
infrastructural investment but for a return to the mass media which has proven to be 
more reliable in this setting and under similar circumstances. 
                                                 
5 Radio transmission in mountainous regions is a bit more prone to interference, but even there it remains 
the most reliable in times of natural disaster. 
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
On February 27, 2010 at 03:34 am local time, a major earthquake of magnitude 8.8 
struck central Chile. The earthquake nucleated in the subduction region between the 
oceanic Nazca plate and the continental South American plate. The epicenter of the 
earthquake was approximately 8 km off the Chilean coast (35.909° S, 72.733° W) and 
the hypocenter was located at a depth of 35 km. The fault rupture zone covered a 
region of approximately 100,000 square kilometers, causing major disruption and 
losses. The earthquake magnitude, its source and mechanism of rupture are expected. 
There have been over 25 major earthquakes with magnitude greater or equal 8.0 in the 
past 500 years. 
Whereas over a million people were affected by the earthquake, the total damage 
due to ground shaking and the tsunami that followed is relatively limited. Less than 
2.5% of the engineered building stock was damaged, while a total of about one third of 
a million buildings, mostly non-engineered suffered varying degrees of damage. About 
530 people died, including about 200 who were killed by the consequential tsunami. 
There are different estimates of direct economic loss; Chilean sources indicate a direct 
economic impact bill of $30 billion. Whereas the death toll was much lower than the 
large magnitude would have implied, the earthquake was highly disruptive to the life and 
livelihood of a large proportion of the population. One of the most devastating effects of 
the earthquake was the impact on land, sea and air transportation, and 
telecommunications, as detailed below. 
Few records from the earthquake were made publicly available; of those the CCSP 
station recorded peak accelerations in the three directions (0.61g, 0.58g and 0.61g in 
NS, EW and UD) are quite high and of approximately the same value. The duration of 
this record, assessed from the plot of energy versus time, is approximately 70 seconds, 
which is consistent with the magnitude. The bracketed duration, with a threshold of 
0.05g, is much longer, yielding 100-120 seconds of strong ground shaking for the CCSP 
record. It is imprudent to draw general conclusions from such a small number of 
recordings, especially that most of them were only available in picture form, hence 
cannot be processed and interrogated. It is however observed from the available 
spectra that the shaking amplification exceeded substantially the Chilean code 
requirements in the period range from 0.2 to 0.7 seconds. The Chilean code seems to 
envelope the recorded motion spectra very well for longer and shorted periods. 
The restrictions that were imposed on the measured earthquake records that have 
not been available until the time of publication of this report has adversely affected the 
quality of the investigations undertaken. It is strongly recommended that the issue of 
public release of earthquake records immediately after the earthquake be addressed 
and arrangements made to ensure the wide dissemination of records for use by the 
engineering and seismology communities. 
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The earthquake has resulted in failures in a number of geotechnical systems 
including embankments, port structures, bridge and building foundations and was in 
many cases consistent with observations from prior earthquakes. Numerous highway 
and roadway embankments failed due to either liquefaction of underlying soils or due to 
what appears to be insufficient compaction of the embankment structure itself. 
Liquefaction and lateral spreading damaged a number of ports and bridges including 
approach abutments as well as bridge piers. Site amplification due to presence of soft 
soils is likely responsible for observed damage at a number of bridge overpasses in 
Santiago. On the other hand, retaining walls and underground structures including 
tunnels appear to have performed very well despite the long duration of shaking. It was 
also reported that areas where ground improvement was performed, liquefaction was 
prevented and building foundations performed well. 
Three of the 15 administrative divisions, Santiago, Bíobío and Maule, were severely 
affected from the earthquake due their proximity to the fault. Santiago is the capital and 
largest city in Chile. PGAs in the range of 0.2 g to 0.5 g were observed. Buildings in 
general performed very well. A limited number of RC buildings suffered significant 
damage due to structural deficiencies such as soft stories, horizontal and vertical 
irregularities, and short-column effects. Several other buildings were damaged due to 
the failure of RC walls since proper confinement in walls were not required until recently 
in the Chilean Building Code.  
The Bíobío region is located at the south half of the rupture area. Main damage to 
the region was in the coastal towns, which were severely damaged due to the tsunami 
that followed the earthquake. In Concepción, capital of Bíobío region and second 
largest city in Chile, several buildings collapsed and several 15 to 20 story buildings 
were severely damaged and will have to be demolished. In terms of transportation 
networks, most of the highways and streets suffered only minor damage but a few 
bridges were damaged or suffered collapse. While the number of failed bridges is small, 
they constituted critical links in the regional transportation network and led to significant 
impact on the area. At the time of the field investigation around one and half months 
after the earthquake, only 30 percent of industries were operating in the region due to 
the damage to structures, lack of power, or difficulty in accessing the facility. There were 
also failures in critical lifeline networks, such as gas, electricity, water, and wastewater. 
The epicenter of the earthquake was located offshore the Maule Region. Talca is 
the capital of the Maule region with a population of 230,000 and a building stock of 
75,000 houses. The city suffered the heaviest damage from the earthquake due to its 
proximity to the rupture area. In addition, there was a large number of adobe houses in 
Talca built without seismic provisions, thus compounding the damage. Approximately 
one fifth of the buildings were severely damaged. After the earthquake, the city suffered 
damage of critical lifeline network including gas, water, and electricity. All lifeline 
networks were recovered in seven-to-ten days. Downtown areas took longer to recover 
from damage as networks were relatively dense and therefore difficult to repair. In 
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general, the central valley area of the Bíobío region, was not largely affected by the 
earthquake except for damage to a few highway bridges and slopes. The area, 
however, suffered failures in water irrigation system. 
Considering the large magnitude and large rupture area of the earthquake, the 
damage to bridge structures was relatively not significant. The majority of highways are 
constructed and maintained by private sectors. These highway networks are as long as 
2,200 km in length and have around 2,000 bridges with spans longer than 10 m. Among 
these bridges, only 1 percent (8 highway and 12 pedestrian bridges) collapsed due to 
the earthquake. Approximately 100 bridges (50 highway and 50 pedestrian) were 
damaged requiring repairs. 
The MAE Center team conducted case study analysis of a building and two highway 
bridges to investigate the failures noted during the field mission. The structures are 
modeled using fiber-based finite element analysis software and inelastic dynamic time 
history analyses are conducted. For the building structure, the analysis results indicated 
that during the earthquake the increased shear demand (due to presence of masonry 
infill walls) at the columns might have exceeded the capacity resulting in the shear 
failures observed during the field mission. The case studies on the bridge structures 
studied the role of the seismic restrainers (commonly observed in bridges in Chile) and 
shear keys on the bridge response. It is concluded that seismic restrainers do not have 
the adequate strength to limit the movement of the bridge superstructure; however, they 
increase the energy dissipation by increasing the friction between the superstructure 
and the elastomeric bearings. It is also inferred from the analyses that the strength of 
the shear keys is critical for the performance of the bridge. Premature failure of a shear 
key causes uneven and excessive displacements at the ends of the superstructure. 
Then the girder ends slip off from the bearing supports and result in torsion of the 
superstructure being accumulated unidirectionally. 
Several churches were heavily damaged in the earthquake. However, relatively 
modern churches, such as the Cathedral of Talca, fared very well, with significant non-
structural damage and minor structural distress. 
There is limited data and guidelines for the evaluation of earthquake-damaged 
roadways. The condition of two road networks, Itata highway and La Madera road, were 
visually evaluated shortly after the earthquake to document typical pavement failure 
patterns. These two road networks were also selected because structural and functional 
data before and after the earthquake were available. Overall, pavements built on 
embankments experienced significantly more damage than other pavement sections 
built on grade. In general, the main distresses encountered were lateral displacement of 
embankment, pavement cracking due to embankment or subgrade displacement, 
under-drain fill settlement, and shoulder-curb separation. Embankment-related 
distresses appeared to be more pronounced in sag vertical curves and bridge 
approaches. Most of the failed fill areas met the current specification requirements 
suggesting a revision of current fill standards is warranted. Falling weight deflectometer 
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data was analyzed before and after the earthquake on one of the road networks. It was 
concluded that no measureable damage had occurred to the pavement structure that 
was not otherwise observed during the visual survey. Surface roughness data was also 
collected and International Roughness Index (IRI) was calculated to determine the 
effects the earthquake had on the pavement functional performance. As a result of the 
earthquake and subsequent patching, the average IRI changed 3.6 to 8.4 percent, in 
the passing and driving lanes, respectively. The roadway case studies highlighted and 
reinforced the need for developing a standardized condition assessment tool and 
guidelines that can be used to evaluate pavements after an earthquake. 
The February earthquake occurred at the end of Chile’s summer vacation season. 
In fact, schools were to begin their fall instruction the Monday after the earthquake. 
There are positive and negative outcomes of the timing of the earthquake. The lack of 
people concentrated in schools, roads, or major shopping centers prevented possible 
chaos and casualties. The vacation time meant both that many people were away from 
the urban areas but also that many of the people who would manage the crisis were not 
at work or even around the cities at the time. The late night hour meant that workers, 
say in emergency alert posts, were also not at work. 
The earthquake on February 27, 2010 came at a time of political transition in Chile. 
The ministerial and bureaucratic government staff, many of whom are politically 
appointed, were also in a state of disarray. It is also observed that the uneven 
distribution of population generated an uneven concentration of political and financial 
clout that in turn negatively affected those regions beyond the greater metropolitan area 
of Santiago in terms of distribution of resources. The implications for the earthquake is 
that resources were first deployed in the central metropolitan areas, regardless of need 
or intensity, and will slowly trickle down to the area closer to the epicenter that falls 
outside the metropolitan region. 
Communication networks were greatly affected from the earthquake, resulting in 
unexpected outcomes. Government itself suffered from an immediate inability to 
communicate with its own agencies and military. In the affected areas, communication 
and transportation were so severely disrupted that emergency vehicles such as 
ambulances and fire trucks could not receive accurate information nor communicate 
with each other as to location of people and situations. The total failure in 
communications meant that populations could not be warned about the impending 
tsunamis that hit the coastal areas following the earthquakes. Whatever warning 
systems were in place on paper did not function at the time. Return to a fully networked 
communications status took up to two weeks. Whereas those connected managed to 
get news of their status out to others, those in the region without these connections 
might have remained more or less unconnected for a week or more; in most households 
there was a week gap in electric power. Even up to the time of the MAE Center trip in 
April there was still little knowledge about communities to the south of Bíobío. 
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The MAE Center field reconnaissance team considers that Chile responded very 
well to the massive earthquake; an earthquake that would have totally devastated a less 
prepared community with a lower level of rigorous design and well-controlled 
construction industry. Contrasting the impact of the Maule earthquake on Chile with the 
impact of recent earthquakes of lesser magnitudes around the world confirms that 
Chilean engineering is of a very high standard and that apart from severe logistical 
disruption and economic loss to industry and commerce, Chile is in a reasonable state 
of earthquake response preparedness. 
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APPENDIX A – FIELD MISSION DETAILS 
A.1. FIELD MISSION MEMBERS AND SPECIALIZATION 
Table A.1 The Mid-America Earthquake Center team and specializations 
Name Affiliation Expertise Technical Role 
Amr Elnashai University of Illinois Earthquake engineering Team Leader 
Imad Al Qadi University of Illinois Transportation and pavement Focus on pavement failures 
Youssef 
Hashash University of Illinois 
Geotechnical 
earthquake 
engineering 
Focus on geotechnical 
failures 
Jefferey 
Roesler University of Illinois Transportation 
Focus on transportation 
systems and pavement 
failures 
Angharad 
Valdivia University of Illinois 
Media and 
communication Focus on the role of media 
Bora 
Gencturk University of Illinois 
Earthquake 
engineering 
Documentation and 
reporting coordinator, focus 
on building failures 
Oh Sung 
Kwon 
Missouri University of 
Science and 
Technology 
Earthquake 
engineering 
Focus on soil structure 
interaction and bridge 
failures 
Sung Jig Kim University of Connecticut 
Earthquake 
engineering 
Focus on building failures, 
ground motion processing 
Jazalyn 
Dukes 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology 
Earthquake 
engineering Focus on building failures 
Seong Hoon 
Jeong Inha University 
Earthquake 
engineering Focus on bridge failures 
 
A.2. CHILEAN HOST ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Catholic University of Chile 
2. University of Concepción 
3. University of Chile 
4. Municipality of Talca 
5. Roadway Concession Itata 
6. Roadway Concession Talca 
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A.3. FIELD MISSION ITINERARY 
Table A.2 Field mission itinerary 
Date Description 
April 12 AM Arrive in Santiago PM Meetings at the Catholic University of Chile 
April 13 
AM Pick-up rental cars Visit to damage sites in Santiago (Ciudad Empresarial) 
PM Drive to Concepción (stop at bride and pavement failures along Route 5 including the case study 3) 
April 14 AM 
Meetings at the University of Concepción 
Visit the damaged buildings of the University of Concepción (including 
the case study 1: the Odontology Building) 
PM Visit to damage sites in Concepción, Talcahuano and Coronel 
April 15 
AM 
Meetings at the Roadway Concession of Itata 
Visit to a damaged bridge managed by the Roadway Concession of 
Itata (case study 2) 
PM Drive to Talca Meetings with the Roadway Concession of Talca 
April 16 AM 
Meeting with city officials in Talca 
Visit damage sites in Talca (including the case study 4: the Cathedral 
of Talca) 
PM Transfer back to Santiago and return rental cars 
April 17 AM Meetings at the University of Chile PM Team leaves Chile 
 
A.4. ROUTE AND VISITED SITES 
The locations of the sites/organizations categorized under: building, bridge, 
historical and underground structures, ports, embankments, landslides, foundation 
failures, and hosting organizations; and separated by regions: Santiago, Santiago to 
Curicó along Route 5, Curicó-Talca-Mataquito, Talca, Talca-Chillán along Route 5, 
Chillán-Concepción-Talcahuano-Coronel-Lota-Arauco, Concepción, and ports of 
Talcahuano and St. Vicente; visited by the MAE Center team are summarized in Table 
A.3 through Table A.11, and shown on maps in Figure A.1 through Figure A.8. 
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Table A.3 Information on building structures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
B1 Ciudad Empresarial Hotel 33°23'23.20"S 70°37'8.93"W 
B2 University of Concepción - Chemistry Building 36°49'46.25"S 73° 2'13.42"W 
B3 University of Concepción - Gymnasium 36°49'35.47"S 73° 2'12.10"W 
B4 Case Study 1: University of Concepción - Odontology Building 36°49'32.78"S 73° 2'11.35"W 
B5 Damaged Highrise in Concepción 36°49'45.02"S 73° 2'43.00"W 
B6 O'Higgins Tower in Concepción 36°49'44.35"S 73° 3'16.70"W 
B7 Alto Río Condominium in Concepción 36°49'41.82"S 73° 3'42.07"W 
B8 Building close to Talcahuano Port 36°43'9.76"S 73° 6'29.63"W 
B9 Building at the Talcahuano shorefront 36°43'6.13"S 73° 6'29.94"W 
B10 Building at the Talcahuano Port 36°42'58.19"S 73° 6'28.06"W 
B11 Typical adobe failures in Talca 35°25'32.82"S 71°39'2.74"W 
B12 Edificio Aranjuez 35°25'40.75"S 71°39'57.46"W 
B13 Tribunales de Justicia de Talca 35°25'16.65"S 71°40'3.83"W 
B14 Building at the Ciudad Empresarial Business Complex 33°23'16.99"S 70°37'2.57"W 
Table A.4 Information on ports visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
P1 Shipwreck at the Talcahuano Port 36°42'46.84"S 73° 6'35.15"W 
P2 Port of Talcahuano 36°42'52.21"S 73° 6'30.22"W 
P3 Port of Coronel 37° 1'43.95"S 73° 8'59.16"W 
P4 Port Lota 37° 5'50.26"S 73° 9'33.59"W 
P5 Port St. Vicente 36°43'31.86"S 73° 7'56.60"W 
Table A.5 Locations of the hosting organizations 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
H1 Catholic University of Chile 33°29'56.48"S 70°36'48.69"W 
H2 University of Concepción 36°49'45.97"S 73° 2'13.35"W 
H3 Roadway Concession of Itata 36°43'47.60"S 72°51'38.39"W 
Table A.6 Information on bridge structures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
R1 Las Mercedes Bridge 34° 4'19.41"S 70°45'45.18"W 
R2 Route 5 overpass near Chillán 36°35'4.79"S 72° 6'29.62"W 
R3 Perquilauquén Bridge 36°15'15.04"S 71°48'49.84"W 
R4 Paso Cladio Arrau 36°39'32.32"S 72°19'29.96"W 
R5 Puente Mataquito 35° 3'2.56"S 72° 9'44.13"W 
R6 Miraflores Bridge 33°23'39.37"S 70°46'9.85"W 
R7 Lo Echevers Bridge 33°22'34.17"S 70°44'51.87"W 
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Table A.7 Information on historical structures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
I1 Edificio Intendencia Maule in Talca 35°25'34.79"S 71°39'55.43"W 
I2 Liceo de Niñas Marta Donoso 35°25'22.76"S 71°39'28.55"W 
I3 Iglesia Los Salesianos 35°25'43.68"S 71°39'36.64"W 
I4 Cathedral of Talca 35°25'33.25"S 71°40'0.93"W 
Table A.8 Information on embankments visited by the MAE Center team (in 
addition to those mentioned in Chapter 5) 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
E1 Route 5 overpass embankment, to Retiro at Tucapel Mill 36° 3'4.35"S 71°46'4.82"W 
E2 Roadway embankment - 5 km south of Parral 36°11'8.42"S 71°49'31.49"W 
Table A.9 Information on underground structures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
U1 Highway tunnel on Route 5 33°54'46.32"S 70°43'31.92"W 
U2 Highway box structure 33°32'29.30"S 70°37'20.72"W 
Table A.10 Information on landslides visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
L1 Aracua Landslides 37°14'31.97"S 73°25'16.35"W 
Table A.11 Information on foundation failures visited by the MAE Center team 
Icon Name/Description Latitude Longitude 
F1 Green building 36°42'51.36"S 73° 6'58.92"W 
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Figure A.1 Santiago region 
 
Figure A.2 Santiago to Curicó along Route 5 
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Figure A.3 Curicó-Talca-Mataquito 
 
Figure A.4 Talca region 
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Figure A.5 Talca-Chillán along Route 5 
 
Figure A.6 Chillán-Concepción-Talcahuano-Coronel-Lota-Arauco 
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Figure A.7 Concepción region 
 
Figure A.8 Ports of Talcahuano and St. Vicente 
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APPENDIX B – STRONG GROUND MOTION 
The information provided here is complementary to Section 2.4. For full references 
see Section 2.5. 
B.1. PGA AND RESPONSE SPECTRA ATTENUATION RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Figure B.1 PGA and response spectra attenuation relationships by Zhao et al. (2006) 
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Figure B.2 PGA and response spectra attenuation relationships by Atkinson and 
Boore (2003) 
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Figure B.3 PGA and response spectra attenuation relationships by Campbell and 
Bozorgnia (2003) 
 
0.1
0.5
1
2
P
G
A
 (g
)
 
 
Firm rock
Soft rock
Very firm soil
Firm soil
Seis. Service
RENADIC
0.1
0.5
1
2
Sa
 (g
) a
t T
=0
.1
0 
se
c
0.1
0.5
1
2
Sa
 (g
) a
t T
=0
.2
0 
se
c
0.1
0.5
1
2
Sa
 (g
) a
t T
=0
.4
0 
se
c
10 50 100 200
0.1
0.5
1
2
Closest Distance to Rupture Plane (km)
S
a 
(g
) a
t T
=1
.0
0 
se
c
10 50 100 200
0.1
0.5
1
2
Closest Distance to Rupture Plane (km)
S
a 
(g
) a
t T
=2
.0
0 
se
c
186 
 
Figure B.4 PGA and response spectra attenuation relationships by Gregor et al. 
(2002) 
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Figure B.5 PGA and response spectra attenuation relationships by Youngs et al. 
(1997) 
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APPENDIX C – CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE 
CATHEDRAL OF TALCA 
Work components referred to: these specifications and basis for calculation refer to 
the construction of the foundation, walls, pillars, and floor and roof beams contained in 
the plans of the consulting engineers (Alberto Covarrubbias P. and Carlos Infante C.) in 
accordance with the project architect (Ramon Venegas C.). 
Levels: the main level corresponds to the first finished floor at 0.65 m on the level of 
the sill. 
Installation tasks: Includes land clearing, temporary facilities, layout and replanting 
permits and municipal taxes in force on that date. 
Excavation and earth moving: Will be the depth and width indicated in the details of 
the foundation. 
Reinforced concrete, basis for calculations: Concrete has been calculated in 
accordance with the rules for calculation and construction of reinforced concrete works 
established by decree #1726 of July 10, 1933 and under the following conditions: 
• Floor live loads – 500 kg/m2 
• Stair live loads – 500 kg/m2 
• Weight of floor and stucco – 100 kg/m2 
• The pillars have been calculated to withstand all loads simultaneously 
• Maximum pressure on the ground – 1.5 kg/cm2 
• Seismic coefficient – 1/10 g 
The execution of the work must be done in all its parts according to the construction 
and Chilean standards of 1933 for the execution of reinforced concrete works. 
Mat reinforcement details: will be made by the consulting engineers who will deliver 
early enough to properly conduct the work. In all of the reinforcement in the long 
direction, these details will be made in accordance with the quantities of reinforcement 
listed in the plans and drawings of the beams/girders/joists. 
Reinforcement in the slabs at the supports: when the main truss/reinforcement of 
the slab is parallel to the support, use a higher reinforcement, not less than half that of 
the other supports, nor less than 1/4 diameter at 20 (no units). This reinforcement will 
aim to resist the fixed end moments. In the main beams this longitudinal reinforcement 
equal to 5 times the thickness of the fiber and will not be less than 3/8 at 20. 
Cement: foreign cement is employed which complies with the rules governing the 
acceptance and use of this material in public works. In each batch of cement that is 
ordered by the consulting engineers or their representatives, strength testing will be 
done in the shop. 
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Sand: river sand of good quality, thick, clean and varying well in size of 7-35mm. 
Coarse Aggregate: gravel or crushed stone, clean and variable in size. 
Reinforcement: will be of mild steel with circular cross-section of premium quality 
and made in Chile. Fabricated by Siemens-Martin. 
Proportions: in works for reinforced concrete in general, 1:2:4 or 8 bags of cement 
per cubic meter of concrete made. The consulting engineers and their representatives 
reserve the right to modify the proportions between sand and gravel keeping the 
quantities of cement per cubic meter constant. 
Preparation and Placement of Concrete: the concrete will be made by machine with 
as little water proportioned as possible; it is absolutely unacceptable if the water rises to 
the surface in appreciable quantities. Concrete placement may not commence while the 
reinforcement mats have not been reviewed and accepted by the consulting engineers 
or representatives. Special precautions were taken so that the reinforcement is 
maintained in its proper place during the pour. Resuming the work of the placement of 
the concrete, must scrape and place the cement grout before the concrete sets. 
Forms and Scaffolds: scaffolds will be made solid enough to not deform or fall with 
loads that they need to support. The beams and slab molds will be made with camber 
necessary so that after removal of forms, beams and slabs will have flat faces and 
corresponding levels. Reinforcement must be accepted by the consulting engineers or 
representatives prior to placement in the forms. Plumb defects that occur in the 
concrete work resulting from error of lack of ties in the mold, and which go beyond 2 cm, 
must be repaired by the contractor at their own cost. 
Traffic on the forms: once the trusses are placed, avoid any traffic on the 
molds/forms and make the concrete settle on the boards and planks. 
Breakdown and removal of forms: everything will be done by written consent of the 
engineers or consultants who they represent. 
Watering of the concrete: the concrete must be protected for the first 7 days, from 
abrupt changes in temperature, and from the direct solar rays, taking care to keep the 
proper permanent moisture state. 
Tests: the contractor will be required to provide workers sandbags and other items 
necessary to conduct stability testing of the work. These tests will effect up to 10 
percent of the floors. Tests may also be ordered to measure the execution of the 
construction of test blocks or beams. The concrete used for these tests must be made 
at the same time and place. 
Reinforcing Dimensions: the plans indicate the reinforcement at the center should 
be considered to be placed in three templates, two bent bars and a straight bar. The 
bent bars penetrate the adjacent extremes around 0.2 of the length of the section. The 
reinforcement of the beams are listed in a special box – the bent bars of a section 
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should be considered continuous and extending into the next section to account for the 
negative moments. 
Masonry: Masonry Bricks to be used should be top quality, well cooked and placed 
completely submerged in water. The mortar will be a mix of cement and sand at a 1:6 
ratio. The masonry walls are erected prior to casting the pillars embedded in them that 
are especially packed/compressed to ensure a good interlocking between the two. 
Structure of iron steeple: The top of the pyramid-shaped tower of iron is anchored at 
the bottom with reinforced concrete. 
Roofing slabs: Will be oak with sections indicated in the detailed plans 
Covering of tile: Is of plain/flat tile. 
Tinsmith: Channels and flashings will be zinc. Water outputs will be cast iron. 
Gutters/downspouts will be galvanized iron. 
Pavements:  
• The two outdoor terraces and crypt are green stone from Maule 
• Reconstituted marble for the aisles 
• Marble in the center part 
Tower Ladder: Made of iron 
Terraces: The entries will be tiered green stone steps from Maule, along with the 
stairway to the crypt. All other interior steps will be marble. 
Choir stairs: Choir stairs will be concrete covered with wood (Rauli wood). 
Stucco: Both interior and exterior will be white cement and speculum 
Doors:  All of the doors of the cathedral are wood according to detail drawings. 
Windows: The windows are iron. 
Glass: All of the windows will have stained glass 
 
The Mid-America Earthquake Center is a graduated National Science Foundation
Engineering Research Center, which was funded under cooperative agreement
reference EEC 97-01785.
On February 27, 2010 at 03:34 am local time, a powerful earthquake of
magnitude 8.8 struck central Chile. The epicenter of the earthquake was
approximately 8 km off the central region of the Chilean coast. With an inclined
rupture area of more than 80,000 square km that extends onshore, the region of
Maule was subjected to a direct hit, with intense shaking of duration of at least
100 seconds, and peak horizontal and vertical ground acceleration of over 0.6
g. The earthquake caused the death of 521 persons, with almost half of the
fatalities caused by the consequential tsunami. Over 800,000 individuals were
directly affected through death, injury and displacement. More than a third of a
million buildings were damaged to varying degrees, including several cases of
total collapse of major structures. The transportation system was dealt a
crippling blow, with 830 failures registered with the Ministry of Public Works on
roads in both the public and private transportation networks. Disruption of
commerce as well as the rescue and response effort resulted from the damage
to roads, embankments and bridges. On the whole, the performance of
engineered structures was reasonable, taking into account the magnitude and
proximity of the earthquake. The latter conclusion is supported by the
observations from several back-analyses presented in this report. Damage to
non-engineered construction is as expected in major earthquakes. Most
reinforced concrete bridges behaved well.
The role of social networking tools in enabling the affected population to
communicate was a most interesting feature in the response to this
earthquake. Due to the failure of the power grid, and the congestion of the
cellphone network, the population resorted to short message service and web
social media. Ham radio networks were activated to fill gaps due to the failure
of the radio network in places. The failure in ham radio broadcast in coastal
regions might have increased the fatalities because tsunami warning did not
reach all hazardous locations.
The MAE Center field reconnaissance team members consider that Chilean
engineering was proven to be robust and that seismic design provisions and
construction practices are of high standard. The extensive damage from this
Mw = 8.8 earthquake is expected and within the ‘life safety’ performance target
of seismic design codes.
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